The Serbian intellectual, political, and military leadership had kept itself in place by abusing the name “Yugoslavia”, by way of which, since as early as 1918, it had enjoyed full supremacy over this geopolitical territory and over the nations inhabiting it. Under the given constellation of powers and within the framework of the anti-fascistic coalition, the State was reconstructed by abandoning the Greater Serbia hegemony and by accepting the Platform of the National Liberation Movement, and the federative system of the country it had successfully fought to enforce. When this political formula was exhausted in the second half of the 1980s, under influence of the Greater Serbia tendencies, the Yugoslav state came under a crisis which had required a responsible reconstruction of the common state on the basis of an actual, not just declarative equality.
The crisis of the Yugoslav socialist state had definitely brought the Greater Serbia hegemony established decades ago into question. Its direct executors and beneficiaries, from army and police officers, diplomats, party members and apparatus, all the way to the SANU — the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the universities, as well as the radio, TV and other media, felt endangered in their monopolistic positions. Such increased demands for actual equality in the distribution of powers and social functions, mainly obtained through the 1974 Constitution, were accused as a threat to the Serbian people. These Greater Serbia forces had assessed that the forthcoming confusion on the international level will make it easier for them to finally fulfil their wartime goals, established as early as in the 19th century (“All Serbs in one State”).
The disruption of the strongly privileged position of the Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had caused resistance throughout the period of the “new Yugoslavia”, culminating with Rankovic’s coup attempt in 1966, and frequently met support in the “Greater Russia” aspirations of the USSR. In the seventies, this showed as resistance against the 1974 Constitution, both during its preparation and immediately after its adoption. It was primarily reflected through the resistance against its shifts towards the actual equality of the non-Serbian nations and ethnic minorities, as well as its dual component armed forces concept. Only two years after the Constitution had been adopted, Draza Markovic ordered the drafting of the “Blue Book” about “the injustice done to the Serbs”. The death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 symbolized the disappearance of an important integrating factor of the SFRY. As early as in late 1981, Petar Stambolic threatened that the Serbs will rely on their “power and numbers”, and the next year, he had revived the issue of the “Blue Book”. The escalation of revival of the Greater Serbia movement could no longer be stopped, particularly once the Literary Association of Serbia and the SANU had stepped onto the scene.
Afraid of the inevitable loss of solid material support, its second such integrative factor — the JNA and its leadership (since 1982, Admiral Branko Mamula and his successor and trainee, General Veljko Kadijevic)4 had started searching for a solution for its own position. The reorganization of the system of command and suppression of the territorial defence had changed the role of the Armed Forces. Instead of defence from external aggression, it intended to impose itself as a referee of the inner crisis. The support was seen in the conceptually similar aspirations of such forces in Serbia and the USSR.
The political developments in the SFRY since 1986 had been characterized by open manifestation and strengthening of nationalism. This nationalism, generated in Belgrade, within the Serbian intellectual, political and military leadership, had lead to an internal crisis in the State, which shook the foundations of socialist Yugoslavia and allowed to use the Greater Serbia project as a fundament for the break-up of the joint Yugoslav state. In essence, this involved a fascistic, nationalist program and a nationalist, aggressive policy encumbering the Serbian nation with a mythological past. The best known and most comprehensive program of this kind was contained in the opinions of the SANU, “where the Serbian nationalist program was designed and drafted”, in particular in its Memorandum (the program for the creation of “Greater Serbia”, “the nationalist testament”, “the manual of nationalism”), which “had expressed the very political idea, deeply rooted and rich in tradition, from Garasanin’s ‘Nacertanije’ to Moljevic’s program of a ‘Homogenous Serbia’”. This political concept “understood and accepted Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia for which the AVNOJ-wise concept of regulation of interethnic relations, based on the full equality of the Yugoslav nations and their republics in a common federation, meant in turn inequality for the Serbs, as the majority nation”. For these reasons, “the authors of the Memorandum condemned the decisions of the AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia; note by the translator) as an ‘anti-Serbian creation’, rejecting the AVNOJ- based borders, ‘because they had divided the Serbian people’, and because due to them, ‘the Serbian nation did not receive the right to have its own state’”. They “used certain very hard words“ to describe the condition of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, and in relation to this, they concluded that “one can not imagine a worse historical defeat than the one suffered by the Serbs in Yugoslavia“, “so that the solution of the Serbian issue imposes itself as a task of top priority”. They saw a solution in the rearrangement of the Yugoslav state ensuring the Serbian nation, as the major one, a dominant position in the centralized Yugoslav federation. Were this not attainable, the Serbs “would have to seek another alternative, i.e. the unification in a Greater Serbia, of the Serbian ethnic area.” Starting from such concepts, the Serbs imposed the model of Yugoslav identification which “aimed at denial of the national specificities of the other peoples”, particularly Bosniaks, “while retaining privileges of the majority nation, towards serbization of Yugoslavia, that is, towards Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia”. The Greater Serbian nationalism was always pro-Yugoslav as much as it suited its view of the order in the common state, that is, it started becoming anti-Yugoslav when it started realizing that the Unitarian concept of the state will not go.
In accordance with its general concept, the Serbian nationalism turned to the concept of Greater Serbia, that is, encircling of the “Serbian lands“ and implementation of the policy of “All Serbs in one State“. The Serbian policy opted for implementation of its program for “the state of all the Serbs“ at any price, even using arms. This meant focusing towards fascistization and cutting Yugoslavia to pieces, as well as forced changing of the republic borders.
After the Eighth session of CK SK Serbia (1987), the radical nationalist and fascistic group of Slobodan Milosevic broke onto the scene, handling the paroles on the general endangerment of the Serbs and the program “All Serbs in one State“. Since then, the Serbian nationalism of criminal nature became the state policy “jointly backed” by the republic state apparatus, the mass media, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Literary Association of Serbia, as well as “well-known Serbian nationalists and many who until recently had been Communists”. In the summer and fall of 1988, in order to disseminate the nationalist indoctrination of the masses, a nationalist-populist movement was created, and the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”, that is, the “bureaucratic anti-revolution”, as the mass rallies were called, putchist acts of dismissal of legitimate power and establishment of the hard, centralist, unlimited power, with its foremost rows headed by the most prominent Serbian nationalists. “All was pushed aside, the worker strikes, the social dissatisfaction: the Serbian cause became the symbol of life and the value above all others. The rallies looked like national festivals”. The rallying mass “was dragged in front of each state institution that was finger-pointed for ‘pulling down’... This ‘selected army’, with the Chetnik cockades over the heads of Njegos, Vuk, Slobodan Milosevic... with bloodthirsty mascots, paroles, banners, conspirative fur hats, gusle [A traditional Serb music instrument], knives clenched in between teeth... with a whole iconography of the darkest populist kitsch, pronouncing on site verdicts by roaring, calling names, chanting, applauding to each curse, each threat and verdict. All those who were not in the mob were pronounced traitors, enemies, anti-Serbs, immoral...” Patriotism was proven “by the masses gathered, and the people had the feeling that for the first time, they were breathing freely. The state institutions ceased functioning: the rallies became the most powerful weapon in the hands of power”. What happened next was “the big head-cutting of the main people in the committees, municipalities, enterprises, institutions. The membership was particularly crazed by the demagogic propaganda that Yugoslavia was endangered by the other Yugoslav nations, but only not by the Serbs, so that, just as Ljubicic had foreseen, it could only be defended by the Serbs and the Yugoslav National Army! Yet, such a defence meant a death verdict for Yugoslavia. What else could it be when it meant that the Serbs and the JNA would shoot other Yugoslav nations also making up this Yugoslavia thing, all of this allegedly just in order to save Yugoslavia!”
Milosevic’s nationalist policy and practice of mass rallies and putsch methods (“bureaucratic anti-revolution“) had dismissed the legally elected leaderships and removed the undesirable people in positions in Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. Through a revision of the 1974 Constitution, the autonomies of Vojvodina and Kosovo were also revoked (with the adoption of the 1989 Serbian Constitution), whereby Serbia was the first republic to proclaim secessionism, destroy the constitutional order of the SFRY (making a coup against the federal Constitution), and started with the process of formation of Greater Serbia even before multi-party elections. In Montenegro, a collaborationist regime was formed. The process of Serbian homogenisation was accelerated, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, the Serbian nationalism solidified its positions in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and through a change of the powers in the federal institutions, primarily in the Presidency of the SFRY, the JNA and the SKJ, it broke up the federal foundations of the SFRY and became stronger for the upcoming attempts at rearrangement of Yugoslavia, using its own model.
The mass support Milosevic had received was quickly transformed into the nationalist Greater Serbia movement of fascistic character. Using the power of this movement, Milosevic established an authoritarian order, which allowed him to bring up the issue of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an interstate issue which could only be resolved by the formation of a state of the Serbian people in those republics, exactly based on the theses promoted by Dobrica Cosic and the circle surrounding him: the endangerment of the Serbian people and the exhaustion of the Yugoslav framework, and the need to change the 1974 Constitution, pursuant to which Serbia was allegedly discriminated in relation to the other republics.
The populist movement promoted Milosevic into a national hero, into the leader of all the Serbs. Slobodan Milosevic “abused the communists and anti-communists, nationalists and the Chetnik emigration, scholars, the Serbs across the Drina River and the Church”. “The wave of populism crossed the Drina River, where it had found strong support”.
The ceremonial excavation of mass graves and transportation of Serbian bones, in organization of the Serbian Orthodox Church, from one monastery in Yugoslavia to another, at places to be called “the Serbian lands“, “was celebrated as a national holiday and incited awareness on the undefeated people”. The relics of (the Serbian) Emperor Lazar “were spitefully marched past across the whole ‘Serbian territory’, in order to raise nationalist temperature”.
A significant segment of Serbian scholars refused the socialist prefix and took on the leading role in the revival and escalation of the Greater Serbia nationalism in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century. The Serbian scholars (scientists, Academicians, writers, and other public personalities) “provided the legitimacy to the new regime by giving them their support”. The planners and leaders of the aggression were “the ethnically oriented intellectuals, the so-called nationalist elite”, who proclaimed that Serbia, through the heritage of the People’s Liberation War, was thrown back into shade, and that it was denied the role of the Piedmont as the only creator of Yugoslavia, whose federal system was not at their will. This is why long preparations were made to present the People’s Liberation War (NOR) in the most negative colour possible, detrimental to the national interests of the Serbian and Montenegrin nations. There were remembrances of the Ustashas’ [Croat Fascists in the World War Two] mass murders of the Serbs, which needed to be avenged in the new war, and then statements were presented that the Partisans had killed Serbs, particularly at the Srem frontline area, and protected Ustashas, etc. In this way, they were silently going over and distorting the truth about the anti-fascistic People’s Liberation War of the nations of Yugoslavia.
Many NOR veterans converted into convinced nationalists, and their veteran organizations were mainly supporting the aggression policy of the Serbian regime, too. “The last representatives of the Partisan generation, who had ruled Serbia for over four decades, were removed from politics with the completion of the Eighth Session”.
The Serbian nationalism from the 1990s started appearing not only as a traditional and anti-system nationalism, with the platform defeated in People’s Liberation War, but also as a “legal nationalism”, within the very system and within the SKJ. And it was exactly this “party”, “communist nationalism” that was the most deserving for the “doing in” of both the socialist system, and of Yugoslavia.
With the aim to realize the dream of a large, ethnically clean state up to the Kupa and Drava rivers, in which “all the Serbs would be in a single state”, special attention was attached to the affirmation of the nationalist policy among the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a stubborn campaign led on terms of that their rights and even their survival can only be ensured in a single state of the Serbian nation. The strife for the single Serbian state was declared as their most important task. Unless this goal can be accomplished in a peaceful way, it was supposed to be realized using force. It was claimed that no victims are big enough to accomplish this goal, and that the opportunity to have it realized was “now, or never”.
The Greater Serbia nationalists, blinded with the megalomaniac goals and with the assessment that those goals were to be accomplished “now, or never”, acted arrogantly, relying mainly on force. All the other proposals for a rearrangement of Yugoslavia (including an asymmetric federation, a confederation, a union of sovereign states) provided as compromises in order to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav peoples and to avoid potential tragic consequences of their division were arrogantly refused by them. They assessed that the Bosniaks and Macedonians will have to side up with and stay in SFRY, because “realistically, they have no other choice”, and if the Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina do oppose, their resistance will be very quickly overpowered by the JNA.
Under the conditions of strengthening nationalist policy and a less decisive position of the leadership of the SKJ and the state leadership in confronting the ever-stronger nationalism, the military leadership of the JNA accepted the Greater Serbia nationalist policy. The leadership of the JNA became “an instrument of the Serbian regime”, whose task, according to general Veljko Kadijevic, the minister of the army, was to “protect the territories with Serbian population, to arm them and to secure the borders of the future, projected Yugoslavia”. By using the cruellest actions imaginable, the JNA participated in the break-up of Yugoslavia. It sided along with the “warrior will of the political leadership of the largest nation in Yugoslavia, turning its weapons against the other, less numerous nations”. The JNA, and later the Army of Yugoslavia, siding along with the Greater Serbia nationalism and its fascistic policy in “rounding up the Serbian lands”, used powerful weapons “that had been, purchased by all of our peoples over years, with great affection for their army, not sparing their scarce means — for the devastation of villages and cities across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which meant the destruction of Yugoslavia”.
The Serbian hegemony concept, which had tailored Yugoslavia in 1918 and survived the revolution and almost half of a century of the socialist rule, buried Yugoslavia finally down. Due to the inability to snatch absolute influence in the Presidency of the SFRY and the Central Committee of the SKJ, at the Fourteenth Congress (January 20-23, 1990), the Greater Serbia-oriented politicians broke up the SKJ as an integrative factor of the Federation. By revoking the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, but keeping their votes in the Presidency of the SFRY, they made efforts to ensure the possibility to vote all the others down, which ultimately led to the paralysis of the Presidency in a stalemate position.
By converting the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (1988) and by excluding the republics and provinces from the system of directing and command over the armed forces and the armed combat, the method of directing and command in the armed forces was significantly changed. Hence, the republics and provinces were denied of their constitutional rights in the management over the Territorial Defence Corps. The subjection of the Territorial Defence to all the headquarters of the JNA in their zones of responsibilities was implemented. By staging the crisis of the Presidency of the SFRY in Yugoslavia (in March of 1991), a sequence of covered-up state coups was initiated. This sequence was finalized by Branko Kostic, on October 3, 1991, with the putsch at the Presidency of the SFRY.
The basic standpoint, in essence, was in the Nazi ideology, with relevant fascistic features. This ideology was developed and formed in the numerous Greater Serbia program documents (“Nacertanije”, “Gorski Vijenac”; the policy of the Kingdom of Serbia; the linguistic mechanism of Vuk Karadzic; the documents of secret and semi- military organizations; the materials of the Corfu Declaration of 1917; “the racial prejudice” of Jovan Cvijic; the nationalist programs of the Serbian bourgeois circles, best expressed in the Serbian Culture Club and its genocidal program document known after Moljevic’s tractate “A HOMOGENOUS SERBIA”; the genocidal program of the Chetnik movement of Drazo Mihajlovic; the program documents of the SANU, in particular the Memorandum; the historic, philosophic and literary works, documents of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the like). In the heart of this ideology lay a pathological hatred against anything that was not Serbian or Orthodox. The hatred against the Bosniaks and Islam is more than present in Serbian historiography, literature, and politics. This genocidal ideology has motivated the biological and spiritual eradication and destruction of the Bosniaks, because they were the main obstacles to the realization of the Greater Serbia concept.
The fifth-column Serbian Democratic Parties of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were most directly used in the service of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation and in the completion of the Greater Serbia state project. A number of activities and procedures were undertaken in order to destroy the legal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina.References:
1. S. Cekic, AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.- 1993., Sarajevo 1994, p. 26; V. Zarkovic, NACIONALIZAM I SLOM JUGOSLAVIJE, in: STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE, Compilation of Works from the Round Table STARANJE I RAZBIJANJE JUGOSLAVIJE, Belgrade, December 5-7, pp. 227-237.
2. N. Pasic — R. Ratkovic — B. Spadijer, PLAVA KNJIGA , Belgrade 1977; I. Stambolic, PUT U BESPUCE, Belgrade 1995, pp. 65-70. 3. M. Kreso, AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU - AMBIJENT POCINJENOG GENOCIDA, in: GENOCID U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI 1991-1995, Compilation of Works of the International Congress for the Documentation of the Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bonn, August 31 through September 4, 1995, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 45-50.
4. General Nikola Ljubicic, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia, appointed Admiral Branko Mamula in 1982 to the post of the Federal Secretary for Defence, who had, in the following years, relevantly changed the doctrine of general national defence and transformed the JNA from an instrument of defence against external aggression, into an instrument for internal conflicts in the country, and accelerated the domination of Serbian and dogmatic staff, with an ambition to be an arbiter for a potential rearrangement of the country. Later on, Ljubicic proposed, supported and offered support to Slobodan Milosevic for the head function in Serbia, and thus took on the infamous role of a Serbian Hindenburg.
5. For the author’s interpretation and basic sequence of events, see: Branko Mamula, SLUCAJ JUGOSLAVIJA, Podgorica 2000.
6. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, formed as the “Society of Serbian Awareness” in 1842, was involved, in addition to the study of cultural and other problems of Serbia and the Serbian people, in the design and projection of the development and objectives of the Serbian state, even of the Greater Serbia ones, once they became a current topic. In 1945, its previous status was re-established (i.e. the status it had before the occupation time), and the removed president Aleksandar Belic was reinvested. Unlike the previous 400 printed sheets each year, after the liberation of the country, and as early as in 1952, it had already reached over one thousand printed sheets each year. At the time, it had 36 full-time and 35 associate members, and over 1,000 associates and employees. Nothing had relevantly changed during the course of forty years. The Academy remained under the influence of the old members and ideas, new members were hardly admitted, even in the field of natural sciences. The reconnection into functioning, in which at a time in the past it used to be a dominant factor, began no later than in 1984. In November of that year, the prominent Academician and writer Dobrica Cosic proposed that the Academy provide its position on the need for involvement “in general societal and national problems” (A. Belic, SRPSKA AKADEMIJA NAUKA, in: ENCIKLOPEDIJA JUGOSLAVIJE, Volume 1, Belgrade 1955, pp. 32-41.). Two years later, its MEMORANDUM saw the light of day, and “speeches“ followed — one after the other — all containing nationalist and war- instigating topics. All the Academicians of the SANU (except for two) had supported the Memorandum, in which they stated their position in favour of the broaching of the Serbian national issue in Yugoslavia, and the directions for its solution, “that is, for a certain policy of solution of the Serbian issue” (M. Minic, RATOVI U HRVATSKOJ I BOSNI I HECEGOVINI 1991.-1995., Sarajevo — Munich — Novi Sad — Zagreb 2002, p. 89). Dobrica Cosic was the main ideologist of the MEMORANDUM of the SANU, a nationalist project, formulating all the Serbian “injustices“ and determining the direction of the Serbian nationalist policy (S. Biserko, PRINUDNI IZLAZAK IZ SENKE, HELSINSKA POVELJA, no. 60, Belgrade, January 2002, pp. 1-2). One of the authors of the Memorandum was the Academician Mihajlo Markovic. On June 9, 1992, on the first channel of the Belgrade TV, participating in a discussion among several well-known politicians from several political parties and in the capacity of the Vice President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, in presenting his opinion on the actions by the Academicians who were asking for the resignation of the President of the Republic of Serbia (Milosevic) and the Government of Serbia, he stated among other things, that he is proud of being one of the authors of the Memorandum (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 90). The Memorandum exerted major influence on the official policy of Serbia in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the Serbian national issue within it, for the purpose of the realization of the Serbian nationalist program. Instead of a democratic policy for the resolution of the issue of ethnic relations in Yugoslavia, including the Serbian national issue, one was applied which had arisen out of nationalist positions, and mainly implemented by the state government, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Republic of Serbia. Milosevic and the Government of Serbia conducted such a policy, jointly formulated with participation of the Academicians of the SANU (Ibid.). The authors of the Memorandum had exclusively addressed the Serbian national issue. They had criticized the policy conducted in Yugoslavia in the war and after the war towards Serbia, the Serbian people and the Serbian national issue, especially since: - the Serbian people were left in an unequal position; - Serbia was in an unequal position within Yugoslavia; - The Serbian people were divided into several republics (since 24% of the Serbs lived outside of Serbia); - The Serbian people did not receive their own state (the Serbian nation “did not receive the right to have its own state”); - Serbia was lagging behind in economic development, and the like (Ibid., pp. 91-96). In this way, a very broad awareness on a position of inequality, on being disadvantaged, on the anti-Serbian coalition and the coalition against Serbia and the Serbian people, and other things, was being created. Hence the “spiritual condition” was ignited with Serbs in Serbia and outside Serbia, that the only solution for the Serbian people is that “all Serbs should live in one state”, and that this must be accomplished either in a peaceful way, or by way of arms (announced for the first time at the rally of millions at Gazimestan) — Ibid., p. 97.
7. Moljevic’s Treatise, dated June 30, 1941, is actually a perhaps somewhat modified reconstruction (based on the notes and memories) of a similar project of the Serbian Culture Club (from the 1930s), and of its president and ideologist Slobodan Jovanovic.
8. V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-229. For this, see also: I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 117-131; M. Minic, the aforementioned work, pp. 89-90. The Memorandum of the SANU, written by the leading Serbian intellectuals, clearly proclaimed the aspirations for Greater Serbia. This document, among other things, states that “the solution of the national issue” of the Serbian nation was prevented by the Communists at the end of World War II, because “it did not receive its own state like other nations did”. The only way to ensure the true “existence and development” of the Serbs, according to the Memorandum, was in “territorial unification of the Serbian people” through the integration of all the Serbs into a single Serbian national state (“the establishment of the full national integrity of the Serbian people, regardless of which republic or region it inhabited, is its inherent historical and democratic right”) — see: N. Cigar, GENOCID U BOSNI —POLITIKA ETNICKOG CISCENJA (hereinafter referred to as: GENOCID U BOSNI… ), Sarajevo 1998, p. 34. The majority of Serbian Academicians were convinced that the war was purposeful for the Greater Serbia, “they trusted those who were waging it, they trusted those who were intentionally or unintentionally instigating it, and believed in those allegedly victorious battles leading into a certain defeat in the war” (M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 61). “In the political games”, according to Slavoljub Djukic, “the Memorandum of the SANU was labelled as the detonator and omen of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was used as the basis for the term ‘Memorandum Serbia’, whose ‘baby was Slobodan Milosevic’. The roots of all later events, ‘the anti-bureaucratic revolution’, the ideas of ‘Greater Serbia’, even the war itself, were lightly sought after in this charter, and the hearty support offered by many Academicians after the Eighth Session to the Serbian President had only confirmed the thesis that all the evil actually came from this reputable institution” (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 57). Without hesitation, Ivan Stambolic pronounced the Memorandum as the necrology of Yugoslavia. The authors of the Memorandum and of the nationalist concept, wanted, according to Stambolic, “to use their writing to dig out the ‘stone of AVNOJ’ from under Yugoslavia. And it was a stone built into the foundations of our multiethnic community. It was immediately clear where this could take us, just as it did. The very paranoid spirit of accusing all others of hating us was nothing else but the inverted hatred of the creators of the Memorandum against the non-Serbian nations…” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 117, and 119-120). According to the Academician Dr. Branko Pavicevic, the Memorandum of the SANU was a document synthesizing the concept of opposition to the AVNOJ Yugoslavia in the clearest way, and objectively calling for its destruction (Introductory word of Academician Branko Pavicevic, the president of the Organizational Board of the same-named Round Table. See: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999, The Compilation of Communiqués and Discussions from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 16). According to Milos Minic, “The Memorandum of the SANU became the conceptual and political instrument of the nationalist orientation of the predominant segment of the Serbian public in Serbia and outside [of it]” (M. Minic, the aforementioned work, p. 96). Admiral Mamula claims that the Memorandum “had encircled the division of Yugoslavia and laid the basis for the formation of Greater Serbia. Until then, Garasanin’s ‘Nacertanije’, as the basis of the foreign policy of Serbia, was considered the most radical program of Serbian expansionism in the Balkans, and later on as the basis of every state construction of Greater Serbia… [T]he Memorandum advocates for hatred and conflicts with Croats and Slovenes, with whom they had been living together for seventy years, accusing other religions for a conspiracy against Orthodoxy” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289-290).
9. V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237.
10. Ibid., p. 231. In the eighties of the 20th century, the Serbs had a flaming desire to form Greater Serbia. Then “the seeds of dreaming of a large Serbian state” were sown “into the Serbian souls” by the “intellectual elite”. These were primarily individual writers, Academicians, and officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church (certain Episcopes were “the leading constructors of the building called Greater Serbia”). For the Serbian political elite too, the concept of Greater Serbia was the goal (M. Tomanic, SRPSKA CRKVA U RATU I RATOVI U NJOJ, Belgrade 2001, pp. 5, 7-8, and 38). “A new Serbian order“ was to be set up on the territory of the SFRY — the Greater Serbia, “consisting of the AVNOJ-based Serbia, Montenegro, and their ‘annexed’ parts of other republics of the former SFRY”, as explained by the Academician Milorad Ekmecic. In relation to this, he wrote in December 1988: “...violence is the midwife of the creation of national states, and even more so, the wartime violence. Each nationalism begins with the creation of fairytales or epic songs, and this is therefore noble nationalism. I tell my students about an anecdote from the beginning of the past century in Prague. In the City Café, people gathered and sat around, just as we are now, at a table. Then someone went in and asked what would happen if the ceiling of the café went down on their heads. The response was that this would be the end of the Czech national movement” (Ibid., p. 9). The Program Declaration of the Serbian Radical Party (February 1991) states that it would advocate for “the revitalization of a free, independent and democratic state at the level of the Balkans, encompassing the overall Serbian population, meaning that within its borders, in addition to the presently imposed Serbian federal unit, it will also comprise Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, and Serbian Baranja” (S. Biserko, OD JNA DO SRPSKE VOJSKE, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1995., Compilation of Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade, 2002, p. 223). This program was even then an informal program of the Serbian regime, based on which the scenario was conducted for rounding up Greater Serbia. The socialists kept the conspiracy as a measure of political slyness, and parties such as Seselj’s had a role in the revelation of war goals. The program of his party states that the goal of the state system is Greater Serbia (Ibid.).
11. The holders of preparations of the Eighth Session were Milosevic and general Nikola Ljubicic. In this, the role of general Ljubicic was decisive in the levering of forces between Milosevic and Stambolic at this session of the CK SK of Serbia (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 112-117; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 188). Without general Nikola Ljubicic (the national hero and the long-time minister of national defence), it was hard to think that Milosevic would ever have triumphed (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 70). The army openly supported the “Eighth Group”, including admiral Mamula, which was decisive for the outcome of the Eighth Session. In claiming so, Stambolic states that the Committee of the SKJ in the JNA, at a suddenly convened meeting on the eves of the Eighth Session, at which admiral Mamula and “all the top people of the Army” spoke, offered the (implicit) support to “what was happening later”. In relation to this, he wrote, “The press had broadly reported on those speeches, and this was on the very day when the Eighth Session was about to begin. At the Eighth Session, Mamula was often quoted by the winning forces, and the very military session would be used up to the maximum. Now, put down the facts onto the table: Nikola, the General, supporting Milosevic, the Military Committee had held a session, they are quoting each other… I must say that this had had a relevant effect on the people in the conference room and on the course and outcome of the Eighth Session… Relevant. I could not believe that the Army was not aware of what it was doing…” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 188, 244, and 246). Speaking about the support from the army to the Eighth Session, Stambolic states that this support could not be unanimous, not even among the army leaders (Ibid., p. 243). Admiral Mamula claims, despite admitting that he had spoken at the session of the Committee of the SKJ in the JNA, that he and the group of generals surrounding him (Mamula’s line in the JNA) did not support Milosevic, which is strongly denied by Stambolic. Among other things, Admiral Mamula states that “no particular support to Milosevic” was then perceived among the active composition in the military, unlike a number of pensioned generals. He also presents the information that the active General M. Djordjevic, at the Eighth Session of CK SK of Serbia had opposed “any coup-like method of Milosevic”, whose disagreement was allegedly “relevant to the JNA, more than what he in person represented on the Serbian political scene and in the JNA itself” (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 115-117). Immediately after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, General Petar Gracanin placed himself at the service of Milosevic’s “bureaucratic anti-revolution”, followed by General Aleksandar Janjic, and others (B. Vuletic, INSTRUMENT DEMOKRATSKOG SUSTAVA, in: F. Ademovic, JNA BEZNADJE ZLA, Sarajevo 1997, p. 189; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 116-117). According to I. Stambolic, the Eighth Session of the CK SK of Serbia “was really the war horn raising the Serbian nationalists up to their feet, and into a quest to destroy Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had already been doomed at that time. What was left was only its horrible death-rattle in blood, which is still going on…” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 19). The leadership of the Serbian Communists, who had given the decisive blow to the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia after the Eighth Session of CK SK of Serbia, according to Vidoje Zarkovic, placed itself among the Serbian nationalists. Namely, that leadership accepted “the statements of the Serbian nationalists on the AVNOJ- based Yugoslavia as an anti-Serbian creation and their concept for the solution of the allegedly unresolved Serbian ethnic issue. The essence of this concept was such a rearrangement of the SFRY, which would allow the domination of the most numerous nation in the centralized federation. And if this were not accepted by the other nations, then one should go for the creation of Greater Serbia, under the motto of ‘All Serbs in one State’, and at the price of a bloody war, in order to rearrange the AVNOJ-based borders and of ethnic cleansing, in order to realize those nationalist goals.” (V. Zarkovic, SAVEZ KOMUNISTA JUGOSLAVIJE U VRTLOGU KRIZE, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999, Compilation of Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade, November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 30).
12. S. Djukic, ON, ONA I MI, Belgrade 1997, p. 84; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 230; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 20-21. The war of occupation and the formation of Greater Serbia were supported by virtually all the Academicians of the SANU (M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 37). According to Slavoljub Djukic, many leading Academicians “became Milosevic’s political servants...”. After the Eighth Session, they offered him “hearty support”, thereby confirming “the thesis that all evil comes from this reputable institution“ (S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, pp. 57-59). In Milosevic’s policy, the scholars had an important place. “Writers, Academicians, scientists and many public personalities were his reliance at the time of the nationalist euphoria. They accepted him as the ethnic leader, granted him fame and helped him strengthen his power...”. (Ibid., p. 26). The University of Belgrade was “the bastion of support to Milosevic” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 248). When, overwhelmed with rapturous applauses at the rallies of millions at Gazimestan, Usce, and other places, Milosevic was “sharing in the delusion of his fans in a nationalist ecstasy” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 96).
13. V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 20-21, 24, and others; S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 88; S. Oro, O ULOZI SPOLJNOG I UNUTRASNJEG FAKTORA U RAZBIJANJU SOCIJALISTICKE FEERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE, in: STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE, Compilation of Works from the forenamed Round Table, Belgrade, December 5-7, 1996, p. 255; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 44; B. Jovic, KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU, Belgrade 2001, pp. 10, 12, 41, 50, and 60; same author, POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, pp. 132 and 153; S. Mesic, KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA, Zagreb 1994, pp. 22 and 313; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, pp. 57 and 286. The Serbian nationalist rallies organized and financed by Milosevic targeted Muslims. The following slogans were shouted at them: “Muslims, your black days have come, Tito is no longer there to defend you!”; “We love you Slobodan, because you hate the Muslims”; “I come second, who comes first, let’s drink Turkish (Muslim) blood!”, and the like. Arms were also requested by the masses at those set-up rallies (N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, pp. 44-45). The nationalist rallies in Bosnia and Herzegovina were prepared with the help of the protesters who were transported from Serbia in buses, and who were organized with the support of the Government of Serbia (Ibid., p. 46). The murder of Yugoslavia had largely started “in the name of the people — Serbian people!” and “under the democratic title called ‘popular phenomenon’” — wrote Ivan Stambolic. According to him, the break-up of Yugoslavia was continued “with this same thumping fist of millions which had already blown away the “unsuitable” heads in Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo... and together with them, it blew off the independence of a republic and the autonomy of two provinces. And then, it was Slovenia’s turn...” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21). Borisav Jovic, one of the People’s Liberation War veteran soldiers of the Eighth Session, at which he cried: “let us get our minds back together!”, and all allegedly for the purpose of preserving Yugoslavia, subsequently the president of the Socialist Party of Serbia and of the Assembly of Serbia, which passed the secessionist Constitution “as the first official document violating the legal system of Yugoslavia and indicating the secession of Serbia”, then the president of the Presidency of the SFRY, claimed “that, since its creation, Yugoslavia has been doomed to fail” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 239). According to admiral Mamula, the homogenisation of Serbs “was in due course when the relics of Prince Lazar were circling around Serbia, to arrive at Gracanica [Monastery] at the St. Vitus’ holiday of 1989”. (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 289).
14. S. Biserko, PRINUDNI IZLAZAK IZ SENKE, HELSINSKA POVELJA, No. 60, Belgrade, January 2003, p. 1. The Serbian nation eagerly accepted Milosevic. The motto “Slobo the Serbian, Serbia is with you!“ was created spontaneously “from the depth of soul of the Serbian people. No one wrote it upon order, it was the real reflection of the overall mood of the nation...” (B. Jovic, KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU, Belgrade 2001, p. 8).
15. S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, pp. 26, 29, and 85. Milosevic’s arrival onto power was supported by the majority of the Serbian people (B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 115).
16. I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21; S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 85; L. Silber, - A. Little, SMRT JUGOSLAVIJE, Belgrade 1996, p. 82; M. Tomanic, the aforementioned work, p. 21. The very act of the ceremonial excavation of the mass graves and “the transportation of Serbian bones“, in the opinion of Ivan Stambolic, “was calling upon the ‘holy revenge’, ‘tooth for tooth, eye for an eye’. Such excavation, this digging into old wounds, in the tensest moment of interethnic relations, equalled the excavation of war hatchets. Finally, did the relics of Prince Lazar have to be marched past so spitefully across the ‘whole Serbian territory’, the future war grounds, exactly in the days of the nationalist spark flying in this whole area? What was the intention of this instrumentalization of a Emperor and a saint if not to raise the nationalist temperature? What was this act messaging to the other nations in that overheated atmosphere? Finally, if nothing was to be messaged to them, was there any thinking about what this could mean at this threatening moment? It was clear that these processions are provoking and upsetting all those who were not Serbs, even those Serbs who were aware as to where this all was leading to, but who remained silent”. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21.). “The church processions... in those heated days before the armed fighting“ and “excursions” across Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the relics of Prince Lazar were carried around, seemed to be an omen. These “promenades” were accompanied with warnings to the enemies of “the blooded and always suffering Serbs” that “we will do everything to eradicate their race and their descendants so thoroughly that even history will not remember them”. Obviously, the aim of these “promenades” was the recruitment of the Serbian people for crimes. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 21; N. Cigar, the aforementioned work, p. 46). However, this travelling and showing around of the relics of Prince Lazar in public was celebrated as a holy national rite. Ljubinka Todorovic warned the Serbian leadership that this “travelling exposition, and return of the Chetnik symbols, such as the two-headed white eagle of the Serbian royal house and the iconography of the Serbian Orthodox Church will upset the delicate balance in Yugoslavia” (L. Silber — A. Little, the aforementioned work, p. 82).
17. S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 84.
18. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
19. V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, pp. 227-237.
20. Ibid., pp. 232. Whole groups of Serbian Academicians (“...the group of the so called ‘immortals’ ...” ) had been troubling themselves for years “over the maps of Bosnia, trying to find at least a goat path that could be walked the way from Belgrade from Karlovac, exclusively through Serbian cities and villages!” (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, pp. 125-126).
21. Ibid., pp. 234-236. There were a number of options for the potential Yugoslavia. However, the Greater Serbia forces were in favour of “either the one [we] want, or none at all!”. They refused any idea on the reforms of society on the line of strengthening democracy, and they did not allow any varying options, except: “Either Yugoslavia will survive as it is, or there will be no Yugoslavia”, which, under the given circumstances, meant, as rightfully claimed by Ivan Stambolic, the death verdict against Yugoslavia (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 239). These forces, in fact, wanted nothing else but Greater Serbia, with the Yugoslav name for camouflage (S. Mesic, the aforementioned work, p. 102). Four republics, including the Republic of Croatia and Mesic in person, advocated in favour of the union of sovereign states as the best way and the only possible solution. This model of the Yugoslav community, presented at the time when Serbia had already revoked certain significant elements of the 1974 federal Constitution, was met with knives pulled out. Serbia, supported by Montenegro, in which Milosevic had installed the power by using rallying campaigns in 1988, initiated “the modern federation”, that is, a Unitarian state, based on the principle: “one citizen, one vote”. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were in favour of compromise solutions and sovereignty of the republics, with the important affairs (businesses, foreign affairs, the military) to be under a centralized administration. The weak Presidency of the SFRY had tried to find a solution in the negotiations among the presidents of the republics, that is, the presidents of the republic presidencies. Milosevic and Bulatovic, with the agreement of the military top, regularly insisted only on the “strong Yugoslavia”, waiting secretly “for the right moment” to launch a military intervention and jump up at the “secessionist republics”. After the defeat in Slovenia, they attacked Croatia, in which they had previously organized “the ‘log’ revolution”, converting it gradually (by arming and sending smaller or bigger Chetnik groups from Serbia, and then by involving the regular army in an armed mutiny (Ibid., pp. IX, VII, XIII, 2, 3, 8, 21, 31, 37). Their basic motto of “strong Yugoslavia” boiled down to the program of “all Serbs in one State”, that is, to the program of geographic expansion of Serbia to cover the whole, or almost the whole of Yugoslav space. (Ibid., pp. 3, and 31) Milosevic declared himself as in favour of unified Yugoslavia, because he did not really care a bit about it, he only cared “about the state in which all the Serbs would live together” (Ibid., pp. 3, 31, and 39). The Sarajevo summit at Stojcevac (Sarajevo), on June 6, 1991, of the republic presidents did not provide any steps further, either. The proposal by Gligorov and Izetbegovic, according to Dr. Kostic, “was a physical merger of two concepts, the federal and the confederal”, which was not acceptable for them. They were “just in favour of the preservation of Yugoslavia as a single state community of the international legal entity”. In relation with this, in a threatening voice, Jovic had for weeks announced exertion of force, stating that “the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia may only be taken out of Yugoslavia by way of war”. In this, immediately before passing the decision on independence of Croatia, on June 25, he threatened with the use of force: “If Slovenia and Croatia go away... the state of war will be introduced in the country, ‘regardless of whether or not it will be publicly announced’”. General Kadijevic was warning and threatening: “No one must touch into the integrity of Yugoslavia by passing unilateral enactments” (Ibid., pp. 42-43, and 47). At the 17th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1988), Kadijevic stated that “Yugoslavia can only be a federal state or there will be no Yugoslavia”. Based on this, one could conclude that he was a committed federalist, believing that the equality of all the parts of the community is the basis on which this state should rely and by which all its key institutions must be guided, including the JNA, which he was himself heading. However, his federalism and the equality of the peoples of Yugoslavia were something else (I. Radakovic, KADIJEVIC SKRIVA ISTINU, in: F. Ademovic, p. 212).
22. S. Djukic, the aforementioned work, p. 114; I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 243; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 235. “With the Yugoslav political top, the top of the Army, as well as the provincial leaderships and the majority of the media siding along with the policy of blood, soil, force and speed”, the chances to stop the bureaucratic revolution, according to Ivan Stambolic, were definitely over. (I. Stambolic, the aforementioned work, p. 249). Without the JNA and its arms, there would never have been bloodshed and devastation, as Ivan Stambolic rightfully claims (Ibid., p. 243).
23. S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, p. 28; V. Zarkovic, the aforementioned work, p. 231; N. Durakovic, PROKELTSTVO MUSLIMANA, Sarajevo 1993, pp.180-181. After “reasoning” his political opponents in Serbia at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Milosevic decided to “reason” the leadership of the SKJ, as well. In the intention to win for himself the supreme power in Yugoslavia, he forced the convening of an extraordinary congress of the SKJ. Because the proposals on the confederal arrangement of the country and the transformation leading towards European integration did not receive necessary support, the Slovenian delegates had left the Congress. Then Milosevic, leading a fierce battle against Markovic’s reforms, which were allegedly aimed against the interests of Serbia, proposed in the upcoming discussion that the Congress determine the new quorum without the Slovenes and continue working, “trying to isolate them and leave them by themselves” (B. Jovic, KNJIGA O MILOSEVICU, Belgrade 2001, pp. 52-56; same author, POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, pp. 92-93; N. Major, RASPAD DRUGE JUGOSLAVIJE, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999, Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, p. 45; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 166). Such a manoeuvre by Milosevic meant “the beginning of the end of any opportunity for reaching an agreement, even for the functioning of Yugoslavia”, that is, the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, the Croats did not either want to participate in the work of the Congress without the Slovenes. In such a situation, the delegates from the JNA proposed to stop the Congress and to convene its subsequent resumption, whereby the Congress stopped working “until further notice”. Thus, Yugoslavia was left without the holder of the supreme power, whose dissolution, in spite of the optimistic statement by Anto Markovic, the president of the Federal Executive Council (SIV, i.e. the Government of Yugoslavia), that Yugoslavia will keep on even without the SKJ, thoroughly shaking up the whole system of power in the country. The state organs were not able to function without the Party (N. Major, the aforementioned work, pp. 45-46; B. Mamula, the aforementioned work, p. 170).
24. S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-31; same author, AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1995., in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991.-1999., Compilation of the Communiqués and Discussion from the Round Table, Belgrade November 7-9, 2001, Belgrade 2002, pp. 312-312.
25. S. Cekic, AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991.-1993., Sarajevo, 1994, pp. 27-28; same author, HISTORIJA GENOCIDA NAD BOSNJACIMA, Sarajevo 1997, pp. 9-11. All the Greater Serbia plans and Chetnik genocidal program documents announce that the formation and organization of a homogenous Serbia (ethnically clean Serbian state), to encompass “the whole ethnic territory populated by the Serbs”, is the “first and foremost duty” of all Serbs. The September 1941 program of the Chetnik movement of Draza Mihajlovic, among other things, states: a) [we need to] “define the borders of the de-facto Serbian lands and make sure that only the Serbs remain as their inhabitants”, and b) “have the quick and radical cleansing of cities particularly in mind, as well as their filling in with fresh elements”. The Instruction of Draza Mihajlovic dated December 20, 1941, decisively defines the goals of the Chetnik forces: 1. “create a Greater Yugoslavia, and in it a Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia — Montenegro — Bosnia and Herzegovina — Srem — Banat and Backa”; 2. “cleanse off the state territory of all ethnical minorities and non-ethnical elements”; 3. “create immediate joint borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing Sandzak of its Muslim population and cleansing Bosnia of the Muslim and Croat populations”; 4. “cleanse off” Kosovo of the Albanians; 5. “in the areas cleanse off of ethnic minorities and non-ethnic elements, populate Montenegrins (poor, ethnically proper and honest families are eligible)”, and the like. The whole Serbian policy from the early 19th century until today is dominated by the idea of a large, powerful and “invincible” Serbia in the Balkans, exclusively populated by Serbs (“all Serbs in one State”, “Serbia will either be big and strong, or none at all”, “the state, territorial and cultural unity of all the Serbs”, and the like). The Serbian intellectual, political and military leaderships, in an effort to form Greater Serbia pursuant to the project policy, had been using all means available to indoctrinate their people for almost two full centuries with false epic and mythical memories that all the troubles they had undergone and still undergo were allegedly caused by the “Turks”, that is, Muslims — Bosniaks. Therefore, they have started into mass murders of Bosniaks across Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandzak, and Montenegro. All the nationalist Greater Serbia program documents openly emphasize the eradication of the Bosniaks: by means of physical and spiritual destruction, through persecution onto other territories which do not fall into the domain of the so-called “Greater Serbia” (such as Turkey and Albania) and by forced conversion into Orthodoxy. Due to this, the Bosniaks have been fallen victim to a number of genocides committed by Serbian and Montenegrin genocidal policy (Ibid.).
26. S. Cekic, the aforementioned work, pp. 28-31; same author, AGRESIJA NA BOSNU I GENOCID NAD BOSNJACIMA 1991-1995, in: RATOVI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1991-1999... , pp. 312-312.