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In acceptance of the Greater Serbia nationalist agenda of “rounding up the Serb lands“, that is, “the exit onto Serb ethnic territories”, and the greater state concept of solution of the Serb ethnic issue, upon an order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the General Headquarters of the Armed forces of the SFRY, as well as the highest political and state bodies of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Vozd of the Greater Serbia movement Slobodan Milosevic in person, in order to execute the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the commands, units and institutions of the JNA were systematically arming the Serb people, or rather, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role of the JNA in arming, first of all, the members and supporters of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then also of the Serb ‘para-state’ municipal headquarters and units of Territorial Defence, armed units of the reserve and active composition of police forces, and other Serb “voluntary“ formations, as a form of military measures to make the silent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (realized as early as in 1991) more effective, and to make the aggression against it more successful, is suggested by many pieces of data, particularly documents of military origin, of a high degree of confidentiality.

The data available indicate that since 1991, the JNA had intensified the activities begun long ago on the arming of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to this, it is interesting to point out the fact that the top military leadership of the SFRY, in closest cooperation with the military, political and intellectual leadership of Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic in person, directed and provided guidelines for armament of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Teams of high ranking JNA officers, headed by the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, had updated the war plans, drafted war deployments and assignments, developed the strategy and plans for the mobilization of the Serb population, the systematic distribution and stationing of arms, ammunition, military equipment, nourishment, and the like, and did all in order to strengthen the combat preparedness of the units.[1]

In compliance with the aforementioned activities and directives of the military leadership of the SFRY, as well as the military and political leadership of Serbia, in mid-1991, the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued the order to proceed with organized armament of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, “the procurement of armament for all military conscripts of the Serb ethnicity”. Thus, exercising the orders from Belgrade, the Main Board of the SDS took the position that the arming of the Serb people should be done through the JNA, and it was concluded that contact and cooperation should be established with the Army.[2]

The aforementioned decision was in accordance with the military intelligence and war plans for preparation and execution of the armed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina an the Republic of Croatia (under the secret codes of „RAM“, „DRINA“, and „KUPA“). In mid-1991, Radovan Karadzic (as an associate of the JNA KOS, in which, in addition, he had regular consultations with the generals too),[3] and the fifth columnist leadership of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina received special instructions from Slobodan Milosevic (president of Serbia) about the organization of direct preparations for an open aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On this occasion, Karadzic was ordered as follows:

1. in order to begin the RAM action, to ensure absolute mobilization of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily on the territory of Bosanska Krajina and the Kupres Plateau;

2.within one hour from their contact, to call General Nikola Uzelac, commander of the Banja Luka Corps, who is assigned to arm all of the mobilized Serb population (“helicopters will be used to bring armament into some faraway areas”); and

3. to organize in Banja Luka “a ‘spontaneous’ rally of the Serb people”, which is “exceptionally important because of the international public”.[4]

After he had received the aforementioned instructions, Karadzic faxed out a special „Order to all the Municipal Boards of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina“, with the following contents:

1. to immediately mobilize the reserve composition of the police forces in the municipality where the SDS has majority power;

2. to immediately mobilize the illegally formed units of the SDS Territorial Defence forces and to be placed under the command of the JNA; and

3. to immediately mobilize the Serb volunteers and to be placed under the command of the JNA.[5]

In order to ensure the implementation of the aforementioned orders, in Banja Luka, Karadzic established several significant contacts with the leading people of the SDS of Bosanska Krajina, such as for instance, Dr. Radovan Vukic, president of the Regional Board of the SDS in this area, as well as with the leadership of the SDS at the Kupres Plateau. In those discussions, Karadzic issued the order to “raise all the Serb population up on their feet”, because “everything must be under a single command”, in which he threatened to shoot to death all the Serbs who would not respond to mobilization and place themselves under the command of the SDS. If they fail to proceed upon this order even then, they were to be publicly pronounced “as not working in the name of the SDS and as working against the interests of the Serb people”, and they were to be then shot to death, as well as their families subjected to retaliation and denunciation.[6]

The direct military preparations for crimes did not remain unnoticed. Thus, at a closed session of the Government of the SFRY (on September 18, 1991), discussing the political and security situation in Yugoslavia, alluding to the mobilization and arming of the Serb people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, presented the data about the contacts and orders by Slobodan Milosevic to Radovan Karadzic on that occasion, “where Slobodan Milosevic ordered Karadzic to contact Uzelac and say — pursuant to the agreement at the highest military top — to have the arms turned over and arm the Territorial Defence of Bosanska Krajina, and use this in execution of the RAM plan”. At this, Milosevic informed Karadzic that Momir Bulatovic (the president of Montenegro) too, “is ready to die for Bosnia”. At the time, among other things, Markovic concluded that “during the war in Croatia, the Yugoslav Army had abandoned their neutral position” and that the JNA did not “just exceed its powers, but it also got involved into a civil war”, having sided with Serbia.[7]

At the aforementioned session of the Federal Executive Council, the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina — Sabrija Pojskic (Member of the SIV) and Mustafa Cengic (Secretary for information of the SIV) strongly reacted. At the time, Pojskic indicated the existence of certain indices that the armament of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina has already been given to some municipalities with majority Serb population, under the disguise of military exercises.[8]

In accordance with the orders of the SDS, that is, Radovan Karadzic, in reviewing of the “current situation at the frontline”, at the session of November 21, 1991, the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the recommendation to the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina to “take the decision in support of the general mobilization” and to take the position on the “territorial defence that needs to be transformed into the active JNA formation”.[9]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 1991, a number of cases had been revealed involving illegal transportation of weapons and ammunition for armament of the Serb people by the JNA. Thus, on May 24, 1991, in the place of Deleusi, on the Niksic — Bileca road, the employees of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic stopped a truck containing 80 automatic guns of Russian manufacture M-41, and 16,000 bullets for these weapons.[10] These weapon and ammunition, as personal armament, was used by the members of the “Karadjordje” Chetnik platoon from Nevesinje.[11] On October 27, 1991, on the Visoko — Kiseljak road (in the village of Podgorani), a vehicle was stopped in which arms and ammunition were found with a certificate issued by the Municipal Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Visoko.[12] In Visegrad, Ustipraca, Gorazde, Doboj, Modrica, and other places, transports had been identified with major quantities of JNA weapons for the same purposes.[13]

On November 21, 1991, near the Old Station at Bistrik, the employees of the Police Precinct of the Stari Grad Municipality of Sarajevo stopped three trailer trucks transporting military materials on the Bar — Kalinovik route. They contained 75 tonnes of rockets (25 tonnes each) for the needs of the JNA. The certificate on vehicle safety stated that the drivers of Rumijatrans from Bar were transporting bananas and tropical fruits, rather than dangerous matters — rockets.[14]

In the second half of February 1992, on the occasion of a control of military vehicles in Han Derventa (around 11 PM), the JNA military police from the barracks in Lukavica stopped four trailer trucks and two “FAP” trucks full of arms from Titovo Uzice, but without any escort, travel orders or specifications of the “commodities”.[15]

On the eve of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to arm the Serbs as much as possible, in mid-1991, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Federal Secretariat of Interior imported huge quantities of weapons and equipment from Lebanon. At the time, seven ships “docked” at the Bar harbour with 15,000 tons of armament and military equipment. According to some assessments, this arsenal could furnish an army of 100,000 soldiers.[16] On this occasion, at one of the SIV sessions, Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic conducted fierce polemics with Admiral Brovet (assistant to the Federal Secretary for national defence). Provoked by their discussion, Brovet admitted that they had to do it, because, according to him, the Croat people were getting arms from Croatia (“the HDZ is armed”), and, allegedly because of this, the SDS, that is, the Serb people, were to be armed too. Pojskic then asked him a question that had granted the military leadership the right to arm the Serb people, and asked what about his own people, that is, the Bosniaks. However, he received no answer.[17]

After the so-called plebiscite of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 9 and 10, 1991), with hearty assistance from the JNA, the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified the activities related to the arming of the Serb population.[18]

In late February 1992, in various vehicles on the roads across Bosnia and Herzegovina, illegal arms were identified in the following quantities: 6 automatic guns, 96 automatic rifles, semi-automatic and “standard” ones, 2 pistols, 2 hand grenades, 50 bullets, 1 knife and 1 tear-gas device.[19] On the occasion of departure of a portion of military reservists from the Sarajevo region to Ustikolina, in early 1992, it was revealed that they were also transporting weapons. The members of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina were picking out from the traffic such vehicles with improper documentation transporting weapons. However, after interventions by high-ranking JNA officers, the vehicles most often continued their way to Herzegovina or to Podrinje.[20]

The police officers of the Stari Grad (Sarajevo) Police Precinct on March 24, 1992, at the check point at Vijecnica, upon regular inspection, had stopped a car in which they found the following quantities of arms: a “Heckler” automatic gun, 3 frames for this automatic gun, 325 9 mm bullets, a “Heckler” muffler, a pistol with two frames, and one mini radio-station with a spare battery. The car was driven by Radomir Kojic from Pale, who introduced himself as the reserve commander of the special unit of the Serb Autonomous Area of Romanija.[21]

Right before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA was massively arming the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization and realization of this task was mainly assigned to the operational agents of the Counterintelligence Service of the JNA and a major number of the JNA officers (who were associates of this Service), mainly of Serb ethnicity.[22]

The federal secretariat for national defence organized, supported and approved the confiscation of arms and weapons, both infantry and artillery ones, as well as of ammunition and equipment from the JNA and TO of Bosnia and Herzegovina for armament and equipment of the Serb paramilitary formations. The JNA officers were arming the Serbs on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, distributing to them weapons, ammunition, and other materials and technical resources in many JNA barracks. Thus, for instance, the barracks Slavisa Vajner Cica and Slobodan Princip Seljo (located in the Sarajevo area of Lukavica), then Viktor Bubanj, as well as many others, played a significant role in arming of the Serb population. Namely, from early September 1991, the aforementioned barracks were daily visited by some “unknown people who were mainly carrying briefcases with the SDS emblems on them”.[23] Among them were the escorts (Blagojevic, Kovacevic, Ilic and Batinic) and the chief of cabinet of Radovan Karadzic, whom the JNA officers, in particularly Major Trivic, armed (with bullets of various calibres, hand grenades, “bazookas”, and the like). Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek and junior Sergeant Vlastimir Plazinic, in agreement with Colonel Milisav Gagovic and other JNA officers, during December 1991 and January 1992, first in private cars, and then in trucks, had transported infantry arms and artillery to Pale. In early February 1992 they went to Pancevo with two TAM trucks, having transported back sniper guns, night sights, and other special equipment.[24]

Having in mind that the “leadership of the Serb people and the Serbs as a whole are prepared for the war”, and the “option that Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon be recognized as a state”, during the referendum for the independent and sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the night between February 29 and March 1, 1992), the command of the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo had set up barricades. Namely, on the eve and during the setting of the barricades in Sarajevo (February 29-March 2), which were, in cooperation with the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly organized and coordinated by the JNA (mainly the high-ranking KOS officers),[25] with the approval and knowledge of the Command of the 2nd Military District, in the time from March 1 through 4, huge quantities of armament, ammunition, equipment, food, medical and other materials and resources were taken out of the barracks in Lukavica, and distributed to the Serb population of Tilava, Vojkovici, Ilidza, Vraca, Lukavica, and some other Sarajevo areas. During March 2, some 1,500 citizens of the Serb ethnicity gathered in the barracks coming from the above mentioned areas, with some hundred passenger and cargo vehicles, seeking that the JNA provide them with arms which it had promised them as early as in mid-1991. At a closed meeting between the representatives of the military authorities and the representatives of the gathered Serb population,[26] it was agreed that the arms shall not be distributed at the site of the barracks, or individually, but that they shall be distributed subsequently, once the mass of citizens leaves. Once the citizens had left, the loading of weapons and military equipment began into some thirty trucks and private cars. On this occasion, the following weapons were issued from the military warehouses: 122 submachine guns, 8 machine guns, 1,250 automatic guns, 272,000 bullets of all types and calibres (standard and tracing ones), 3,000 standard hand grenades and a truck of hand grenade launchers. General Kukanjac, among others, also participated in the distribution of arms and ammunition to the members of the Serb ethnicity in Lukavica.[27]

On March 2, 1992, based on the personal approval of General Kukanjac, and “based on the need and the current situation in Sarajevo”, the Command of the Light Artillery Division of Anti-Aircraft Defence of the 46th Background Support issued 250 automatic handguns 7.62 mm and 60,000 bullets to the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Novo Sarajevo. In addition to the aforementioned arms and ammunition transported from Lukavica, at the time, Colonel Major Djuro Gvozdenovic and senior Sergeant Radmilo Kovacevic also issued 100 tonnes of food, as well as large quantities of bandages and other medical materials, for the needs of the Serb “volunteers” from the military warehouse.[28]

On March 28, 1992, at one of the military JNA barracks in Lukavica, based on the order and in personal attendance of general Kukanjac, military uniforms, automatic guns with 150 bullets each, and then one green and one black hand grenade each, as well as dry meals, were distributed to a group of Serb “volunteers” (some 500 Serbs).[29]

At the Slobodan Princip Seljo barracks, on April 4, 14, and 19, 1992, upon order of general Kukanjac, the JNA was distributing arms to the Serbs. Thus, on April 4, 500 Serbs came to the barracks and were given: one automatic gun and 150 bullets each, two hand grenades and a uniform (instead of the star, the caps had the emblem of the “Yugoslav” army). Ten days later, at the mentioned barracks, the JNA armed 1,500 Serbs. In addition, on April 19, in the Primary School in Tilava, JNA officers were arming the Serb population from the territory of Sarajevo.[30]

Other Sarajevo barracks too, in addition to the Slobodan Princip Seljo one in Lukavica, were involved in the drive of distribution of arms, ammunition, transport vehicles, medical materials and foods to the Serb population. The most responsible JNA officers participated in these activities. This is particularly confirmed by the example of the Sarajevo Viktor Bubanj barracks. Thus, the infantry armament of the JNA units that had withdrawn from Croatia in late 1991 and early 1992 (mainly from Zagreb), was — directly before and in the very beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina — distributed to the Serbs from Lukavica, Kasindol, Vojkovici, Tilava, and other Sarajevo areas. Through the SDS, these arms were sent to individual local communities and distributed to Serbs. In its division and distribution, particularly from March 1 to 3, 1992, the most involved were the most responsible officers of the KOS and the Military Police. Among them, those particularly active were Colonel Djuro Gvozdenovic, major Janko Trivic, 1st class captains Radoslav Vojvodic and Momir Tomcic (commander of the Military Police battalion), then senior Sergeant Radmilo Kovacevic, Sergeant Mile Jovanovic, and Ensign Lizdek, and others. Colonel Major Gvozdenovic and Captain Vojvodic were openly giving out arms, ammunition and food to the Serb people. They made senior Sergeants Dusan Polic and Bato Matasin, under the threat of arms, to open up the warehouses and load the arms and ammunition into trucks. The aforementioned officers also directed the setting up of the March barricades from two headquarters: at the Vrbanja Bridge, and near the Osmice motel on Mt. Trebevic. In addition to them, the other military personnel from the Viktor Bubanj barracks were involved in the events of March 1 through 3, 1992. Among them was the pensioned officer of the KOS, former military prosecutor, retired Colonel Budimir Djordjic. Together with Zivko Sokic, director of the prison at the Viktor Bubanj barracks, Djordjic had the task to coordinate work with the prominent people from the Ministry of Interior of Serb ethnicity (Zepinic, Mandic, and the like). Lieutenant Perko Alimpic, an officer of Military Police and commander of the anti-terrorist platoon, was directly securing and supplying the arms to the Serbs.[31]

The JNA officers were present at some barricades as well, such as the case was, for instance, with the barricade at Vraca, at which there were an active lieutenant and an active Sergeant in uniforms and with JNA emblems. They personally also transported arms, ammunition and food to the criminals, and among them the most active were major Trivic, captain Radislav Vojvodic, senior Sergeant Lizdek and Sergeant Mile Jovanovic, and they also kept permanent contact between the organizers of the barricades and the high-ranking officers with the Command of the 2nd Military District and the barracks in Lukavica and Svrakino Selo.[32]

Major Pero Despotovic was arming the armed SDS formations in Ilidza. In this job, he closely cooperated with Ljubo Bosiljcic, a delegate of the SDS at the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Military Post 9785 in Blazuj began issuing, upon receipts, infantry weapons and ammunition to Serbs, and “each military conscript was obligated to take them along with him when invited to the unit”.

In all of the Sarajevo barracks, in particular in Rajlovac, on April 5, 1992, the Yugoslav National Army was distributing arms to pensioned military and civilian personnel serving in the JNA. On the next day, in Sarajevo, the JNA was distributing arms to the citizens of Serb ethnicity. At the Sarajevo area of Park (15 and 17, Mose Pijade St.), on April 17, 1992, the JNA members distributed arms to Serbs from a military truck. The JNA had also secured armament and ammunition for the needs of the Serb fascists in the areas of Pofalici, Dobrinja, and other Sarajevo areas.[33]

The arming of the Serbs on the territories of municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad (local communities: Omer Maslic, Blagoje Parovic, Avdo Hodzic, Kumrovec, Cengic Vila, Otoka, Alipasino Polje, Ivo Lola Ribar, Buca Potok, Dobrinja, and the like) was done from the JNA barracks. Thus, for instance, the provision with arms of the Serb armed formations in the area of Buca Potok was done from the Viktor Bubanj barracks. These tasks were assigned to the officers from the Military Police of the 4th Corps of the JNA: Captain Momir Tomcic, Boro Milkovic, and others.[34]

The duty of arming the Serbs on the territory of the Local Community of Otoka was assigned to Ensign Nedeljko Lizdek, also from the mentioned military unit. Thanks to him, Slavisa Stojisavljevic and Jovica Bradonjic took six “zolja” rocket launchers, one “osa” bazooka, and a hand grenade launcher with two casks of shells. Together with Dusko Stojisavljevic, Zdravko Todorovic, and others, through the JNA, Aleksandar Stamenkovic procured weapons and distributed them to the Serbs on the territory of the aforementioned local communities.[35]

Massive and organized distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serb population was intensified in late February and early March 1992. The procurement and distribution of arms to the persons of Serb ethnicity for the area of the Drinska and Orlovska Streets (Novo Sarajevo) was organized by Momo Garic (used to work on recruitment affairs at the Secretariat for National Defence of Novo Sarajevo, and after the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was appointed commander of the Serb force for Novo Sarajevo). He received the weapons from the “Marshall Tito” barracks, and on the eve of the March barricades in 1992, the divided to numerous Serbs one automatic gun with 150 bullets each. In certain garages at Grbavica, there were heavy weapons stored, mainly cannons and howitzers with several casks of ammunition.[36] The members of the Serb armed formations on the territory of the Sarajevo local communities of Omer Maslic and Blagoje Parovic were also armed by Goran Smiljanic from Sarajevo.[37]

The Serb armed formation at the localities of Kromolj and Slatina was armed with 3 heavy machine guns, 10 light machine guns, 23 rifles, 10 “zolja” rocket launchers, 4 hand launchers, 6 casks of ammunition and a major quantity of hand grenades. This unit had received all of that armament from the JNA.[38]

Parallel to the formation of the Serb armed formations at Alipasino Polje, activities related to the purchasing of armament were also conducted. The Coordinator of these activities was Miso Mijatovic. In these tasks, he was most frequently helped by Mile Babic and Boro Ivanisevic. Mijatovic often went to the Viktor Bubanj barracks, where he arranged with the JNA members for deliveries of arms and ammunition. The result of these activities was taking out of rifles and other types of armament from these barracks, such as: 86 automatic guns, a number of mortars of 60 and 82 mm, “zolja” rocket launchers, hand grenade launchers, hand grenades, and major quantities of 7.62 ammunition, and kame (large knives), and the like. For these needs, they most commonly used the small truck owned by Boro Ivanisevic.[39]

The Serb population in Sarajevo’s Adema Buce Street was armed by the JNA member Milenko Glogovac, then the employee of the enterprise Zrak, Dimsa Odzakovic, and the traffic police officer Kojo Vukicevic. In addition to them, the distribution of arms, ammunition and explosive devices also involved participation of Mito and Jovan Mijovcic, Jovo Mosaic, and Ranko Cicovic, residents of this area, who, as SDS activists, procured the arms from JNA warehouses, and then organized meetings with the residents of Serb ethnicity from this area and sent them for training to Vojkovici.[40]

Sretko Jeremic, director of he FAMOS Factory of Special Vehicles, also conducted armament and equipment of the Serb criminals in Sarajevo. On April 29, 1992, he came to the site of the factory, bringing in three vehicles with equipment and ammunition for 150 members of the Serb territorial defence. “Immediately, 150 Serb terrorists were clothed in uniforms and were given arms. The uniforms were carrying Chetnik emblems”.[41]

Mico Krstovic (a lorry driver from Pofalici), through the JNA from Lukavica, had organized the procurement and distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serbs in the area of the Sarajevo settlement of Pofalici. On the eve and after the March barricades in Sarajevo 1992, Krstovic distributed to Serbs over 300 automatic and semi-automatic guns, including snipers, several light machine guns M-53, M-48, mortars of 60 and 80 mm, hand grenades and grenade launchers, then automatic guns with 150 bullets each, a number of ammunition casks, and “a huge heap of military uniforms”. Thus, for instance, he gave Sinisa Milivojevic, Marko Kuzman, Zoran Cvoro, the Tesanovic brothers, Gojko and Marko Sikiras, and others, one semi-automatic gun with 50 bullets, and one hand grenade each.[42]

The Serb population on the territory of the local community of Kosevsko Brdo also received a lot of the arms and ammunition from the JNA. Particularly active in the distribution of this armament were teacher Mirjana Mimovic and Vlado Medic.[43]

Slavko Petrovic, president of the SDS for this area, as well as the Mocevics from Crepoljsko, organized procurement of armament for the Serbs of Kromolj. For instance, on March 10, 1992, semi-automatic guns and submachine guns of 7.62 and 7.9 mm, and the like, were brought from the JNA warehouse to Kromolj.[44]

The arming of the Serbs in Sarajevo was also organized by Bogdan Boskovic, a retired JNA Colonel, who, together with Mile Stojanovic and other Serb fascists, excelled in crimes against the detained Bosniaks in Rajlovac.[45]

From the barracks in Butile, Rajlovac and Hadzici, the Yugoslav National Army was also arming the Serbs in the areas of Dobrosevici, Ahatovici, Bojnik, Doglodi, Stup, Rajlovac, and other places. Namely, the JNA used military trucks to bring casks full of arms and ammunition to the aforementioned Serb villages and distributed them to the Serbs. These activities also involved participation of the commander of the barracks in Rajlovac, Colonel Miletic. In addition, many Serbs were also put in charge of arming the Serb population in the aforementioned villages, among whom these were particularly distinguishing themselves: Momo, Mile, Nebojsa and Zdravko Tintor, Maksim and Darko Milicevic (a father and son), Nedjo Vujicic, Marinko Simeunovic, Dragan and Pero Koprivica, Nikola Stanisic, Stevo Gogic, and others.[46]

The JNA officers were arming the members of the Serb armed formations even in the barracks of Nedzarici. These activities involved the participation of the commander of the barracks, Colonel Major Miodrag Stanic, then his deputy Colonel Major Blagoje Tomic, senior Sergeant Srdjan Trifunovic, 1st class Captain Branko Milosevic, and Jovan Djogo (Colonel Majors Stanic and Tomic were Serbians, i.e. from Serbia, and the rest of the officers came from Kalinovik). The arms from the barracks were distributed to the members of the Serb ethnicity residing in Sarajevo, with an explanation that “the Serbs must organize and defend themselves against the Muslims, because the same will happen in Sarajevo as what happened in Vukovar”.[47]

The distribution of arms from the Viktor Bubanj barracks also involved participation of Ranko Cicovic, owner of the hospitality facility in Buca Potok, who claimed he had a unit of 100 people, and he was also assisted by Branko Miocevic. The population of the Serb ethnicity were suggested that in case they are no longer able to defend their residential area, they flee to Lukavica, “where they will be safe, because the army is there”. On the occasion of dislocation of the active military composition from that barracks on April 3, 1992, Stanic surrendered the facility to the Serb armed formations, also joined by captain Jovan Djogo.[48]

Uros Rankovic, too, together with Zoran Bartula, Obren Balac, and Ranko Miladin, in order to plan, prepare and execute the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, armed the Serbs from the Nedzarici barracks. Together with the aforementioned persons, he organized transfer of weapons from this barracks even to Pale. He transported certain quantities of armament (a truck of arms and ammunition) to the house of Ranko Mladjen at Mojmilo, where they placed-hid it into a trench. “During started aggression and the war activities conducted by the aggressor with artillery fire from the Nedzarici barracks upon the Alipasino Polje residential area, by telephone, he reported to his son Veljko, who was in the Nedzarici barracks, about the position and correction of aiming at civilian facilities, at which a number of persons was killed or heavily wounded…”[49] Major quantities of armament from the Nedzarici barracks, between March 2 and 3, 1992 (the first night of the barricades) were distributed to the citizens of the Serb ethnicity. In the beginning, the arms were distributed to “volunteers”, and later (“as the tension rose”) to the local residents too. In application of the filthiest methods of special war, commander of the barracks (Colonel Major Miodrag Stanic), released rumours that the Muslims were preparing to attack the barracks, and that due to this the arms need to be distributed to “volunteers”. In just several moments’ time, a truck of modern weapons was all distributed, and when the arms ran out, another truck full of weapons was driven up from the Lukavica barracks (semi-automatic guns and M-48’s). Massive distribution of arms from their warehouses allowed the Serb civilians to take weapons without any order, “particularly when the casks of ammunition and arms were thrown over the barracks wire fence among the civilians, as raw meat among starving animals”.[50]

In many Serb houses and apartments in Sarajevo, weapons were found as well as major quantities of ammunition and explosive devices. Thus, in the basement of the house of Radomir Elek at Slobodana Vukovica St., an automatic gun M-70 and 270 bullets for it were found. In the family residence of Radmilo Radan from Sarajevo, an automatic gun was found, with 2 frames, 165 bullets, 1 hand grenade, a colt of unknown make and a bag for ammunition. During the search of the apartment of Gojko Knezevic (at 20, Trg Rade Koncara), an automatic gun was found with two frames of ammunition. In the apartment of Rajko Ninkovic (at 14/3, Ivana Krndelja St.), an automatic and a semi-automatic gun was found, as well as three hand grenades and large quantities of ammunition. At 51, Adema Buce St., in the family residence of Jukics, the following quantities of armament and military equipment were found (owned by Mirko Simic): 7 M-48 guns; 2 rifles (Russian) 7.62 mm; automatic gun M-56 with frames; ammunition 7.62 mm (for the Russian rifle) in an unpacked cask — 600 pieces; 4 optical sights; 1 hand grenade (standard); 1 hand grenade; 50 bullets 9 mm (long); 261 bullets 7.9 mm; 32 bullets 7.62 mm; 1 military belt; 1 military blouse; 1 protective mask, and a military backpack.[51]

The JNA took large quantities of arms and ammunition from the military barracks in Lukavica to Pale, Han Pijesak, Kalinovik, Ustikolina, and to other places.

The arms and ammunition in Pale were unloaded off to hangars of the barracks at Koran, near the source of the Miljacka river, and into the other warehouse at Jahorinski Potok. The military hangars had been dug into the ground and a pine forest was planted on top of them.[52]

In the area of Pale, where the SDS seat was found, in addition to the large number of armed formations, there was also a major concentration of armament and equipment. Thus, in Renovica, there were 17 underground warehouses of the JNA with major quantities of arms and ammunition delivered by the Serb fascist in trucks to the positions around Sarajevo. The JNA, among other things, made military transporters too, available to the Serb unit from Pale commanded by Desimir Petrovic and Rajko Kovacevic. The warehouse of this unit, which was located at Koran (behind the Famos enterprise), contained armament, military equipment and other material and technical resources delivered by the JNA in helicopters. The Kovacevic brothers, Milos Vukadin, Nebojsa Lizdek, Slavisa Golijanin, and others, had procured and distributed the arms to the Serbs in Pale.[53]

On March 28, 1992, 30 tons of weapons and ammunition were also transported from Pale to the villages of Odzak and Povrsnica, and were distributed around the Serb villages in the area of Gorazde.[54]

The armament of the Serb population in Han Pijesak was directed by the JNA officers Dragomir Milosevic, Milan Beronja, as well as Rvovic, and Milos Pajic (president of the SDS), and others. In the capacity of the commander of the garrison in Han Pijesak, Dragomir Milicevic was involved in armament of the armed formations of the SDS in the broader region of Romanija. When the arms began “missing”, Rvovic suspended investigative actions related to this, which had been undertaken by senior Sergeant Vlado Topalovic.[55] Milan Beronja (commander of the 3rd Mountain Battalion of the 216th Mountain Brigade) had distributed arms together with commander of the Territorial Defence of Sokolac (Slobodan Batinic), in the first half of March 1992, and equipment to the Serbs in Han Pijesak.[56]

The Serb armed formations in Sokolac were well armed. Their equipment came from the warehouse of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was located at the same place.[57]

During 1991, through the JNA, the Serb population in the area of Cajnice was armed by physician Dusko Kornjaca (from the November elections of 1990, he was the president of the SO Cajnice), a “count” and a “minister” in the so-called government of the SAO Herzegovina. In preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition to organized arming of the Serbs, he also organized military exercises, conducted mobilization and dug in artillery weapons in the surrounding villages and on the whole territory of the Cajnice municipality.[58]

In the period from October 1991, through March 1992, Colonel Sreten Stosic, commander of the 11th Partisan Division of the 17th Corps of the JNA, through Colonel Major Veljko Bosanac, commander of the garrison in Doboj, and Colonel Major Ozegovic (from Belgrade), were distributing to the Serb “volunteers” on the territory of the Doboj region (in the Serb villages in the municipalities of Teslic, Doboj, Maglaj, Gracanica, Modrica, Odzak, Derventa and Bosanski Brod) some 50,000 automatic guns of 7.62 mm, a significant number of hand launchers M.57, “zoljas”, “osas”, submachine guns, hand launchers M-75-42, MB 120 mm with three combat sets of ammunition.[59]

Over the same period, the commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Major Cazim Hadzic, distributed to the Serb “volunteer” units on the territory of Doboj, Gracanica, Maglaj and Tesanj (with the focus on Mt. Ozren), some 3,000 automatic guns, as well as all the other lethal devices of the brigade.[60]

Arming the Serbs on the territory of the Doboj garrison also involved participation of Major Milovan Stankovic and Second Lieutenant Ilic. In compliance with the order and direct agreement with general DJurdjevac, for the needs of the “Serb volunteer units” on Mt. Ozren and in the villages at the foot of Ozren, during 1991, from the Doboj garrison they took out 3 to 4,000 pieces of automatic infantry arms, as well as weapons for support (mortars, howitzers, anti-aircraft machine guns and cannons).[61]

The numerous Serb formations on the territory of Northern Bosnia were armed up to the mortars by General Savo Jankovic, commander of the 17th Corps of the JNA. With the armament that belonged to the 454th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade from Derventa, Colonel Major Stevan Nikolic armed numerous Serbs. 1st class Ensign Slobodan Krstekanic distributed arms, ammunition and military equipment in the Serb villages around Derventa. Colonel Major Radovan Tasic, commander of the Armoured Brigade in Tuzla, armed the Serb “territorial members”, while using the tanks to destroy unprotected cities and villages, killing and wounding the civilian population. The Serb villages around Bijeljina were armed by Colonel Major Milicic, the commander of the 38th Partisan Division, from the division’s warehouse in Bijeljina.[62]

In cooperation with colonels Milisav Gagovic and Ratko Djukanovic, Colonel Major Radislav Cvetkovic, Major Dragojlo Stosic and others, General Vojislav Djurdjevac (commander of the 4th Corps of the JNA) armed the Serb population on the territory of Sarajevo and Romanija, provided the Serbs with ammunition, trained them and supplied them food and military equipment.[63]

The JNA officers from Serbia (Valjevo) armed the Serbs on the territory of Bratunac. In the village of Kravica, a heliport was made to allow landing of the JNA helicopters full with arms.[64]

According to the available data, the arming of the Serbs on the territory of Foca was particularly intensified during 1990. From this period, there is a preserved list of 35 Serbs (containing personal names, names of fathers and surnames, years of birth, types and number of weapons with years of manufacture), who, on July 6, 1990, had received various types of arms.[65] In addition to all types of guns (M-48, automatic and semi-automatic ones), the Serbs also received submachine guns M-53, then sarac submachine guns, and 60 mm mortars. It is also interesting to point out that at the time, three Serb women also received arms.[66]

On the eve of the Serbo-Montenegrin aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, commander of the JNA barracks Slavko Timotijevic (born in Titovo Uzice) armed the Serb population on the territories of the Foca’s villages of Zakmur, Djedjevo, Trbusce, Kuta, and the like. In addition to this, in May 1992, he also directed the attack against the Bosniak population of the village of Djedjevo, when the Serb fascists killed thirteen Bosniaks and raped a number of women.[67]

The main organizers of the arming (i.e. of the procurement and distribution) of the SDS members and the Serb population on the territory of Foca, in addition to the JNA officers, were also: Novica Tripkovic (a long-time prisoner sentenced for rape and murder, was in the war in Vukovar), Momo Kovac (pensioner of the Correctional Home of Foca), Stjan Blagojevic, called “count” (used to work at the Foca department store), Vaso Pljavaljcic aka “Discipline” (pensioner of the Correctional Home of Foca and the commander of the Chetnik Brcanski party), Vlatko Pljevaljcic (medical technician at the Regional Medical Centre in Foca), Boro Ivanovic (principal of the Primary School in Godijen), Dragan Milenkovic (representative of the Navip enterprise in Foca), Slavisa Stankovic (employee of the Urban Planning Institute), and many others. Vlatko Pljevaljcic also participated in equipment of the hospital in the village of Bare for the needs of the armed formations of the SDS. Boro Ivanovic armed the Chetnik unit in Godijen and included it into the criminal attack on Foca. The main organizer of the arming of the armed units with artillery weapons was Savo Blagojevic (member of the Municipal Board and the Chetnik commander in the village of Budanj, famous from the 1992 incident, when he transported them from Bar to Foca).[68]

In February 1992, the distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serb population on the territory of Foca was intensified. Then, among others, arms (guns — automatic and M-48) and certain quantities of ammunition (two boxes of bullets each) were given to: Rajko and Vukasin Milutinovic, then Lazar and Zeljko Milutinovic (a father and son), Zeljko Elez, Petar Popovic, and others.[69] The distribution of arms and ammunition to the Serbs on the territory of Miljevina were organized by Zeko, Ljubisa and Novo Miletic from Miljevina (Ljubisa used to work for the Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina). They received the arms and ammunition from the JNA barracks in Foca[70] and Ustikolina. In relation to procurement of arms, Zeko Miletic also contacted Velibor Ostojic and Vojislav Maksimovic.[71]

In preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA distributed major quantities of arms and ammunition to the Serb population in the area of Ustikolina. The arms and ammunition from the Ustikolina barracks were taken in trailer trucks into the surrounding villages (Zesce, Dragocava, Josanica, Tulovici, Vranjevci, Previla, Ligate, Cvilin, and others), and distributed to the Serbs. The delivery of arms and ammunition from the aforementioned JNA barracks was an order issued by Captain Golubovic.[72]

The organizers of armament of the Serb population in Ustikolina and the broader surroundings were: Simo Mojevic (principal of the Primary School in Ustikolina), and Petar Mihajlovic, with his son, Radisav. Upon orders by Vojislav Maksimovic, Velibor Ostojic, and Petko Cancar, in these tasks, they were actively assisted by Pero Mitrovic, Mladen Jankovic, the brothers Momo and Diko Maric, then Ciro Dubovina, called “count”, Savo Bilanac (representative of the Prokupac enterprise from Serbia, who, instead of food and drink from Serbia, he hauled arms over into his shop), then Radoje Zoric, Vucko and Savo Blagojevic, Cedo Fustar, and the like. Upon order by V. Maksimovic and through Marinko Bilanac, a reserve officer of the JNA, and the commander of the Ustikolina barracks, they distributed the arms and ammunition into the aforementioned and other Serb villages.[73]

Serbs had located significant quantities of weapons onto the surrounding hills around Ustikolina, specifically above the villages of Zesca, Ligata, Tulovici, former railway station, at Cvilinsko Polje, in the housees of Danilo Ivanovic, Vojislav Maksimovic and his brother Milosav, and of Gavran and Manjak Timara. On one occasion, two tons of arms arrived in front of the house of Manjak Timara. In this way, all the Serb houses in the area of Ustikolina were well armed.[74]

Strong military fortifications with heavy artillery in the area of Foca were located on the hill of Kmur above Brod na Drini, as well as on the Gornje and Donje Brdo hills above the former railway station, then at Tjentiste, in Avdagica Luka, on the Foca-Miljevina road, as well as in the village of Susjesno, above Foca. The aggressor formations had also stored a lot of arms; ammunition and vehicles at the sawmill in Brod, and major quantities of heavy weapons were stored in the warehouses in Ustikolina.[75]

The organized armament of the Serb population in the area of Vogosca was conducted from mid-1991. The distribution of arms to the Serbs was particularly intensified during and after setting up of the March barricades (1992), which was jointly organized by the JNA and SDS members. Under the direction of the JNA officers and Jovan Tintor, Jovan and Mirko Jovanovic, Ilija Crnogorac, Jasmin Heto and others, transport of arms and ammunition and its distribution were organized from the barracks in Semizovac to the surrounding Serb villages. Jovan Tintor even procured arms from the port of Bar, which he initially sold, later giving them away to the SDS members and other Serbs on the territory of Vogosca, Ilijas, Srednje, and Olovo. In these tasks, he was assisted by Nikola Simpraga with his son.[76]

During the March barricades, Ilija Crnogorac, one of the organizers of the criminal attack on Svrake, and Jasmin Heto, transported the arms from the barracks in Semizovac onto distribution points in Malesici and to the Vogosca crossroads.[77] One of the organizers of the distribution of arms to the Serbs in Svrake was Savo Cetkovic.[78] The JNA officer (a pilot) Dusko Cetkovic (aged about 30) frequently used a helicopter to transport arms for the Serb population on the eve of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in relation to this, a number of times he even landed it on the stadium in Svrake.[79]

The arming of Serbs in the area of Ilijas was organized, in cooperation with Ratko Adzic, by the following JNA officers: Colonel Jovan Bartula (commander of the barracks in Visoko) and Colonel Major Mihajlo Tucovic (commander of the barracks in Ilijas — Misoca and Semizovac), and an SDS member. They armed the SDS members and the Serb population in Ilijas. From the military barracks in Misoca and from other surrounding JNA barracks, for the Serbs of Ilijas, they provided 2,800 automatic guns, several dozens of mortars, three multiple rocket launchers, and the like, as well as the corresponding ammunition and mines. The armed formations of the SDS in the area of Ilijas were also armed with the armament and ammunition from the military warehouses in Rajlovac. In Krivajevici, too, on several occasions, arms were distributed to the SDS supporters.[80]

All the persons of Serb ethnicity (of younger age) from the villages of Gornja and Donja Bioca (the Ilijas municipality) were well armed with automatic and semi-automatic arms, whereas the elderly were provided with M-48 rifles and Russian automatic guns. Some 150 people from these villages were under arms. Infantry armament and ammuntion were obtained by the Serbs from the JNA officers from the military barracks in Misoca, and Dusko Pustivuk and Rade Vrljes were in charge of this task. The transport of the arms from the barracks to Gornja and Donja Bioca was done in military trucks. In addition to infantry arms, the Serbs also received artillery weapons from the JNA, which they then deployed on the locality of the aforementioned villages. Thus, three cannons, among which one howitzer, were set up above Gornja Bioca and turned in the direction of Visoko. Above these cannons, at the distance of 50 meters, two 120 mm mortars were set up, as well as three 62 mm ones. On the slopes of Mt. Paljevo there was one multiple rocket launcher set up, turned in the direction of the Visoko municipality (its servers were from Malesici).[81]

The Chetnik party in Nisici was well armed with automatic guns and hand grenade launchers.[82]

The president of the Municipal SDS, Pero Subotic organized the arming of the Serbs on the territory of Breza. He had possessed an action plan, as well as lists of the persons of Serb ethnicity to whom the SDS had distributed arms, as well as concrete tasks they were assigned with, including the commission of crimes against Bosniaks. With Ratko Elez in the village of Smrekovici, among other things, heavy weapons were found, including a recoilless cannon.[83]

The arming of the Serbs on the territory of Visoko was conducted under the command and with the approval and assistance of JNA officers, from the military barracks in Visoko. These activities were directed by the commander of the Visoko barracks, Colonel Jovan Bartula, and Vitomir Krsmanovic, a civilian serving the JNA, and an SDS member. There was very close cooperation between Colonel Bartula from the Visoko garrison and the leaders of the Muncipal SDS of Visoko, particularly from mid-September 1991. This cooperation was maintained in the following activities:

- organization of courier service for mobilization of the armed Serb units;

- distribution of arms and radio devices to the Serb population;[84]

- entry of Serb civilians with vehicles into the barracks (mostly at night), in order to take fuels and oils from the military warehouses;

- creation of lists of “volunteers” from the surrounding areas, that were used as couriers to carry invitations;

- visits to barracks by the Municipal Delegation of the SDS of Visoko;

- training of “volunteers” in handling arms;

- harassment of the non-Serb soldiers and officers, particularly Bosniaks and Albanians, “Serbization” of the Visoko barracks, and the like.[85]

In October of 1991, upon order by the commander of the garrison (Colonel Bartula), and under the control of ensign Ilija Damjanovic and through Vito Krsmanovic, the SDS Visoko members received major quantities or arms and radio devices (type RUP 3), from the JNA. The arms, transported in military trucks, were distributed to the members and supporters of the SDS and to the members of the armed units in the Serb villages of Kalotici, Vilenja, Paljike, Gornja and Donja Zimca, Muhasinovici, Biskupici, Pucisce, Kondzila, and the like. Thus, for instance, Zdravko Miric (from the village of Cekrcici — Visoko), after he “placed himself available to the JNA as a volunteer”, in the Visoko barracks (Military Post 2651), received the 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, 3 defensive hand grenades M-70 A, and a set called “RAP”. Blagoje Sakota (from the village of Gorani — Visoko), also received the 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, and 5 frames with a bag. In addition to semi-automatic and automatic arms, sub- machine guns and hand grenades, the Serbs also received snipers, and mortars and artillery weapons were also set up in Biskupici. Colonel Bartula turned the barrels of the dug cannons towards Visoko. The sources available indicate that on the territory of Visoko, the Serb armed formations had the following to their disposal: 7.62 mm pistols, automatic and semi-automatic guns, machine guns, submachine guns, hand grenade launchers, “maljutka” rockets, bazookas, launcher grenades, hand defensive grenades, hand rocket launchers, “osa” and “zolja” rocket launchers, as well as bullets of all calibres. The SDS leaders had also organized a communications system, and they placed the radio devices into Serb houses, with coded messages arriving from Cekrcici.[86]

The activity of arming the Serb population on the territory of Visoko also involved participation of the following persons: Mladen Cebic, reserve captain, Rajko (Rajo) Krsmanovic, Zdravko Misic, Blagoje Sakota, Momir Krajisnik, Dragomir Kapor, Ratko Adzic, Dalibor Siforija, Oliver Dabic, and others. They also organized storing of foods for the needs of the Serb armed units.[87]

Certain groups of military and civilian persons from the Zenica JNA garrison and from the city itself were arming the Serb population on the territory of Zenica in the first half of 1992. In the night of February 14, 1992, in the settlement of Bare, on the territory of the Local Community of Drivusa (near Zenica), arms were unloaded from a transport vehicle and were distributed to the population of Serb ethnicity.[88] In late February 1992, in the village of Kovanici (near Topcic Polje), nearby Zenica, military and civilian persons from the Zenica garrison were distributing arms to the Serb population. Also, in mid-March 1992, in the surroundings of Zenica, the JNA was distributing arms to the members of the Serb population.[89]

The organizers of the illegal arming of SDS members on the territory of Zenica were Slobodanka Hrvacanin, a member of the Political Council of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Radovan Glogovac, Bosko Jeftic, and Zarija Sarcevic, members of the senior leadership of the SDS of Zenica. In this, they were assisted by JNA representatives from the Zenica garrison — Colonel Tomislav Sipcic, major Trivic, and Krsto Lakicevic, a civilian in the service of the JNA, and others.[90]

At the same time, during the evacuation of manpower and equipment from certain barracks, the JNA had distributed arms from military columns to the population of Serb ethnicity. Thus, for instance, while withdrawing from the Josip Jovanovic barracks in Zenica (on May 18, 1992), on the road to Kakanj, from a number of vehicles, the JNA members were distributing weapons to the Serb population. On the same day, from the column of JNA vehicles moving from the Zenica barracks via Visoko, Ilijas and Srednje to Pale, in the village of Dobrinja near Visoko, arms were distributed to the population of Serb ethnicity.[91]

The Serb population from the territory of Hadzici and beyond, was massively armed from the Technical Overhaul Institute (TRZ) in Hadzici. Among the main organizers of the armament, the following particularly distinguished themselves: Colonel Arizanovic, Momcilo Stanimirovic, reserve JNA officer and chief of security at the Institute, and at the same time president of the Municipal Board of the SDS, then Ratko Radic, Miso Tomas, Nedjo Banduka, aka Pededa, Obren Krstic, Rade Veselinovic, and others. The SDS members and activists, particularly the members of the reserve composition of the JNA, took out from the TRZ huge quantities of arms, machinery, ammunition and military equipment. For example, during April 1992, two military transports were sent in the direction of Kalinovik. The first one had over 30 trucks hauling cannons and howitzers of 105 and 155 mm, several “praga” guns, and transported other arms and weapons. In the second convoy from the Institute, some 20 cannons were hauled away. In addition to this, a smaller number of armed vehicles were hauled to Ilidza.[92] Arms, ammunition and military equipment were hauled from the Zunovnica barracks in convoys and thus the Serbs were armed.[93]

The arming of the Serb population in the valley of the Neretva was the task of Branko Simic from Zitomislici, near Mostar.[94]

The Serb population, first of all, the members of the SDS in Bradina, Brdjani, Donje Selo, Borci, Celebici, Ostrozac and Konjic, were armed by Strahinja-Strajo Zivak, Dragan Vujicic, Tihomir Glavas, Dordje Jovanovic, and others. They procured arms, ammunition and military equipment, and they organized their deliveries from the military warehouses in the areas of Nevesinje, Mostar, and Hadzici. They, Zivalj in particular, were involved in the arming of the Serbs throughout 1991, and particularly intensively in the first half of 1992.[95]

In the capacity of the member of the Executive Board of the SDS of Konjic (from October 1990), executing the tasks received from the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its president Karadzic, pertaining to organized arming of the Serb people,[96] from June 1991 until April 1992, Strajo Zivak[97] participated in armament of the Serb population. Thus, in June 1991, Zivak provided major quantities of infantry arms of military origin, which, after he had transported them from Nevesinje, he distributed to the Serbs on the territory of Bradina. On that occasion, in addition to the M-48 rifles, he also brought two hand grenade launchers, three PM-53’s, and an English submachine gun.[98]

Strajo Zivak personally made the lists of Serbs to whom he had given the arms. At receipt, each Serb had to bring a textile sack with him and pay 300 dinars. He distributed arms in late night hours, and at takeover, he ordered each individual that he must not speak about the received arms to anyone, and that he should hide it away in a special place until the time “when the need arises”. Zivak said that the arms were distributed in order to realize the SDS goals, while he often pointed out that “it is only with arms that it can be ensured that all Serbs live in a single state”.[99]

In addition to armament, from the JNA of Nevesinje or Bileca, Zivak also personally provided the radio station ANG-9, in order to maintain communications with the Serb armed units at Borci, as well as in other places in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[100]

In September of 1991, Zivak transported 100 rifle guns, 3 automatic guns, and some 12,000 bullets from Nevesinje to Konjic. He initially stored these arms in his house in the village of Brdjani, and after the SDS Commission for General National Defence and Social Self-Protection gave him the list of distribution of arms by local boards in writing, he distributed these arms to the various local boards. In October 1991, from the village of Zegulje (near Ljubinje), in the Zastava transport car, Zivak transported into Bradina (i.e. to the house of Petar Gligorovic) 100 semi-automatic and 50 automatic guns, and 50 bullets for each automatic gun, and 100 bullets for each semi-automatic gun. He again used the list to distribute these arms and ammunition by the local SDS boards.[101]

During November 1991, a number of times, Zivak transported armament and distributed it to the Serbs. From the village of Zegulje, he took and placed into the house of Milovan Cecez in Donje Selo 300 M-48 rifles, 100 semi-automatic guns and 50 automatic ones, then 10 hand launchers, and 100 bullets for each M-48 rifle, 100 bullets for each semi-automatic gun, and 150 bullets for each automatic one, four grenades for each hand launcher, as well as 3,000 bullets for the anti- aircraft machine gun. He later distributed these arms to the members of the Serb ethnicity (by the local SDS boards) who entered into the composition of the armed aggressor formations. Again, in the same month, Zivak provided major quantities of armament and ammunition for Bradina. Thus, from Mostar, with an unknown trucker whose FAP truck carried the JNA emblem, in order to avoid police controls, for the village of Brdjani, he transported 4 automatic and 15 semi-automatic guns, 30 M-48 rifles, as well as major quantities of ammunition.[102]

The armament of the Serbs on the territory of Bradina also involved the participation of Dragan Vujicic from Hadzici. Through Zara Mrkajic, in agreement with Ratko Radic from Hadzici, owner of the café “AS”, Vujicic transported the following quantities of arms: 20 automatic and 30 semi-automatic guns, and some 5,000 bullets. These arms were taken by Radic from the military warehouse in Krupa near Zovik, stored them into his garage in Hadzici, where then they were taken over by Nenad and Damjan Gligorijevic, Vukasin Mrkajic, and Dragan Vujicic from Bradina. Through Radic, the following quantities of arms were transported into Bradina: 30 semi-automatic guns and 20 M-48 rifles, five to six casks of ammunition, two mortars, thee submachine guns and 40 submachine grenades.[103]

Just like many other Serbs, Tihomir Glavas (the commander of the police station in Hadzici), was arming the Serb population, too. Using a military transporter from Hadzici, Glavas transported major quantities of arms to Bradina. Arming of the Serbs in the territory of Bradina was also the activity of some Kilibarda from Puhovo — Konjic, with his passenger vehicle, and then, a trucker from Borak with a blue FAP truck 16-12, as well as a Risto from Borak (used to work at the Elplin factory as a driver). The arms brought to Bradina were taken over by platoon commanders and assigned them to the members of the armed Serb formations.[104]

In addition to the infantry weapons, two 82 mm mortars were also brought to Bradina (procured in Rastelica) with 80 grenades, one 60 mm mortar, one anti-aircraft machine gun, three M-53 submachine guns, two M-72 submachine guns, four hand launchers with 16 grenades and a number of hand grenades, then a sniper with a gun, Heckler- Koch machine guns, and the like.[105]

Evidently, the Serb armed formations in Bradina were very well armed. All these arms were received by the Serbs from the JNA. The total armed persons in Bradina were 188.[106] However, “during the combat activities” in Bradina, there were a total of 300 armed Serbs, whereas in the village of Brdjani, according to some data, there were around 120 of them.[107]

The data available indicate that the armament was transported to Bradina both for the Serbs in Bradina and for the Serb population in Donje Selo, Konjic, Brdjani, Bjelovcin, and Ostrozac. In Bradina, it was taken over by the SDS activists from those places and thus armed the Serb population.[108]

In April 1991, in preparation for the aggression and realization of the Nazi idea of (“all the Serbs in one state”), Serb criminals stole two tons of explosive from the warehouse of the public enterprise Sip in Konjic, with explosive which was located at the woord processing site near Bradina, as well as a cask of initial caps, as well as 4-5 packets of fuse.[109]

On the territory of the Konjic municipality, in April 1992, the JNA supplied arms, including heavy artillery, to the Serb population.[110]

The JNA officers from the barracks in Donji Vakuf, and the SDS leadership armed the overall capable Serb population and mobilized it. On this occasion, “the artillery weapons were dug in, machine gun nests and guards were set up”.[111]

Armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bugojno was synchronized from mid-1991 in cooperation between the SDS and the JNA officers. With the assistance and by way of the JNA officers, the SDS members from this territory received arms from the territories of Banjaluka, Sipovo, and Travnik. Its distribution was conducted by the previously formed Serb armed units. Those particularly active in armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bugojno were: Boro Pejicic, Vlado Bilanovic, Nikola Misic, Miodrag Poleksic, Nikola Kisin, Vlado Zubic, Novo Stanisic, Janko Kasic, Rajko Stojic, Simica Kasic, Krstan Radic, Ilija Djelmo, Momcilo Duvnjak, Cedo Bucic, Boro Milinkovic, Milan Basic, Stevo Zelen, Ilija Ikic, as well as the former police officers of the Bugojno Police Precinct: Grujo Svitlica, Djuro Djuric, Cedo Martic, and Andjelko Pavlovic, who had prior to that been to the special training at Manjaca. From the JNA, they provided some 1,500 pieces of various automatic arms with the corresponding ammunition, then certain quantities of heavy artillery, as well as radio stations and other equipment. In the second half of 1991, the Slavko Rodic factory in Bugojno illegally manufactured 540 combat hand grenades. In addition to that, combat fuses for grenades were taken out of the factory, without the sign of the manufacturer or serial numbers.[112]

Speedy armament of the Serb population on the territory of Bosanska Krajina was organized in mid-1991. Thus, for instance, in the summer of 1991, the JNA distributed arms to the Serbs in Sipovo. At the same time, in mid-1991, after “the putsch against the legal bodies of the TO, and the breaking into the warehouses with arms and ammunition”, the Municipal and party leadership of the SDS of Sipovo distributed the arms and ammunition to the Serbs only, “among them to the extremists too, to drunkards, insane persons, Chetniks”.[113]

The 5th Corps of the JNA armed the Serbs (with their own arms, then with the arms of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as that one displaced from Slovenia and Croatia). The 993rd Background Support Base on a daily basis received 43 wagons of military equipment from Slovenia and Croatia.[114] This Corps also armed the Serb Territorial Defence of Prnjavor.[115] General Milan Uzelac issued an order to the commander of the 993rd Background Support Base to arm the Territorial Defence of Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad and Jajce, following which Colonel Osman Selak executed the order (i.e. he issued the arms).[116]

Under the command of Colonel Branko Basara, after it was deployed in Sanski Most on April 6, 1992, the 6th Infantry Brigade armed the Serbs. They did it by way of mobilization. In addition to that, they also armed one battalion in Kotor Varos, and Kljuc, and “they helped a lot in arming of the Banjaluka Ministry of Interior forces”.[117]

In the area of Bosanska Krupa, in late 1991 and early 1992, the JNA was arming the Serb population. This activity was organized by Mile Strbac, Zeljko Tabakovic, Mirko Orelj, Dragan Damjanovic, Mitar Ciganovnic, Mile Vojinovic, Branko Miljevic, Dusko Zmijanac, Ilija Ivanisevic, Nikola Tatalovic, Stanko Obradovic, and Rade Mazalov. From the second half of 1991, as members of the Presidency of the Bosanska Krupa SDS, and members of the so-called “Main war headquarters”, through the JNA they were arming the Serb population. Milan Strbac also performed the function of the commander of the so-called Serb army for Bosanska Krupa.[118]

In cooperation with the JNA, the activity of arming of the Serbs on the territory of Bihac was directed by Dragan Gacesa from Bosanski Petrovac (teacher of national defence), and others.[119]

The arming and training of the Serb population on the territory of Brcko was organized by the JNA officers from the Brcko garrison: Pavle Milinkovic (Colonel Major, commander of the Garrison, Momcilo Petrovic (captain, assistant of the commander for security), Predrag Manojlovic, Stevan Nikolic, Miodrag Kostic, Dragomir Todorovic, Slobodan Milenkovic, Milorad Jovovic, Radoje Bekcic, Marko Subotin, Dusan Subotic, Milovan Adamovic, Momir Cvetkovic. As active military personnel, approving the Chetnik ideology, in the period from August 1991 to March 1992, they distributed some major quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment to the SDS members, particularly in Brcko and the surrounding villages. In addition to that, they planned and organized the displacement of the JNA units into the Serb villages of Pelagicevo, Zabari, Obudovac, Razljevo, Potocari, and D. Brezik, but also the carrying out of the aggression combat activity by the armed Serb formations, and the crimes against the civilians of Bosniak and Croat ethnicity, in order to form the so-called ethnically pure so-called “Serb municipality of Brcko”.[120]

Branislav Filipovic (aka “The Forester”) had the approval from the JNA to provide heavy ammunition for the Serb Territorial Defence of Brcko from Belgrade.[121]

The JNA was also intensively arming the Serbs on the territory of Tuzla. In these activities, Colonel Mile Dubajic, commander of the “Husinska Buna” barracks especially excelled. He distributed arms to the Serbs in Pozarnica, Kovacevo Selo, Marici, Crno Blato, Ugljevik, and other places.[122]

In closest cooperation with some commanders of the JNA, the leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina organized arming of the “reliable” members of this political party even during 1990 and 1991. It was established that the following JNA officers received tasks from the SDS headquarters: general major Milenko Andjelic, general Ratko Milicevic, colonels Pero Simovic, Jadranko Jandric, and Slavoljub Belosevic, Colonel Major Trajkovic, and major Milivoje Loncarevic.[123]

It is also interesting to point out the intensive activity of a number of the active JNA officers, particularly from the Counterintelligence section of the Security Department of the 2nd Military District. Pursuant to the instructions from the top military leadership of the SFRY, during 1991 and in early 1992, they focused their offensive activity onto the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their activity was focused primarily to creation of a distorted perception about the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then on certain problems in functioning of the Ministry of Interior, and organization of paramilitary formations, and the like, which had significant effect on the formation of relations and approaches of the JNA towards the official bodies of the government in the Republic, too. Namely, pursuant to the instructions from the SDS leadership, certain operational agents and inspectors of the State Security Services and the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Serb ethnicity dosed information and data submitted to the security bodies of the JNA, such for instance: “The Ministry of Interior is doing nothing against the Muslim extremists”, “against the HOS and Croatian extremists”, that “the Ministry of Interior services exclusively control the Serb people and the armament of the Serbs”, that “they are controlling the JNA”, and “working against the command personnel and officers of the JNA”, and the like. In this way, the conflict was prepared between the Ministry of Interior, the bodies of the government in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the JNA, and among other things, destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina was committed. In the context of thus designed information, the commands of the JNA Military Districts, and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the SSNO, formed their own assessments of the situation, and based on them, they focused their activity on planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.[124]

Certain leaders of the SDS “at all levels”, for the purpose of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, used various channels to obtain arms even from the Republic of Serbia (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia). Leaders and numerous members of the SDS maintained constant contacts with the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the leadership of Serbia, the authorities and other structures in Serbia. Illegal contacts, beyond the legal bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were a regular practice. They clearly showed subordination of the bodies of the neighbouring republic. Just to illustrate, in early September of 1991, in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, with the president Dr. Radoman Bozovic, then Minister for information and Minister for relations with Serbs, and with the Vice Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, and “by telephone with the Minister of Interior”, Velibor Ostojic reached an agreement for procurement of military equipment, radio stations, transmitters, and studio and reporting radio and TV equipment”.[125]

On a number of occasions, Radovan Karadzic had sent military delegations to the minister of Defence in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, general major Tomislav Simovic. During the reception of one such delegation, lead by major Dragan Gvozdenovic (Gvozden), as written by the chief of cabinet of this minister, Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, he stated that by November 20, 1991, 80 per cent of all the preparations had been made for successful armed combat against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[126]

Constant contacts were made between the Command of the 2nd Military District and the top leadership of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[127] Cooperation between the SDS and the commands, units and institutions of the JNA was maintained even at the lower command levels. For instance, on March 23, 1992, the president of the “Serb municipality of Kalesija” stated: “The political and strategic decisions are coordinated with the Command of the Corps [meaning the 17th Corps of the JNA; note by the author] and the 4th Armored Brigade”.[128] The Command of the 216th Mountain Brigade in Han Pijesak was visited daily by the representatives of the SDS from the territories of municipalities of Han Pijesak, Sokolac, Olovo, Kladanj, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Rogatica, and the like, where in attendance and with approval of commander Dragomir Milosevic and commander of the 4th Corps general Vojislav Djurdjevac, constant meetings and consultations were held.[129] This, of course, was not an exception, but the system of mutual communications at lower levels.

The confiscated SDS materials indicate that the most responsible persons in the top of this party had received arms from the JNA as early as in June 1991. Namely, these were the persons who at that time were at the most prominent leadership SDS positions (designers, founders, members of the Political Council and the Main Republic Board, as ell as the SDS personnel at the Government and Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The first and foremost one was Radovan Karadzic who was given a Heckler with muffler, no. 93421, and 200 bullets. Vojislav Maksimovic, the chairman of the Club of Representatives of the SDS at the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a professor of the Sarajevo University, was provided with an automatic pistol Scorpion no. 24704 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Aleksa Buha, professor of the Sarajevo University, had a Scorpion no. 24578 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Petko Cancar, president of the Council of Municipalities of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also had a Scorpion no. 23722 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Momcilo Pejic, minister of finance in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned with a Scorpion no. 23517 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Komnen Pijevac, assistant minister for information in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was provided with a Scorpion no. 24536 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Ljubomir Zukovic, deputy minister for education in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned with a Scorpion no. 24538 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Tatjana Starovic, deputy minister for health of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a Scorpion no. 24033 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milos Savic, deputy general secretary of the Assembly, had a Scorpion no. 24818 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Slavko Leovac, Ph.D., professor of the Sarajevo University, had a Scorpion no. 24693 and 200 7.65 mm bullets; Milorad Ekmecic, academician and professor of the Sarajevo University, had a Scorpion no. 24889 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Bozidar Antic, minister at the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a Scorpion no. 24826 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Risto Djogo, editor of the Sarajevo Radio, had a Scorpion no. 24803 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Todor Dutina, writer, had a Scorpion no. 24361 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Danilo Dursum, director of the Holiday Inn Hotel, had a Scorpion no. 25841 and 90 7.65 mm bullets; Miroslav Toholj, writer, had a Scorpion no. 23812 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milivoje Unkovic, academic painter, had a Scorpion no. 24582 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; Milivoje Tutnjevic, (at 20, Muhameda Dzudze St.), had a Scorpion no. 24311 and 100 7.65 mm bullets; and Mirko Caric (2, Pavla Goranina St.), had a Scorpion no. 25841 and 100 7.65 mm bullets.[130]

The aforementioned documentation also records three persons under the codes of “xy”, “xz”, and “zy”, which were decoded by the bodies of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through their services, and established to represent Biljana Plavsic, Nikola Koljevic, and Momcilo Krajisnik (the Scorpion number for Plavsic is 24879, for Koljevic it is 24661, and for Krajisnik it is 24801).[131]

There are numerous data suggesting about the participation of the leading persons of the SDS in arming of the Serb population. Thus, the Assembly delegates Kozic and Simic led a convoy with arms through Eastern Herzegovina. Branko Simic was one of the key persons “at the admission centre for the JNA armament”. In one cycle, from the JNA he received: 54 mortars 82 mm, over 600 automatic guns, pistols, hand grenades, and the like.[132]

The ‘para-state’ bodies of the Serb autonomous areas from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the function of the occupying bodies had approached the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, and approached the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Command of the 2nd Military District, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry for Communications with the Serbs Outside Serbia, the Red Cross of Yugoslavia, the Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Registry Office of the Emigrants, and the president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (“Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic”), seeking weapons and equipment. The data available clearly confirm that the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (the JNA) and the Government of the Republic of Serbia (the Ministry of Interior of Serbia) had formed, armed, equipped and trained the Serb armed units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[133]

The JNA assigned the whole reserves of armament, ammunition and equipment of the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the armament, ammunition and fuel of the JNA at the JNA warehouses for distribution to the Serbs. Only the warehouses of the 2nd Military District stored reserves of armament and two sets of ammunition for units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and armament, ammunition and fuel of the JNA in the following quantities:

a) for the Territorial Defence: 78,400 barrels of arms and 1,500 tons of ammunition; and

b) for the JNA: 30,000 pieces of light infantry armament, 40 tons of ammunition and mines and explosive devices, and some 25 tons of fuel.[134]

By March 20, 1992, the JNA had distributed in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District 51,900 pieces of armament (75%), and the SDS distributed 17,298 pieces (or 25%) to the Serb “volunteer units on the territory of BiH. At the same time, by March 20, 1992, the JNA distributed some 6,000 further pieces of infantry arms belonging to the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the arming of the Serb people. By then, 300 automatic guns had been distributed to the “reliable” pensioned officers, and “a hundred more people shall be armed in three to four days”. These persons, according to the assessment of the commander of the 2nd Military District, “shall defend and protect residential blocks, buildings, entrances, and in particular shall protect the families of active military personnel during their work time, and in situations when such personnel goes out with units to camping, combat tasks, and the like”.[135]

The Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor even used hospital facilities as warehouses for arms. The most blatant example was the misuse of the Military Hospital in Sarajevo. In the second half of 1991, this hospital “became an armed camp”. Arms were transported and stored into it. Thus, according to the statement of a medical doctor who was working as a psychiatrist at the Sarajevo Military Hospital, “in one place only there were 150 AK-47 guns and 250 hand grenades stored”.[136]

After the referendum of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina for an independent and sovereign state (February 29 — March 1, 1992), medical doctors of Serb ethnicity at this health institution in Sarajevo, separated from their non-Serb colleagues, and arms were distributed to them. Thus, for instance, captain Mladen Puskovic (a dentist), Colonel Major Vladimir Vujaklija (senior x-ray technician), and Sergeant Milorad Otovic (security officer of the hospital) received sniper guns.[137]

According to the data of the military intelligence analyses in Belgrade, the JNA equipment was used to arm 50,400 people (Serbs), that is, full four divisions, with 200 tanks, 150 armored transporters, 400 heavy cannons, 800 mortars, and recoilless cannons. The Republic of Serbia additionally equipped some 42,000 more people, that is, three independent divisions. In this contingent, for instance, it was delivered as follows: 1,017 machine guns of caliber 7.62 mm, 216 machine guns 12.7 mm, 162 recoilless cannons, 441 mortars, 54 cannons of calibers 76 and 100 mm, 36 howitzers of 122 mm, 54 multiple rocket launchers of 128 and 262 mm, 90 anti-aircraft guns (PAT) of 20, 30, 40, and 57 mm, 96 medium-sized tanks, 30 self-propelled vehicles with guns, and 18 armored vehicles.[138]

By March 20, 1992, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts and in collaborationist formations of the so-called Serb autonomous areas, mobilization was mainly terminated as was the arming and equipping of the “military conscripts” of Serb ethnicity.[139]

After the genocide committed in Bijeljina against the Bosniaks in early April 1992, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a request to the JNA to return the armament of the units and headquarters of the Territorial Defence. The Command of the 2nd Military District informed the whole officer composition about this decision and presented to them that this armament and equipment may not be issued without the written approval of the Commander of the 2nd Military District. However, the JNA refused to return the arms and equipment of the legal Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[140]

All of this confirms that all the armament, ammunition, equipment, material, technical, food and other supplies that were available to the Serb armed formations had come from the JNA arsenal, from the sequestered property of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Territorial Defence and the Ministry of Interior of Serbia.

“From the beginning of the combat activity”, directly or through their headquarters, the formed Serb units of Territorial Defence approached directly the SSNO for supplying with armament and military equipment from the JNA reserves. Equipment of those units, “at the time when conditions existed”, was done directly by assigning the armament and military equipment on the part of tactical holders (i.e. of ‘SSNO arms and services’) through the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO and commands of military districts. However, due to the large number of requests and problems in resolving of this issue further at the level of the SSNO, the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, General Blagoje Adzic, on December 30, 1991, issued a confidential no. 2268-1, Order (marked military secret) for equipment (method of supplying) of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with armament and military equipment (from the JNA reserves).[141]

The supply of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with armament and military equipment was to be done “in the following way: the Commands — TO headquarters shall submit their applications for supplying of their units with armament and military equipment in the future to the command of the JNA unit in which area of responsibility they are located”. The applications for supply were to be submitted to the SSNO through the competent TO bodies, “and the units employed in the JNA compositions, through JNA units and commands.

- The competent SSNO bodies shall analyze the applications received and, in compliance with the assessed needs and capacities, they shall provide approval for the type of arms and equipment and the unit that shall surrender the arms and equipment to the TO.

- The Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, upon approval of the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’), shall prepare decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment of the TO units.

In bringing of the decision for assignment of the arms and equipment or surrender in any other way, take into account the actual needs, purpose and level of training of the TO unit compositions for use of the assigned resources.

- The command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO shall have the duty to report to the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’) about the execution of the passed decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

- The supply of the employed TO units with combat needs upon consumption is to be done in an organized fashion, through units

- institutions on which they rely based on the chart of background securing. The procedure is in all identical for all the support units”.[141a]

Based on the aforementioned order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, on January 9, 1992, General Milutin Kukanjac (commander of the 2nd Military District) issued a similar order on the method of equipping of the units of the Serb territorial Defence with arms and equipment from the JNA reserves. This order in its full version stated:

“1. - Supplying of the TO units with arms and equipment to be done exclusively in compliance with the applicable rules. The TO commands and headquarters shall submit application for supply of their units with arms and equipment to the command of the JNA unit in whose area of responsibility they are located.

The applications for supply shall be submitted to the SSNO through the competent TO bodies, and for the units employed within JNA units, through the commands of Corps to the command of the
2nd Military District.

2. - The command of the 2nd Military District shall assess the applications received, judge their justification and forward them to the SSNO for approval and decision to assign arms and equipment and other non-combat resources to the TO units.

The commands - TO headquarters in their applications shall take into account the actual needs, purposes and training levels of their compositions for use of the resources assigned.

3. - The Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, upon approval of the tactical holders (‘SSNO arms and services’), shall prepare decisions on the assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

4. - The commands of the Corps and background bases shall have the duty to report to the tactical holders of this command about execution of the brought decisions on assignment of the arms and equipment to the TO units.

5. - Material assignments of the commands - headquarters of the TO units with the allocated arms and equipment from the JNA reserves shall be done in the spirit of the existing rules on material accounting and records in the JNA.

6. - The supply of the employed TO units with combat needs upon consumption is to be done in an organized fashion, through units — institutions on which they rely, based on the chart of background securing. The procedure is in all identical for all the support units”.[142]

In compliance with the order of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, particularly dated December 30, 1991, with the order by general Kukanjac dated January 9, 1992, and the instructions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (particularly of February 21, and April 20, 1992), the Yugoslav National Army was arming and equipping the Serb armed units of the territorial Defence and police, as well as other Serb armed units, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. In this way, the JNA armed, equipped, supplied and trained the Serb population in handling and aiming with infantry and artillery weapons, which is corroborated with numerous documents.[143]

The para-state Serb Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, as “the only military unit on the territory” of this municipality, in late 1991, “given the political and security situation in Yugoslavia”, and in particular the dislocation of the JNA units from Croatia onto this area, reviews the organizational and formational filling in for formation of new units, and brought the conclusion to approach the JNA, in order to supply the material resources. In relation to this, on December 13, 1991, the commander of this headquarters, reserve 1st class Captain Obrad Vrzina, sent a request marked strictly confidential no. 06/190-1 to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac, and to the Command of the 530 Background Base for allocation of the infantry and artillery armament, ammunition and clothing for the soldiers.[144]

After it received the aforementioned request, the Command of the 530th Background Base, “in reviewing the tasks facing the newly formed units of the OpSTO [Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence; note by the author] of Bosanski Petrovac” and “in assessing the political and security situation in the broader surrounding of the area of responsibility of the 530th Background Base”, it reached a conclusion that they are “in the function of controlling the territory, the main and substitute communications, protection of facilities of special significance and cooperation with the JNA units in potential combat activities on this territory”. Having in mind that the organizational and formational preparations for forming of the aforementioned units of the Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of B. Petrovac “had already been conducted successfully”, the representative of the commander of the 530th background base, Colonel Milorad Skondric, assessed that by “supplying of the requested material resources they would be additionally strengthened in performing of the aforementioned significant tasks for the JNA”, and he proposed to the Command of the 5th Military District “to have the aforementioned request resolved positively as soon as possible”. In this, he in particular noted that “there has already been some very successful mobilization of military conscripts and volunteers from the territory of the SO /Municipal Assembly; note by the author/ of Bosanski Petrovac, and that they have been very actively involved and made efforts in completion of the tasks assigned to the 5th Corps and 9th Corps and the 200th Air Force Base, which confirms that this is the population firmly motivated for protection of the common homeland, who have been very positively committed to the JNA as a whole”.[145]

The Command of the 2nd Military District, that is, the representative of the Chief of Staff of the Technical Services, Colonel Gradimir Petrovic, on January 8, 1992, issued an order to the Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 32/198-5, that for the needs of the so-called Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, it should issue the following types and quantities of ammunition:

a) from the ammunition warehouse of Bihac:
- bullet 7.62 for pistol 2,100 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 1,500 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm, piercing-flammable bullet for automatic gun 3,780 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm, standard, for automatic gun 27,720 pcs
- bmullet 7.62 mm, tracing bullet for automatic gun 7,560 pcs

b) from the ammunition warehouse of Donji Lapac:
- instantaneous grenade for 60 mm mortar 1,440 pcs

c) from the ammunition warehouse of Bosanski Novi:
- instantaneous grenade for 82 mm mortar 1,200 pcs
- cumulative grenade for M-57 hand launcher 320 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 420 pcs.[146]

For supply of the 6th Lika Division, on January 2, 1992 (Strictly confidential no. 32/205-3), the Command of the 5th Military District urgently requested from the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, to approve the following armament:
- automatic gun 7.62 mm M-70 B1 100 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm M-70 AB2 300 pcs
- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm, sniper, M-76 100 pcs
- mortar 60 mm M-57 40 pcs
- mortar 82 mm M-69 A 16 pcs.[147]

The president of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most and deputy commander of the TO of Sanski Most, Nedeljko Rasula and Sveto Mrdja, in January 1992, submitted “the specification of needs in armament, equipment and other materials for organization of Defence of the Serb people on the territory of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most” to the JNA. In order to supply the units of the Territorial Defence, they requested the following types and quantities of arms and material and technical resources:
1. mortar — 82 mm 2 pcs
2. mortar — 120 mm 4 pcs
3. mortar — 60 mm 16 pcs
4. boxes of poisonous gases - 4 pcs
5. anti-aircraft gun — 20 mm 4 pcs
6. howitzers, 105 mm — 155 mm 2 pcs
7. combat armored vehicles 2 pcs
8. tanks 2 pcs
9. sniper rifles — 7.9 mm (2 with night sights) 80 pcs
10. submachine gun M-84 10 pcs
11.mine and explosive devices,
anti-infantry, dispersive, surprise 3-400 pcs
12. explosive mass 2,000 kgs
13. automatic gun 800 pcs
14. semi-automatic gun 300 pcs
15. light rocket launcher — 128 mm 4 pcs
16. signaling gun 20 pcs
17. “zolja” rocket launcher 900 pcs
18. fuse caps 300 pcs
19. IR binoculars for night observation 3 pcs
20. passive sight (4 for automatic guns, 5 for snipers) 9 pcs
21. communication sets
- RU 12 10 pcs
- RU 3 6 pcs
22. portable kitchen, set 2 pcs
23. mufflers:
- for sniper rifles 15 pcs
- for automatic guns 5 pcs
24. manual compass 50 pcs
25. “osa” rocket launcher 1 pc
26. camouflage uniform set 120 pcs
27. dry ready meals 5-6000 pcs
29. ammunition 10 combat sets.[148]

This request was supplied by the Command of the 530th Background Base on January 28, 1992, to the Command of the 2nd Military District, in compliance with its order, confidential no. 31/103-6-1, dated January
9, 1992.[149]

After he received the request, general major Ratko Milicevic (assistant commander for background activity of the 2nd Military District), on February 10, 1992, forwarded it to the SSNO — Technical Administration, in compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the GS OS SFRY, confidential no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991, “with the request to have the I and III Administration of the GS OS [General Headquarters of the Armed Forces; note by the author] and other competent bodies to review the justification of the request and to bring the appropriate decision”. Although he stated that the request had been submitted to the Command of the 2nd Military District “beyond the TO bodies, due to the ‘mistrust’ of the signatories of the request against the appointed TO bodies”, and that “the request does not state whether there is a unit formation existing for which the armament and equipment are sought”, because “from the specification list attached we can not conclude what type of a unit this is”, general Milicevic concluded that “if there is a certain TO formation unit or there is a belief that it could be formed, we believe that the appropriate armament and equipment should be allocated depending on the capacities”.[150]

General major Dusan Koturovic, Chief of Staff of the Military Post 4509 in Belgrade, “based on the needs that have arisen”, on February 7, 1992, issued an order to the Military Post 9808 in Pancevo, Confidential no. 11/9, to issue a warrant for allocation of the following resources for the needs of the 3rd Party of the Territorial Defence in composition of the 10th Partisan Division, with the command place located in the village of Zivaja (municipality of Kostajnica, Croatia):
1. anti-tank cannon 76 mm M-42 with
3 combat ammunition sets 6 pcs
2. self-propelling weapon 76 mm M-18 with
3 combat ammunition sets 6 pcs.[151]

Based on the order from the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Artillery Administration (Confidential no. 11-9 dated February 7, 1992), on February 22, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (Confidential no. 32/148-60) to the commands of the 993rd, 530th, and 405th Background Bases, and to the Command of the 5th Corps, to issue the following types and quantities of ammunition as supplies for the 3rd Party of Territorial Defence of the 10th Partisan Division of the 5th JNA Corps:

a) from the 1st ammunition warehouse of Krcmarice — Banjaluka
- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for self-propelling weapon M-18 161 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, piercing, for self-propelling weapon M-18 180 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, sub-caliber, for self-propelling weapon M-18 36 pcs

b) from the 2nd ammunition warehouse of Mrkonjic Grad
- bullet 12.7 mm, piercing, flammable and piercing flammable tracing bullet for Browning anti-tank machine gun 4,400 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 150 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for cannon M-42 450 pcs
- bullet 76 mm, cumulative, rotating, for cannon M-42 450 pcs

c) from the 3rd ammunition warehouse of Bihac
- bullet 76 mm, sub-caliber for self-propelling weapon M18 144 pcs

d) from the 2nd ammunition warehouse of Golubic
- bullet 76 mm, instantaneously flammable for the self-propelling weapon M18 290 pcs.[152]

On February 6, 1992, the Serb Police Precinct of Bosanski Petrovac approached the JNA, that is, Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac, and to the Command of the 530th Background Base, asking for a “borrowing” of combat weapons and equipment in order to equip “the reserve and active composition of the police forces”. On this occasion, the request was for the following combat weapons and equipment:
- sniper rifles, and a certain number of
combat ammunition sets 50 pcs
- “zolja” hand launcher 250 pcs
- “osa” hand launcher 150 pcs
- all-terrain boots 240 pairs
- pullovers 250 pcs
- gloves, and the like.[153]

Starting from the assessment that the “reserve and active composition of the police through its training did not face training for handling these combat weapons”, Ljubomir Kerkez, Chief of Staff of the aforementioned ‘para-state’ police precinct also asked for assistance from the Command of the 530th Background Base “about the implementation of training in handling and aiming using these weapons in the reserve police compositions”.[154]

On February 18, 1992, (strictly confidential no. 06/1-1/92), the ‘para-state’ Serb District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bihac approached the Command of the 450th Background Base for supply of 2,000 pcs of infantry arms, two combat ammunition sets, and 850 sets of military equipment (clothing and footwear) in order to form “a unit of the Serb people”.[155]

After it received the aforementioned requests of the so-called Police Precinct of Bosanski Petrovac and the Serb District Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bihac, in compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (confidential no. 2268-1) dated December 30, 1991, on March 3, 1992 (confidential, no. 32/205-16, “Military Secret — Confidential”), the Command of the 2nd Military District approached the Technical Administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, with the request to approve supplying of these units with armament and equipment.[156]

Based on the request of the Military Post 4022 from Banjaluka (confidential no. 18/4-35) dated March 26, 1992, to be urgently provided with 2,000 pieces of automatic guns (7.62 mm), “for the purpose of better quality supply for the units and for equipping of volunteers” on March 30, Military Post 5027 approved issuing of 986 pieces of automatic guns 7.62 mm. It is interesting to point out that the aforementioned unit in Banjaluka possessed 17,571 pieces of automatic guns of the aforementioned caliber at the time, and that according to the formation, “it should be assigned with 21,901 pieces”.[157]

The supplying of the para-state Serb units and headquarters of territorial Defence, as well as bodies and units of police, with material, technical, food and various other equipment (infantry and artillery weapons, tanks, ammunition, mines and explosive devices, communication devices, food and kitchen materials for work on the field, equipment) and material reserves was directly done by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and its commands, units and institutions. These activities were commanded personally be the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, general Blagoje Adzic. Thus, on March 13, 1992, at the Command of the 6th Operational Group (Headquarters at the Plitvice Lakes) there was a meeting held between the representatives of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the 2nd Military District, the commands of the corps, and the representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the ‘para-state’ Main Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Republic of Serb Krajina, directed by deputy Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY. At this meeting, “in relation to supplying with material and technical resources and material reserves for the units and headquarters of TO, as well as bodies and units of the police”, the following positions were taken:

1) the ‘para-state’ bodies and police units “shall receive 20,000 sets of footwear and 100 all-terrain motor vehicles. As for the other resources, “the Ministry of Interior had the obligation to file applications for supply” (the priority in supplying was given to the Serb police, territorial Defence units, and infantry parties);

2) the Corps commands are obligated to provide supplies from their own resources by formation of the TO and police units and headquarters with functional armament and equipment. “For the missing resources, they shall approach the Command of the 2nd Military District, and the requests it can not resolve shall be submitted to the SSNO competent bodies”; and

3) the supplying of the Corps “with the missing arms and equipment and replacement of he non-functional ones”, as well as the supplementing “of the lacking reserves shall be done after the redeployment”.[158]

On April 7, 1992, general Milutin Kukanjac informed the commands of the 9th, 10th and 5th Corps on the aforementioned conclusions (strictly confidential no. 31/101-230), pointing out that they are obligated to proceed “according to the conclusions brought at the aforementioned meeting”. In addition to this, he in particular pointed out that the commands of the aforementioned Corps need to perform the supplying of resources in compliance with the formation, whereby they should be asking the supply approval “for all the resources sought based on the formation”. General Kukanjac also informed the commanders of the aforementioned Corps of the fact that the Command of the 2nd Military District had subsequently received the formations of the communications bases of the operational zones and background bases of the Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence and Police of the Republic of Serb Krajina for supply with the war material reserves. At this, he pointed out that “a certain number and types of vehicles from the Army Fund are used to supply the TO units and headquarters”.[159]

For the needs of the ‘para-state’ Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the 3rd Operational Zone for Banija and Kordun with the headquarters-affiliated units of spatial structure of the municipal headquarters of territorial Defence of the collaborationist Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina (request no. 405-1, dated March 13, 1992), in compliance with the aforementioned agreement at the Secretariat for National Defence, the following material, technical, food and kitchen supplies were approved:

- pistol 7.62 mm 50 pcs
- pistol 7.65 mm (“Scorpion”) 40 pcs
-semi-automatic gun 7.62 mm 500 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm 300 pcs
- rifle gun M-48 7.9 mm 400 pcs
- submachine gun 7.9 mm 50 pcs
- submachine gun 7.62 mm 300 pcs
- sniper gun 30 pcs
- submachine gun 84 mm 9 pcs
- “zolja” hand launcher 500 pcs
- “osa” hand launcher 50 pcs
- rocket “arrow” 2-M 40 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/1 40 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/3 40 pcs
- hand anti-tank launcher M-75 1,500 pcs
- protective mask 3,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for TT handgun 4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm for Scorpion handgun 12,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for semi-automatic gun, automatic gun, and submachine gun 5,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm for rifle M-48 60,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm for sniper gun 9,000 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher, simultaneous 1,000 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher, cumulative 1,000 pcs
- infrared binoculars 19 pcs
- infrared sniper 18 pcs
- telephone switchboard TICI-10 9 pcs
- telephone cord coils 50 pcs
- radio device RTU-100 10 pcs
- artillery binoculars 30 pcs
- artillery compass 40 pcs
- battery 180 A/C 12 V 2 pcs
- battery 130 A/C 24 V 2 pcs
- communication mechanic tools 9 pcs
- small battery 4.5 V 200 pcs
- small battery 1.5 V 100 pcs
- battery charger 9 pcs.[160]

Based on the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (marked ‘State Secret’, no. 892-1, dated February 27, 1992), on April
1, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (Confidential, no. 14/20-38) to the Chief of Staff of the Background Service of the 2nd Military District to prepare and surrender the following list of items to the Territorial Defence of the so-called West Slavonia, in relation to this organizational and formational changes and needs for supplies, from the composition of the units of the 5th Corps and the 993rd Background Base:

- anti-aircraft cannon — PAT 2071 mm, M-75 16 pcs (10 from the units of the 5th Corps and 6 from the 993rd Background Base)
- launching mechanism “S-2 M” 12 pcs (from the units of the 5th Corps)
- planchette 60 x 60 1 pc.[161]

For the needs of the so-called Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia, based on the enactment of Military Post 4509 Belgrade (confidential no. 173-2),dated March 27, 1992, and telegram from Military Post 9808 Pancevo (confidential no. 11-200/1), dated April 7, 1992, the following resources were supplied:

- anti-tank launching set 9k-11 24 pcs
- artillery binoculars 8 pcs
- artillery compass 6 pcs
- artillery thermometer 6 pcs
- artillery logarithm from Military Post 9802 Visoko 16 pcs.[162]

In early 1992, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence took the decision that the material and technical resources for the needs of the so-called Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia be assigned “free of charge”. In compliance with this decision and based on the approval of the Infantry Administration (confidential, no. 289-2), dated March 26, 1992, then based on the telegram from the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO (Confidential, no. 1194-2), dated April 8, 1992, and based on the “urgent need on the field”, and the request of the so-called Zonal Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of West Slavonia, on April 10, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order (confidential, no. 32/205-28) to assign to this ‘para-state’ creation the following material and technical resources (armament and equipment), from the 5th Corps;

- semi-automatic handgun 383 pcs
- automatic handgun 78 pcs
- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm sniper 135 pcs
- bag for hand launcher grenade 324 pcs
- manual binoculars 589 pcs
- manual compass 393 pcs
- curve meter 102 pcs
- field periscope 5 pcs
- universal, leather, single ammunition bag 3,839 pcs
- signaling pistol 103 pcs
- machine gun 109 pcs
- mortar 60 mm 36 pcs
- mortar 82 mm 24 pcs
- recoilless cannon 46 pcs
- semi-automatic gun 327 pcs
- submachine gun 116 pcs.[163]

Based on the request of the Command of the 10th Corps (strictly confidential no. 20/40-2009), dated April 5, 1992, in the first half of April 1992, for the supply of the units of the so-called Operational Zone of Kordun, the Command of the 2nd Military District approved the following technical and material resources (ammunition, and mines and explosive devices):

- bullet for handgun 7.62 mm standard 6,300 pcs
- bullet for handgun 7.65 mm standard 4,000 pcs
- bullet for rifle gun 7.9 mm sniper, standard 19,800 pcs
- bullet piercing 10,800 pcs
- bullet tracing, for automatic and semi-automatic guns submachine guns and machine guns 7.62 mm 380,800 pcs
- bullet, piercing 175,840 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 12.7 mm “browning”, piercing 9,600 pcs
- bullet for hand launcher M-57, cumulative grenade 872 pcs
- bullet for rifle gun launcher, cumulative grenade 2,352 pcs
- bullet for recoilless cannon 82 mm, instantaneous cumulative flammable 2,232 pcs
- hand defensive grenade M-75 15,360 pcs
- anti-tank hand grenade 1,170 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling (all colors) 8,500 pcs
- instantaneous light grenade for launcher 120 mm 172 pcs
- instantaneous heavy grenade 3,360 pcs
- rocket 9m -14m (for personal set 9-m11) 3,044 pcs
- rocket 9m-32m (for personal set “Arrow 2-m) 198 pcs
- instantaneous flammable grenade for cannon 100 mm on tank T-55 1,486 pcs
- piercing tracing 894 pcs
- cumulative 820 pcs
- piercing flammable bullet for anti-aircraft machine gun 12.7 mm on tank T-55 7,488 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm standard 172,800 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm tracing 49,680 pcs
- bullet for machine gun 7.62 mm piercing flammable 24,840 pcs
- infantry land mine 7,950 pcs
- detonator special mechanical 30 pcs
- detonator special chemical 30 pcs
- detonator special electrical 15 pcs
- special time detonator 15 pcs.[164]

Based on the request of the so-called Main Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina (confidential, no. 220-92, dated March 24, 1992), on April 6, 1992, for the needs of the aforementioned ‘para-state’ creation, the Engineering Administration supplied the list of the mines and explosive devices, which needed to be “stored in the echelons and kept as a reserve”:

- TNT explosive 10,000 kgs
- plastic explosive 5,000 kgs
- anti-personnel mine with deferred action 30,000 pcs
- anti-aircraft mine 3,000 pcs
- dispersive mine with deferred action 1,500 pcs
- slow burning fuse cord 3,000 meters
- detonating fuse cord 30,000 meters
- detonating cap no. 3 3,000 pcs
- detonating electrical cap 3,000 pcs.[165]

Based on the request from Military Post 4022 Banjaluka (confidential, no. 18/4-37 dated April 1, 1992), on April 8, 1992, (confidential, no.32/205-28), Military Post 5027 Sarajevo issued the following material and technical resources to the aforementioned military post:

- automatic pistol 7.65 M-61 40 pcs
- semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm, sniper M-76 166 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm, M-70AB2 111 pcs
- submachine gun 7.62 M-72B1 214 pcs
- machine gun 7.9 mm 344 pcs
- pistol M-52 for machine gun 7.9 mm 12 pcs
- hand rocket launcher 90 mm M-79 22 pcs
- mortar 60 mm M-57 26 pcs
- mortar 82 mm M-69 32 pcs
- recoilless cannon 82 mm M-60A1 2 pcs
- helmet M 59/85 164 pcs
- patrolling binoculars 7x40 90 pcs
- artillery compass PAB-ZAT 16 pcs
- desk 9S415 24 pcs.[166]

Based on the request of the command of the 5th Corps, (confidential no. 18/4-37 dated April 1, 1992), on April 13, 1992, (confidential no.32/205-28), the Command of the 2nd Military District issued to the above Corps the following technical and material resources:

- automatic pistol 7.65 mm 44 pcs
- signaling pistol 26 mm 103 pcs
- mortar 60 mm 22 pcs
- recoilless cannon 82 mm 26 pcs
- universal, leather, single ammunition bag 4,340 pcs
- patrolling binoculars 6x30 262 pcs
- field periscope 16 pcs.[167]

In the second half of April 1992, the Serb Municipality of Bosanska Krupa approached the Command of the 530th Background Base and the 10th Corps “for assistance in formation of the TO units and their supply with food and technical military materials (primarily armament and ammunition)”. “Having in mind the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential no.359-1) dated February 21, 1992, as well as the current political situation on the territory of this municipality”, informing the Command of the 2nd Military District, in the telegram (strictly confidential no.19/81-442) dated April 23, 1992, Grujo Boric, assistant commander for background activity of the Command of the 10th Corps, presented the opinion that “they need to be approved a certain quantity of military resources to be issued by the 530th Background Base”. “Having in mind the urgency of implementation of the task for formation of units” of the TO of the Serb municipality of Bosanska Krupa, in compliance with the order of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential no. 359-1, dated February 21, 1992, on April 1992 (strictly confidential no. 31/103-401), general Milutin Kukanjac ordered to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base to issue “from the surplus in the units of the 10th Corps and available reserves at the 530th Background Base” armament, ammunition and equipment for the newly formed units of the TO of SO [territorial Defence of the Municipal Assembly; note by the author] of Bosanska Krupa. On that occasion, general Kukanjac in particular stressed that the “lacking resources” should be requested by telegram through the Technical Administration of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, with “reference to the Order of the Chief of Staff of the GS OS [General Headquarters of the Armed Forces; note by the author] of the SFRY (confidential, no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991) and with my approval”.[168]

Focusing particular activity on the disintegration of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina,[169] pursuant to the Order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (confidential, no. 2268) dated December 30, 1991, and the decisions of the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the formation of the Serb Ministry of Interior from 1991 and the Executive Board of the Serb Democratic Party (no. 702/02/92) dated April 3, 1992,[170] from its material reserves, the JNA armed and equipped the Ministry of Interior of the Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the Security Services Centre of Banjaluka of the ‘para-state’ Ministry of Interior of the collaborationist Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on April 23, 1992 (strictly confidential no. 11), approached the Command of the 2nd Military District with the request that, within the framework of its competencies, “for the needs of the special police platoon formed at the” Security Services Centre of Banjaluka, the following material and technical resources be assigned to them:

Helicopters:
- Gazela 4 pcs
- Transporter MI-8 2 pcs

Armored vehicles:
- Patrolling armored vehicle BRDM-2 1 pc
- Armored transporter (with recoilless gun) 3 pcs
- Combat armored transporter 3 pcs

All-terrain transport vehicles:
- All-terrain vehicle “Pinzgauer” 6 pcs
- All-terrain vehicle “Puch” 2 pcs
- All-terrain vehicle TAM-110 2 pcs

Armament:
- Pistol, 7.62 or 9 mm 157 pcs
- Automatic gun 7.62 mm with folding butt-end, or Automatic gun 9 mm “Heckler Koch” 157 pcs
- Submachine gun 7.62 mm 7 pcs
- Machine gun 7.62 mm 3 pcs
- Sniper semi-automatic gun 7.9 mm 20 pcs
- Signaling pistol 22 pcs
- Chemical gun 38 mm 6 pcs
- Chemical pistol 38 mm 6 pcs

Ammunition, mines, explosives and chemical devices:
- Ammunition (for pistol, automatic gun, submachine gun, machine gun, anti-aircraft machine gun, and recoilless gun) 3 sets by category of weapon
- Defensive hand grenade 468 pcs
- Chemical bullet 38 mm 200 pcs
- Chemical hand grenade 312 pcs
- Chemical spray 107 pcs
- Hand grenade, smoke, neutral 225 pcs
- Plastic explosive 10 kgs
- Mining explosive 150 kgs
- TNT explosive 40 kgs
- Cap no. 8 200 kgs
- Electrical detonator 150 pcs
- Slow burning fuse cord 100 meters
- Detonating fuse cord 100 meters

Communication devices:
- USW radio-station, fixed 1 pc
- USW radio-station, mobile 15 pcs
- USW radio station 33 pcs
- Mobile transmitter 1 pc

Lighting and p.a. equipment:
- Generator 5 kw 1 pc
- Battery lamp 3 pcs
- Electrical lighting equipment with hookup 1 pc
- Megaphone for vehicle 1 pc
- Manual megaphone 3 pcs

Instruments:
- Binoculars 21 pcs
- IR binoculars 4 pcs
- IR rifle gun sniper 5 pcs
- Binocular for identification of instruments with IR rays 5 pcs
- Manual compass 21 pcs
- Curve meter 9 pcs

Protective and special equipment:
- Protective mask M-1 157 pcs
- JNA helmet 157 pcs
- Bullet-proof jacket 157 pcs
- Camouflage helmet net 157 pcs
- Scuba diving equipment 9 sets
- Asbestos uniform 3 sets
- Alpinist equipment 10 sets
- Rubber stick 124 pcs
- Electric stick 30 pcs
- Helmet with visor 30 pcs
- Handcuffs 124 pcs
- “Stop” sign post 28 pcs

Tools:
- Blasting tool set 1 pc
- Demining set 1 pc
- Radio-mechanic tool set 1 pc
- Criminal technician set 1 pc
- Video camera with 10 tapes 1 pc
- Backpack welding device 1 pc
- Machine for electrical set off of mines, manual 1 pc

Food and accessories:
- Camouflage uniform 157 pcs
- Overall, camouflage or blue 150 pcs
- Transporting bag 157 pcs
- Combat backpack 157 pcs
- Sleeping bag 157 pcs
- Officer bag 22 pcs
- Hand lamp 70 pcs
- Whistle 19 pcs
- Self-propelling kitchen 150 liters 1 set
- Mobile kitchen 25 liters 3 sets
- Equipment and accessories for food preparation 3 sets
- Working equipment for cooks 3 sets
- Water tank (rubber-coated or plastic) 500 liters 1 pc
- Water dish (rubber-coated or plastic) 20 liters 6 pcs
- Tent “Kozara” for 22 persons 3 pcs
- Tent “Sutjeska” for 14 persons 3 pcs
- Foldable table 1 pc
- Foldable chairs 12 pcs
- Aluminum container for packaging (800x600x400 mm) 7 pcs
- Sports equipment (overalls, shorts, t-shirts, tennis shoes, kimono) 157 pcs

Medical materials:
- First bandage, individual 157 pcs
- Personal decontamination set 157 pcs
- Nurse medical set 5 pcs
- Medical doctor set 1 pc
- Stretchers 2 pcs.[171]

In compliance with the order of the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (marked strictly confidential no. 2268-1 dated December 30, 1991), on April 24, 1992 (marked strictly confidential no. 31/103-41), general Milutin Kukanjac submitted the aforementioned request to the Technical Administration of the SSNO, with a note stating “very urgent”. At this, he presented his opinion “that the request should be met primarily in terms of those resources that are not available on the market and in the quantity that can meet the most basic needs”.[172] Two days later (on April 26), the Command of the 2nd Military District issued the order to the 993rd Background Base to issue the aforementioned material resources for the needs of the Security Services Centre in Banjaluka.[173]

The command of the 30th Partisan Division equipped certain units of the Serb police with bulletproof jackets.[174]

Also, the 30th and 39th Partisan Divisions, then the 13th Partisan Brigade, which was in the composition of the 11th Combat Group at Kupres, as well as the 30th Infantry Division, were supplied from the 2nd Military District. Also, the 6th Lika Special Division, upon order by the SSNO assistant for background (strictly confidential, no. 683-59), dated October 20, 1991, was supplied with technical and material resources from the 2nd Military District, that is from the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.[175]

Pursuant to the decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (marked strictly confidential no. 352-1) dated April 20, 1992, through the 2nd Military District, directly from Serbia, the JNA armed, equipped and supplied the units of the territorial Defence and police of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Thus, the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (strictly confidential, no. 1472-9) and (strictly confidential, no. 1472-11) dated April 23, sent telegrams to request from the Command of the 2nd Military District, “in order to provide ammunition supplies” of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, to issue ammunition to the
‘para-state’ police station in Vojnic and Benkovac “free of charge”. In accordance with the aforementioned requests and orders of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-13, and confidential no. 32/198-137, dated April 25, 1992), the following quantity of ammunition wwas issued from the 1st Ammunition Warehouse of Bosanski Novi for the needs of the ‘para-state’ stations of “the ministry of interior” of Vojnic, Benkovac, and Korenica:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol 4,200 pcs each
- bullet 7.65 mm for automatic pistol 24,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun 750,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun 224,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, for automatic gun 112,000 pcs each
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper 36,000 pcs each
- signaling bullet 26 mm 6,650 pcs each
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-75 576 pcs each.[176]

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence dated April 20, and the decision of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-138), dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of the Ministry of Interior of Benkovac, the same quantity of ammunition was issues from the Golubic ammunition warehouse as for the aforementioned stations of the “Ministry of Interior”.[177]

The units of the 10th, 9th, and 5th Corps and the warehouses of war material reserves of the Commands of the 405th and 530th Background Base, and the 2nd Military District issued the necessary quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment they had in reserve for the supply of the ‘para-state’ stations of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Also, the Command of the 2nd Military District regulated the surrender of the arms and equipment which “the soldiers of the TO and the JNA are carrying with themselves into the police units”.

The formation resources (“the lacking resources”) in the equipment of the units that could not be supplied by the 2nd Military District from the resources available were supplied by the competent administrations and based on the decisions and instructions of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.[178]

For the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of the Ministry of Interior of Okucani, based on the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-137) dated April 25, 1992, also “free of charge”, the following quantity of ammunition was issued from the 1st Ammunition Warehouse of Bosanski Novi:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol 4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 4,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for automatic gun 705,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun 281,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun 100,800 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 48,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard 3,200 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard 8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper 3,600 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 6,650 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling 500 pcs
- smoke box 96 pcs.[179]

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-135) dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of the Ministry of Interior of Petrinja, the following ammunition was issued “free of charge” from the ammunition warehouse of Bosanski Novi:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol 4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm for automatic gun 728,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun 212,800 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun 106,400 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 50,400 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard 17,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard 8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper 3,600 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm universal 72,000 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm piercing, flammable or piercing, flammable, tracing, for Browning 25,400 pcs
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-57 128 pcs
- bullet 82 mm, cumulative, for recoilless gun 48 pcs
- bullet 82 mm, rocketed cumulative, for recoilless gun 72 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 7,350 pcs
- bullet 26 mm, signaling 500 pcs
- smoke box 288 pcs.[180]

Pursuant to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District (strictly confidential, no. 32/198-133) dated April 25, 1992, for the needs of the ‘para-state’ station of the Ministry of Interior of Knin, the following ammunition was also issued “free of charge” from the ammunition warehouse of Golubic:

- bullet 7.62 mm for pistol 4,200 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm 16,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun 722,800 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, for automatic gun 224,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable for automatic gun 112,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard 50,400 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm tracing, standard 17,600 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard 8,000 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm sniper 4,500 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 7,350 pcs
- bullet 26 mm signaling 500 pcs
- smoke box 144 pcs
- cumulative grenade for hand launcher M-57 208 pcs
- bullet 76 instantaneously flammable for cannon M-42 100 pcs
- bullet 76 cumulative rotating for cannon M-4 2,100 pcs
- bullet 27 mm instantaneously flammable 9,600 pcs
- bullet 20 mm instantaneously flammable, rotating 5,000 pcs
- bullet 20 mm piercing, flammable 6,400 pcs
- bullet 40 mm instantaneously tracing, for cannon M-1 400 pcs
- bullet 40 mm anti-tank for M-1 160 pcs.[181]

Based on the order of the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Brigade of the SSNO (strictly confidential, no. 1472-3), the Decision of the SSNO for free provision (strictly confidential, no. 352-1 dated April 20, 1992), and the decision of the tactical holders of this command (in documents strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/I, strictly confidential no. 32/205-30/3, and strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/2, dated April 26, 1992), the assistant Chief of Staff of the Technical Service of the Command of the 2nd Military District, Colonel Gradimir Petrovic ordered the commands of the 9th, 5th, and 10th Corps that they make an urgent order to allocate from their own reserves of the following armament to the
‘para-state’ units of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina:

- pistol 7.62 mm to the Police Brigade of Knin 11 pcs
- to the station of the Ministry of Interior of Knin 63 pcs
- to the police precincts of Korenica, Vojnic, and Benkovac 60 pcs each
- to the police precincts of Okucani and Petrinja 62 pcs each
- armored transporter vehicle M60 for the Police Brigade of Knin from the 221st Motorized Brigade 10 pcs.[182]

In its document Confidential no. 32/198-100/1, dated April 26, 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District ordered to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Brigade, for the needs of supplying the units of the so-called Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Operational Zone of Kordun, to issue from their ammunition warehouses the following types and quantities of armament:

- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for pistol 6,300 pcs
- bullet 7.65 mm standard 4,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm standard, for automatic gun 380,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 standard 175,840 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm marking, standard 49,000 pcs
- bullet 7.62 mm piercing, flammable, standard 24,840 pcs
- bullet 7.9 mm for sniper 30,600 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm for Browning machine gun 9,600 pcs
- bullet 12.7 mm for tank cupola machine gun 7,488 pcs
- cumulative bullet for hand launcher M-57 827 pcs
- cumulative extra-caliber grenade 2,352 pcs
- bullet 82 mm for recoilless gun 2,232 pcs
- hand grenade M-75 15,360 pcs
- anti-tank hand grenade 1,170 pcs
- signaling bullet 26 mm 8,500 pcs
- hand rocket launcher 64 mm M-80 “zolja” 136 pcs
- grenade 120 mm instantaneous flammable 3,532 pcs
- bullet 100 mm instantaneous flammable for T-55 1,486 pcs
- bullet 100 mm, piercing, tracing for T-55 984 pcs
- rocket 9M — 14M 3,044 pcs
- rocket 9M — 32M. 198 pcs.[183]

On April 25, 1992, in the letter Confidential, no. 256, the ‘para-state’ Zonal headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Kordun of the Republic of Serb Krajina requested from the commands of the 10th Corps, 2nd Military Command and the 993rd Background Base, to supply “the lacking materials and equipment” for arming of the Police Brigade. On this occasion, the following quantities of material and technical resources were requested:

- semi-automatic pistol 7.62 mm 426 pcs
- automatic pistol 7.65 mm 92 pcs
- sniper gun 11 pcs
- automatic gun 7.62 mm 3,900 pcs
- hand launcher M-57 116 pcs
- machine gun 7.62 mm M-84 or 7.9 M-53 93 pcs
- recoilless canon 82 mm 7 pcs
- anti-tank launching set 9-K-11 32 pcs
- mortar 120 mm 10 pcs
- cannon 76 mm M-42 (“zis”) 12 pcs
- howitzer 105 mm SQUARE METRESa-1 or M56 18 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/1 mm 24 pcs
- anti-aircraft gun 20/3 mm 10 pcs
- launching mechanisms S-2 m 13 pcs.[184]

During March and April of 1992, the Command of the 2nd Military District distributed significant quantities of armament from the command of the 405th and 744th Background Bases to the Command of the 5th Corps. Thus, for illustration, the telegram from the Command of the 2nd Military District (confidential, no. 32/205-24) dated March 30, 1992, allocated to the Command of the 5th Corps 986 pieces of automatic guns 7.62 mm from the 993rd Background Base. In the aforementioned distributions, the Command of the 2nd Military District allocated to the Command of the 5th Corps over 90% of the armament that the aforementioned Corps had requested for supplying of the 30th Partisan Division and the so-called Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Western Slavonia, whereby the Command of the 2nd Military District utilized “the overall reserves of armament of the 2nd Military District”.[185]

Evidently, in the preparation for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence had armed the Serb population and had given to the Serbs huge quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment. They went so far as to actually have Serb women carrying arms, which was, for instance, the case on the territory of Kalinovik.[186] It was indubitably proven that the commands, units and institutions of the JNA had materially (up to heavy weapons and armored transporter vehicles), organizationally and personnel-wise, equipped members of the Serb collaborationist armed formations on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, together with the fascists from Serbia and Montenegro, and from the “Serb Krajinas” in the Republic of Croatia, had carried out the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and committed mass crimes, including the genocide against Bosniaks, which is confirmed by numerous documents.


References:

1. ARHIV INSTITUTA ZA ISTRAZIVANJE ZLOCINA PROTIV COVJECNOSTI I MEDJUNARODNOG PRAVA U SARAJEVU (hereinafter referred to as: AIIZ), inv. No. 2-113, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2525, April 30, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre, and others; N. Durakovic, PROKLETSTVO MUSLIMANA, Sarajevo 1993, p. 279; Slobodna Bosna no. 3, Sarajevo, November 14, 1991, p. 6; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, PROSECUTOR AGAINST SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T), the Hague, May 31, 2002.
2. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.
3. DNEVNI IZVJESTAJ O AGRESIJI I TERORIZMU PROTIV REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as: Dnevni izvjestaj), no. 65, June 28, 1992; Vreme (Belgrade), September 30, 1991, p. 5. The data available obtained by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina corroborate its previous operational intelligence on preparations for the armed aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Namely, these were the military intelligence plans under the codes of “RAM”, “UNA”, and “KUPA”, and the data that Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, and Bozidar Vucurovic, as well as other persons from the leadership of the SDS, were associates of the Counter-intelligence Service of the JNA, and acted as agents of the highest rank, executing the tasks of the aggressor centre in Belgrade. Radovan Karadzic was designated as the top associate of the KOS (Ibid.). For more details on this, see: AIIZ, 2-535, The Role of the KOS in the Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina (Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
4. Ibid.; Oslobodjenje, June 28, 1992, p. 5; See: note 7, p. 649, p. 399 and p. 495 of this work. The “spontaneous” rally of the Serbs “for support to Yugoslavia” was of great importance to Slobodan Milosevic. Thereby he primarily wanted to show the Serb “mood” for Yugoslavia to the international public, and thus cover up the truth about who is the actual Commander of the armed aggression in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic had a similar scenario in July 1991, for the organization of a rally “for Yugoslavia” in Sarajevo, where, having in mind the significance of the international aspect, from the centre of Yugoslavia, that is, Sarajevo, the support was sought “for Yugoslavia” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-1007, Conversation between Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic - July 9, 1991). In February 1991, in order to “resolve” the crisis in the country, the military leadership too, among other things, proposed organization of the rally “for Yugoslavia” in Sarajevo, which was supposed to “raise Bosnia and Herzegovina up on its feet” (B. Jovic, POSLEDNJI DANI SFRJ, second edition, Kragujevac 1996, p. 350). “The anti-war rally for Yugoslavia, a single JNA, for peace” was held (with paroles such as “He who does not accept the JNA is not in favour of Yugoslavia!”, “Adzic and Kadijevic, we are with you!”, ”JNA is the guarantor of peace!”) in Sarajevo, on September 3, 1991, but without the planned effects (Javnost, September 7, 1991, pp. 1 and 5).
5. Ibid.; AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 1166. The aforementioned Order, among other things, stated as follows: “Kindly request from the JNA command to leave on the territory a portion of the territorial defence and volunteer forces under the JNA command, in order to keep peace. The operational portion may go wherever the JNA says”.
6. Ibid.
7. The testimony of Sabrija Pojskic given to the author; Vreme, September 23, 1991, pp. 7, and 9, and September 30, 1991, pp. 4-5; S. Mesic, KAKO JE SRUSENA JUGOSLAVIJA - politicki memoari, Zagreb 1994, p. 236; S. Djukic, ON, ONA I MI, Belgrade, 1997, pp. 252-253. At this session of the SIV, the following recording of the conversation between Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic was read out:
“Milosevic: ... Approach Uzelac, he will tell you everything. There where you have problems, contact me.
Karadzic: I am having problems with Kupres. There is a portion of Serbs there that is rather disobedient.
Milosevic: Do not worry, it is going to be a peace of cake. Just you contact Uzelac. (.....)
Milosevic: You will have everything, do not worry. We are the strongest...
Milosevic: Do not worry. As long as we have the Army, no one can do anything to us. (.....)
Milosevic: Do not worry about Herzegovina. Momir has sent a message out to the people: ‘He who is not ready to die for Bosnia, let him step out now’. Nobody stepped out.
Karadzic: That is good... And what about that bombing at ...
Milosevic: Today is not suitable for the aircraft, the European session is underway“ (Ibid.).
8. The testimony of Sabrija Pojskic given to the author. According to Sabrija Pojskic, this session of the Federal Executive Council clearly revealed the arming of the Serb population conducted by the JNA.
9. AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 74, Minutes from the session of the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on November 21, 1991.
10. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551, Information of the Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on certain phenomena and events that have in particular affected the complexity of the security situation in the Republic, June 11, 1991: AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2448; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2823, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, strictly confidential no.02/11-8, Sarajevo, May 24, 1991 - SSNO - GS OS SFRY - Operational Centre in Belgrade. In the transport vehicle was also Dusan Kozic, SDS delegate in the Assembly of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vehicle was driven by Milutin Popovic (owner of the vehicle) from Ljubinje. The truck with arms and ammunition was forwarded to Mostar. However, by setting barricades, the Serbs prevented the transport from coming to Mostar, and the vehicle was returned to Bileca again. Upon insistence of the Commander of the barracks, “for security reasons”, the vehicle was placed within the site of the JNA barracks. The military investigation bodies did not allow the civilian bodies to do an on-site inspection, because “they would conduct the required investigative actions, because this is a vehicle with arms within the site of the barracks”, which, according to their explanation, was in the jurisdiction of the military judicial bodies. It is interesting to point out that the Serbs from East Herzegovina opposed to instituting any procedures against persons brought into connection with the illegal transport of arms, expressing distrust of the legality and objectivity of the legal bodies for conducting the procedure, demanding that the procedure should be conducted in Niksic (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551, and 2-2448, Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic Headquarters of Territorial Defence, confidential, no. 04/143-8, June 6, 1991, Sarajevo, Information on Significant Facts and Manifestations as to the Moral and Combat Preparedness of the SO SR BiH for MAY 1991). The transport of arms in the Bileca area also involved participation of the president of the Municipal Assembly of Bileca, because the “vehicle of the president of the SO Bileca” was found escorting the aforementioned vehicle with arms (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2823).
11. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551; Borba, June 11, 1991, pp. 1-5; Oslobodjenje, October 1, 1993.
12. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/1-12; Oslobodjenje, February 25, 1992. The employees of the Police Precinct of Visoko, on October 27, 1991, on the Visoko-Kiseljak regional road (in the village of Podgorani), stopped the driver of the passenger vehicle type “Golf” (license plates SA 328-286) owned by Srpko Djukic from Ilijas. During the control of the driver and vehicle, two automatic guns (M-70 A 7.622 mm) were found, as well as three hand grenades and 350 bullets. The aforementioned arms and ammunition were military in origin. Namely, Zdravko Miric and Blagoje Sakota had received and were assigned with the above mentioned arms and ammunition according tosonal armament at the Military Post 2651 Visoko. Miric gave his gun (M-70 A, 7.62 mm, no. 99436), 150 bullets and 3 hand grenades (M-75) to Vaso Djukic, whereas Sakota gave his gun (M-70 A, 7.62 mm, no. 99776) and 150 combat bullets to Srpko Djukic (Ibid.).
13. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2445; Ibid., inv. No. 2-2458; Slobodna Bosna, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6. At one of the sessions of the Federal Executive Council, Sabrija Pojskic insisted on the Federal Secretariat for National Defence to inform the Federal Government as to where these arms had come from. Later on, information was received that these arms were intended for the military garrison in Visoko (testimony by Sabrija Pojskic given to the author). After the activities about armament and equipment of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the JNA had been revealed, they were immediately covered up “with infantile explanations of the JNA and non-understandable idleness on the part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities” (Slobodna Bosna, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6).
14. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-536, Court Martial in Sarajevo, Kr. No. 99/91, dated November 26, 1991 - to the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; Oslobodjenje, February 1, 1992. The transporter company was Rumijatrans from Bar, and the drivers were: Mujo Sukurica (from Bijelo Polje), Zoran Vukmanovic (from Bukovik), and Hajrudin Sejdovic (from Bar). On November 25, 1991, on the site of the special Unit of Police Forces of the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Krtelji, the investigatory judge of the Court Martial in Sarajevo (1st class Captain Borislav Jamina) performed an on-site inspection of the trailer trucks and their cargo in the trailers. On that occasion, it was found that the “trailer trucks contained military materials in crates that were sealed“. Because these were “JNA resources“, in compliance with the basic Art. 211 of the Code on Criminal Procedure, on November 26, the investigatory judge sent a letter to the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the following note: “you are obligated to immediately surrender the trailer truck drivers, the trailer trucks with the cargo, as well as the documentation confiscated from the drivers, to the Court Martial in Sarajevo“ (Ibid.). A number of the shells from Bar was also brought to Foca (Dnevni izvjestaj, No.70, July 3, 1992).
15. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311.
16. Oslobodjenje, February 27, 1991. The sender of the aforementioned “cargo” was from Cyprus, and it had been loaded in Beirut.
17. Testimonies by Sabrija Pojskic and Mustafa Cengic given to the author. 18. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 72, July 5, 1992.
19. Oslobodjenje, February 25, 1992.
20. Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 111, August 13, 1992; Pres Centar Armije Bosne i Hercegovine, no. 102-02/115, October 23, 1992.
21. AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU IZ DANA U DAN, DOKUMENTI O AGRESIJI NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU (hereinafter referred to as: Agresija …), Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1993, p. 15; Oslobodjenje, March 26, 1992, p. 10.
22. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-535, The Role of the KOS in the Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Information of the Ministry of Interior o the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 4. There were also individual cases of involvement persons of Muslim ethnicity, who had previously been recruited as the JNA KOS associates (Ibid.).
23. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; POSEBNO IZDANJE O AGRESIJI I TERORIZMU PROTIV REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, Information Office of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as: Posebno izdanje), no. 2, April 28, 1992. The Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina was openly active at the JNA barracks, particularly in Lukavica. Thus, in November 1991, people from the leadership of the SDS came to visit the Command of the 2nd Military District. This was particularly intensified on the eve of the aggressor’s attack on Sarajevo, when the SDS criminals were increasingly frequently coming to see General Kukanjac for consultations. After the criminal attack on Sarajevo, at the motel at Koran and at the Posta Hotel on Mt. Jahorina, Kukanjac often met criminal Karadzic an other leaders of the SDS. On these occasions, they discussed about execution of offensive actions in order to destroy Sarajevo, and about other crimes, mainly over the civilian population. In early April 1992, criminal Karadzic proposed (through radio communications) to Kukanjac to shell the building of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Post Office, which General Kukanjac ordered to be done. When parting from the criminals from the SDS leadership, General Kukanjac would say “it is ok”, “do not worry”, “we will arrange for that”, and the like (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317, and 374). In early 1992, the Serb Democratic Party increased the pressure on the officers and soldiers who were not of Serb ethnicity. Thus, in the first half of April 1992, the SDS was particularly making pressure on certain officers of the 5th Corps who were non-Serbs, sending them the message through the Glas newspaper to leave the Corps, or that they would else make them go away. On April 18, 1992, the units of the 2nd Military District were left by: 19 officers, 5 junior officers, and 4 civilian personnel. These were “predominantly persons of the Muslim ethnicity” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-91, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Team, strictly confidential, no.10/36-2082, April 8, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre, and to others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-102, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2321, April 18, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre, and others).
24. Ibid.
25. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (“attn. NGS”); Ibid., inv. No. 2-535, The Role of the KOs in the Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785; Slobodna Bosna, No. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 4; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 2, April 26, 1992, and no. 93, July 26, 1992. On March 1, 1992, the unit of the Military Police from the JNA barracks in Lukavica received the order from captain Radojcev (Commander of the party of the Military Police) to block Sarajevo (AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311).
26. Ibid. On behalf of the military authorities, the gathered Serbs were approached by the following JNA officers: Colonel Radomir Milekic, Nenad Bacanovic, and Colonel Majors Risto Aleksic and Djuro Gvozdenovic. At some point, the conversation was also joined by the Commander of the 2nd Military District, general Milutin Kukanjac. It is interesting to point out that these discussions were not attended by the Commander of the Slavisa Vajner-Cica barracks, Colonel Enver Hadzihasanovic, who was in the barracks, because, according to some eye-witnesses, he was practically blocked, just as any other officers of Muslim, Croat, Albanian or Macedonian ethnicity (Ibid.).
27. Ibid; Slobodna Bosna, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.
28. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-228, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.16/28-3, March 2, 1992 - to the Command of the light artillery division of the anti- aircraft defence of the 46th background support; Slobodna Bosna, No. 20, March 12, 1992, pp. 4 and 6. The aforementioned guns and ammunition were delivered at the site of the Slobodan Princip Seljo barracks in Lukavica. In the name of the TO Novo Sarajevo Headquarters, Milovan Aleksic signed that he had received these arms and ammunition.
29. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-317. Leaving the barracks on this occasion, General Kukanjac told those Serbs: “Stay put guys, come over if you need anything”.
30. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-539; Ibid., inv. No. 3-354.
31. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-334, 374, and 375; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785; Dnevni izvjestaj, no.93, July 26, 1992. The aforementioned and other JNA officers organized and directed the setting up of the March barricades in Sarajevo. In these activities, the major roles were played by major Tomcic and ensign Lizdek. “That night when the barricades were set up in Sarajevo for the first time, the civilian telephone at Tomcic’s rang constantly and they were mainly asking for Tomcic or Lizdek, with the question: ‘Are we going to do something too now’, etc. For instance, Tomcic was called by Nedjo Slavisa from Dobrinja, and he told him that in his street there is one barricade, and ‘as I know the people can I tell them to remove it’, Lizdek grabbed the phone receiver from Tomcic and told him: ‘I am setting it up, and you are removing it’” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785). Very often, at major Tomcic’s there were meetings between the retired Colonel Budimir Djordjic, then Colonel Belosevic, while Colonel Simokovski also telephoned in frequently. Colonel Djordjic telephoned often and personally went to see general Adzic (as for instance, in early March 1992). In relation to this, he conveyed to major Trivic and captain Tomcic that, during his stay in Belgrade, he told general Adzic that “he should not be giving food to these smugglers from Sokolac and from Han Pijesak, because they are reselling it, but to have it transported to the barracks or through the Romanija Military Institution” (Ibid.). Upon orders of major Trivic, on the occasion of the first aggressor’s attack against Sarajevo, lieutenant Alimpic was guiding the fire onto Sarajevo, from the area of Zlatiste and “with him he had 18 Chetniks from Pale and several regular soldiers”. Before him, that is, on the first night of the attacks on Sarajevo, the fire onto Sarajevo was guided (from Zlatiste) by Sergeant Jovica Bubalo. On the second night, he was invited by General Djurdjevac in person and he was told to reduce the fire. Given that Bubalo did not do it, General Djurdjevac called Major Tomic and told him to “go and replace that Chetnik up over there” (Ibid.).
32. Slobodna Bosna, no. 20, March 12, 1992, p. 6; Ibid., no. 21, March 19, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; Ibid., inv. No. 2-538, 540, 545, and 547; N. Durakovic, the aforementioned work, p. 282.
33. Pres-centar Armije Bosne i Hercegovine, no. 102-02/15, October 23, 1992; Agresija ...., pp. 19, and 21; BILTEN MINISTARSTVA ZA NARODNU ODBRANU THE REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE (hereinafter referred to as: Bilten MNO), no. 13, April 15, 1992; Ibid., no. 21, April 18, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-540; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 20, May 14, 1992, and no. 21, May 15, 1992.
34. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-316, and 319. The distribution of arms to the citizens of Serb ethnicity in Buca Potok was organized by the JNA. Thus, just for an illustration, Milenko Glogovac, with one of the JNA lieutenants was distributing arms to the Serbs in this residential area. In early April 1992, in a military truck (covered with a canvass), they came in front of the houses of Dimso Odzakovic (Adema Buce St.) and distributed to the Serbs automatic and semi-automatic guns with ammunition. Dimsa Odzakovic received an automatic gun and 5 frames of ammunition, and his brother received an automatic gun (Ibid.).
35. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538; Ibid., inv. No. 3-342. The Serb population in Novo Sarajevo and beyond was armed from the JNA warehouses by certain Delivoje, an active member of the military personnel, too.
36. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592. Testimony of Boris Herak; Prva Linija (the paper of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), no. 2, February 1, 1993, p. 3. The arms and ammunition, among others, were also given to the following ethnic Serbs: Veljko Ilic, Ranko Bogicevic, brothers Vaso and Slobodan Vaskovic, then Radomir Draskovic, Milos and Dusko Teskovic (a father and son), and others.
37. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-796.
38. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-795. From early April 1992, this unit was working active against the civilian population in Sarajevo and against the members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jovo Ninkovic (from Sarajevo) too participated in armament and war activities of this unit.
39. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-326. Major quantities of the taken armament were stored at Mojmilo with Djordje Mladjen, Miodrag Beat, Mirko and Nemanja Zirojevic, whereas a smaller portion, mainly the hand grenades, were placed by Dabic into the basement of his building. For his unit, Rajko Cerovina assigned 4 automatic light guns with two casks of ammunition each (150 bullets per gun).
40. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 87, July 20, 1992.
41. Agresija …, p. 33.
42. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261, 262, and 320.
43. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-385. Teacher Mimovic (Vojislava Kecmanovica Djede St.), for instance, in early Arpil 1992, invited Milenko Ceklic (14a, Vojvode Putnika St.), and gave him an automatic gun with two frames of ammunition (her husband Bogdan Mimovic, a Montenegrin from the village of Murino, municipality of Plav, was employed at the PTT). In a meeting of the SDS at the local community of Kosevsko Brdo, also attended by the president of the Municipal Assembly of Centar, Dr. Radomir Bulatovic, upon the request to distribute the arms, it was responded that this will be done “once there is a more massive response of the Serb ethnic persons from the area of Kosevsko Brdo”. In addition to the armament, the Serbs from the Kosevsko Brdo local community also had other equipment. Thus, for instance, Nebojsa Savic had a radio station.
44. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-335, and 385.
45. Ibid.; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 61, June 24, 1992.
46. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538, and 545; Ibid., inv. No. 3-2906; Ibid., inv. No. 3-2831; Ibid., inv. No. 3-342; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 86, July 19, 1992; Bilten MNO, No. 13, April 15, 1992.
47. Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 89, July 22, 1992; Slobodna Bosna, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.
48. Ibid.
49. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-797.
50. Slobodna Bosna, no. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 4.
51. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-537 and 542; Ibid., inv. No. 3-342 and 356; Bilten MNO, no.39, April 27, 1992; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 4, April 28, 1992. Rajko Ninkovic received the aforementioned armament form Dusan Forcan who, starting from the assessment that the Serb people are allegedly at risk and need to be armed, distributed arms to the Serbs on the territory of Novo Sarajevo. Milutin Forcan was in charge of the military affairs on the territory of Novo Sarajevo.
52. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-311; Ibid., inv. No. 2-785. The delivery forms/orders for transports of weapons were signed by captain Colovejic (?). The orders and delivery forms for transports of weapons, mainly guns and ammunition, never contained any exact quantity, but the order just said “a major quantity“.
53. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 74, July 7, 1992, no. 75, July 8, 1992, and no. 77, July 10, 1992; Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, September 21, 1991, p. 3; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-538.
54. Agresija..., p. 17; Oslobodjenje, May 31, 1992.
55. Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 2, April 26, 1992, and no. 127, August 29, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785. From September 1990, officer Milosevic was found “under command“ of Rajko Dukic from Milici, president of the Executive Board of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
56. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809l, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of he 216th Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel of the JNA, Asim Dzambasovic.
57. Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.
58. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-792, and 798. During 1990 and 1991, in the capacity of president of the SDS of the Cajnice Municipality, through public addresses and through printed and other mass media, Dusko Kornjaca was instigating ethnic intolerance, which particularly came to emphasis on the holiday of the Serb Orthodox Church called Small Madonna, in Cajnice, on September 21, 1990, when in the presence of the members of the SDS from Sarajevo Vojislav Maksimovic and others, through loudspeakers he was threatening the Muslims with bloody Drina river and manslaughters from WWII. From late April 1992, Kornjaca was the organizer and participant of many crimes against the Bosniaks in the Cajnice area (Ibid.). During 1991, Milos Kornjaca (from Staronic, Cajnice) was arming the Serbs and organizing crimes against the Bosniaks. Drago Pojevic too (from Staronic) armed Serbs and organized manslaughter and forced expulsions of Bosniaks, burning down of their villages and plundering of their property. Dusko Pejovic, “delegate” in the self-proclaimed Assembly of Republic of Srpska, during 1991 and 1992 armed Serbs and planned crimes against Bosniaks. In addition, on the territory of Southeast Bosnia, he brought in fascists from Serbia and Montenegro who committed crimes against Bosniaks (Ibid.).
59. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-784, and 2-2458; ICTY, Case: no. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 811. Using the aforementioned arms distributed to them by the JNa, at the same time supported by hteh JNA units, the Serb criminals were destroying Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Doboj, Bosanski Samac, Modrica, and other towns. Colonel Stosic took a battalion of tanks from the 6th Infantry Regiment from Colonel Major Cazim Hadzic, Commander of that unit. It is interesting to point out that Colonel Stosic issued the order for the movement of tanks from Doboj into Bosanski Brod, thus activating the DRINA military plan. This order was published in Slobodna Bosna, (no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5). Thus, the public had the opportunity to see a photocopy of his order, with a clear seal of the 11th Partisan Division.
60. Ibid. With this armament, the Serb criminals destroyed the Bosniak and Croat villages around Doboj, thus pushing away in the direction of Tesanj and Zepce some 20,000 Bosniak and Croat civilian refugees.
61. Ibid.; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 79, July 12, 1992. Under the command of major Stankovic, Commander of the city of Doboj, a number of concentration camps were formed on the territory of the Doboj municipality. Major Stankovic also commanded the actions of criminal attacks on the villages of Prisade, Makljenovac, Carsija, Plane, Orasje, Sevarlije, Pridjel, and others.
62. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-784; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 78, July 11, 1992. With the assistance of the aforementioned units, the JNA attacked Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Bosanski Samac, Brcko, Kalesija, Zvornik, Sapna, and other places.
63. Ibid.
64. Slobodna Bosna, no. 3, November 14, 1991, p. 6.
65. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-746. This armament was probably received from the JNA, although the aforementioned document does not specifically state so.
66. Ibid. These were the following Serb women: Vesna (daughter of Milan) Skakavac, born in 1975 (received an M-48 gun, no. 55290), Andelka (daughter of Savo) Kovac, born in 1926 (received an M-48 gun, no. 12805), and Stoja (daughter of Milorad) Simovic, born in 1956 (received an M-48 gun, no. 62818).
67. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3352.
68. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 42, June 5, 1992, and no. 70, July 3, 1992.
69. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261.
70. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3352. The JNA facilities (warehouses, storage places, and the like) were found above the village of Zakmur (on the Kmur hill).
71. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-261.
72. Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 63, June 26, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-309. In addition to the arms and ammunition, the JNA also delivered to the Serbs large quantities of oil, petrol, and food, particularly canned food.
73. Ibid.
74. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-309.
75. Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 82, July 15, 1992.
76. Ibid., no. 69, July 2, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 3-385 and 1004.
77. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1004. Pensioner Ilija Crnogorac (from Semizovac, about 55 of age, worked part-time at Jasmin Heto’s workshop for repair of chainsaws) took active participation in the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jasmin (son of Muhamed) Heto (from Semizovac, about 35 of age, owner of the workshop for repair of chainsaws), during the March barricades, used his own car to transport arms to the Serbs. After the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, he joined the aggressor units.
78. Ibid. Savo Cetkovic (from Svrake - Semizovac, about 50 of age) was actively involved in the Serb units from the beginning of the aggession, stationed on the positions in Semizovac.
79. Ibid.
80. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 6, April 30, 1992, no. 23, May 17, 1992, and no. 33, Mary 27, 1992; Agresija..., p. 22; Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3. This is the way the aforementioned officers supplied the Serb people with arms.
81. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2592, Testimony of Branislav Herak.
82. Slobodna Bosna, no. 4, November 21, 1991, p. 3.
83. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 61, June 24, 1992.
84. Slobodna Bosna, no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5; Dnevni izvjestaj, No. 72, July 5, 1992, and no. 85, July 18, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/4 and 549/5. Colonel Major Bartula gave to the reserve captain Mladen Cebic a “scorpion” automatic gun with 150 bullets as a gift.
85 Ibid. Among the main scenario makers of the “Serbization” of the Visoko barracks were:
- general major Vojislav Djurdjevac (Commander of the 4th Corps);
- Colonel Ratko Djukanovic (Chief of Staff of the artillery of the 4th Corps, otherwise married in Visoko);
- Colonel Major Zoran Simovic (security authority in the 4th Corps), with his main assistants: junior Sergeant Kic, captain Mladen Cebic, and Simo Savic (a civilian in the JNA - restaurant manager);
- Colonel Major Jovan Bartula (Commander of the Visoko garrison) with associates: Stevan Harambasic, replacing the legal deputy of the 1st class captain of the First Motorized Brigade Hajrudin Hasanovic, 1st class captain Milorad Gorancic, and ensigns Ilija and Spaso Damjanovic (Slobodna Bosna, No. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 5). The aforementioned officers harassed the non-Serb officers and soldiers, in particular the Croats and Bosniaks (Ibid.).
86. Ibid.; Slobodna Bosna, no. 20, March 12, 1992; Oslobodjenje, February 25, 1992; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/5, Ministry of Interior, Law Enforcement Centre of Sarajevo, Police Precinct of Visoko, no. 17-23/20-375/91, October 27, 1991, Record. In the first half of October 1991, upon the decision of hte Municipal Board of the SDS of Visoko, Zdravko Maric “placed“ himself available to the Jna as “a reservist volunteer“, based on which, at the Military Post of 2651 Visoko, he took a 7.62 mm M-70 automatic gun, 150 bullets, 3 defensive hand grenades M-70 A, and a set called “rap”. Along with the arms, he also received a certificate stating the type of arms, and the code of the war unit in which he was assigned (the certificated had the seal of the military post, and was signed by Vitomir Krsmanovic, as the person who delivered the arms, directly obtained from the garrison in Visoko - AIIZ, inv. No. 2-549/4, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law Enforcement Centre of Sarajevo, Police Precinct of Visoko, no. 17-23/20-5-5-374/91, October 27, 1991, Record).
87. Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785. On August 1, 1992, in Visoko, criminal reports were filed against 23 Serbs due to grounded suspicion that from May 1991 until June 1992, as the SDS members, they were falsely presenting the circumstances in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and arming the Serbs with the Jna arms - Agresija..., p.15 (II). 88. Agresija …, p. 6. The investigatory authorities found 3 empty metal caskets and a part of the wooden cask for ammunition, as well as empty cardboard boxes for ammunition, and brushes for weapon cleaning, as well as 7.62 mm bullets.
89. Ibid., pp. 7, and 12.
90. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-785; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 64, June 27, 1992, and no. 106, August 8, 1992. Major Dordje Petrovic stole a certain quantity of amrs in Zenica and sold it, and afterwards he fled to Slovenia. For seven days, major Trivic worked to identify the culprit, and finally he arrested four Serbs (reserve officers), who were on guard at Kaonik. Criminal Karadzic insisted that Trivic stops the investigation. In relation to this, Colonel Major Jadranko Jandric said to the arrested Serbs: “Are you impudent, we gave you the weapons, and now you are smuggling?!” (Ibid.).
91. Agresija..., p. 43; Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 25, May 19, 1992, ands no. 26, May 20, 1992.
92. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-235, 49, and 3335. A number of armed vehicles with crews from the TRZ in Hadzici, in April 1992, were sent to Ilidza too, as support for the Serb criminals who were attacking the area of Sarajevo, killing civilian population and destroying residential, commercial, religious and other buildings. Thus, on several occasions, Momcilo Stanimirovic went there, in the capacity of the Commander of the unit. The crew of an armed transporter were: Branko Krneta - aimer, Nenad Grbic - driver, and Predrag Grbic - assistant to the machine gun operator. The crew of the other armed transporeter were: Radmilo Bijelica - aimer, Draga Tot - assistant to the machine gun operator, and a certain Raso - driver (used to work in the car plant). The crews of the “praga” guns were: Boro Samoukovic, aka Ico, Slavisa Devedlaka, Nikica Subotic, Milorad Zerajic, Nebojsa Banduka, Milan Acimovic, and others. The tank drivers were: Radmilo Samardzija and Predrag Lavicki. The Commander of the tank unit was Svetozar Elcic.
93. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-3335.
94. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.
95. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521-522, and 794.
96. Ibid. Strahinja Zivak (son of Djordje and mother Bosiljka Zelenovic), was born in 1932 in the village of Brdan (SO Konjic), where he resided, an ethnic Serb, national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pensioner, a father of two.
97. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794. The Executive Board of the SDS of the Municipal Assembly of Konjic was ifnromed of the aforementioned position of the Main Board ofhte Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Djuro Kuljanin, president of the Municipal Board of the SDS, and proposed to come in contact with major Ranko Kuljanin, who worked as the chief of security of the UNIS factories. Thus, contact was established with the aforementioned major, and in mid-1991, an arrangement was made that the procurement of arms be conducted through Branko Simic, who lived in Zitomislici (near Mostar). Immediately after, with Vukasin Mrkajic, president of the Local Board of the SDS of Bradina, Desimir Mrkajic, Damjan Dordjic and Milos Kuljanin, Zivak went to Mostar.
98. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521, and 522.
99. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. In June 1991, Zivak distributed the arms to the following Serbs: Danilo Zivak; Cedo and Mirko (sons of Obren) Zivak; Neno and Bozo (sons of Danilo) Zivak; Jovo (son of Savo) Dragovic; Marinko (son of Milan) Zivak; Ljubo (son of Jovo) Dragovic; Todor (son of Rade) Zelenovic; Zdravko (son of Simo) Zelenovic; Milan (son of Petar) Draganic; Rajko (son of Bosko) Draganic; Dragan (son of Mirko) Zivak; Srdjan (son of Jovo) Gligorevic; Radenko (son of Rade) Gligorevic; Sretko (son of Jovo) Simikovic; Vito (son of Marko) Stojanovic, and Nedjo (son of Bosko) Draganic.
100. Ibid. In addition to the aforementioned radio station, there was one more radio station in Bradina, sized some 20x40 cm, brought by Sretko Zivak from Dzep. Through this station, Rajko Djordjic and Sretko Zivak established connection with Jovo Jovanovic and Rajko Micevic at Borci, inquiring about the situation at Borci, asking whether the JNA is arriving.
101. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-794.
102. Ibid.; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-522. Zivak unloaded the aforementioned arms into the garage of Zdravko Zelenovic, without his approval. For distribution of these arms, he made a list “which he gave to Zoran Zelenovic, and through his children, Zoran notified the people from the list about the time and method of transfer of the arms”. At taking over of the arms, each individual had to pay 500 dinars: In this distribution, the arms were received by the following Serbs: Slavko (son of Zdravko) Zelenovic; Zoran (son of Djordje) Zelenovic; Radomir (son of Obren) Dragovic; Bozo (son of Danilo) Zivak; Momcilo (son of Branko) Gligorevic; Mile (son of Andjelko) Zivak; Marko (son of Nedjo) Draganic; Mirko (son of Dimitrije) Draganic; Milo (son of Petko) Draganic; Drago and Slavko (sons of Dusan) Saran; Marinko and Mirko (sons of Milovan) Zivak; Novica (son of Boro) Draganic; Ranko (son of Zdravko) Zelenovic; Gordan (son of Zivko) Zivak, and Ratko (son of Milan) Draganic (Ibid.).
103. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. At the time, Radic took the aforementioned persons to Zovik to Drago Lubura, who enabled them to load the weapons in some facility in Zovik.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. It was established that the arms in Bradina were stored at the house of Gojko Mrkajic, and the ammunition at the warehouse of the store Oaza.
106. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. Of the total number of armed Serbs in Bradina, 18 came from the territories of Tarcin and Rastelica. Those persons had come to Bradina ten days before the combat activity was initiated by the Serb criminals. Four of them got private accommodations, and 12 in the sheds of the Sip enterprise. For them, in those sheds, Rajko Djordjic organized meals, and he assigned these tasks to Zara Mrkajic. Of the 18 persons from the aforementioned places, we particularly point out the following ones: Dragan Krstic, Zarko Kulas, Darko Kulas, Velimir Mijatovic, Sinisa Curic, Dragan Travar, and Boris Travar.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-521. The participants of the stealing were: Velibor Mrkajic, Damjan Djordjic, Vaso and Dragan Vujicic, Dragan Mrkajic, Zdravko Zuza, Radoslav Kuljanin, and Branko Gligorijevic. After the stealing, the explosive was stored in the basement of the house of Dragan Djordjic, and then a portion of it was transported into the house of Velibor Mrkajic (Ibid.).
110. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 6, April 30, 1992.
111. Agresija …, p. 22 (II).
112. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 111, August 13, 1992; Slobodna Bosna, No. 1, October 31, 1991, p. 8.
113. Slobodna Bosna, No. 21, March 19, 1992, p. 8, and no. 22, March 26, 1992, p. 4; Oslobodjenje, March 25, 1993, p. 5. From then until March 23, 1992, the Serb criminals had fired thousands and thousands of bullets, intimidating the peaceful population and killing individual Bosniaks. “They partied and drunk night after night, they used hand launcher grenades to shell the Muslim houses in Sipovo, the grave and monument of Alija Djerzelez in Gerzovo, they used barricades as a means to dismiss the Sipovo leadership…”, and the like. 114. Slobodna Bosna, June 19, 2003, p. 19.
115. ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 869.
116. ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T, Evidence of the testimony by the JNA Colonel O.S., June 4, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as: ICTY, Case: No. IT-94-I-T).
117. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2550, pp. 9-10. This brigade participated with five battalions in “cleansing of the space around Ljubija, Brisevo, and Kozarac”, then in cleansing of the forests between Grmusa and Grabez”, and “on the war frontlines” in Bosanski Brod, Jajce, Gradacac, Bratunac, Doboj, and in Vogosca (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2550, pp. 9-10).
118. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 110, August 12, 1992, and 114/115, August 17, 1992. On April 21, 1992, with his criminals, Milan Strbac committed an armed attack on Bosanska Krupa, in order to occupy this territory and to exterminate the Bosniaks on the right bank of the Una river.
119. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 149/150, September 21, 1992. In addition, to the members of the so-called Serb police precinct in Bosanski Petrovac, he issued orders to commit crimes against Bosniaks in which he participated himself. He is, otherwise, one of the organizers of the concentration camps of Kozila and Kamenice. Gacesa is also directly responsible for liquidation of the Bosniak population, for plundering and destruction of their property, and for destruction of the Islamic religious facilities.
120. Dnevni izvjestaj, no. 85, July 18, 1992; S. Cekic, VOJNE PRIPREME ZA ZLOCIN U BRCKOM, in: J. Kadric, BRCKO - GENOCID I SVJEDOCENJA, Sarajevo 1998, p. 12; J. Kadric, the aforementioned work, p. 27. Even the reserve major Milisav Milutinovic was involved in the arming of the Serbs. Colonel Major Milinkovic, captain Petrovic, and major Milutinovic played a key role in arming of the Sreb population on the territory of Brcko (J. Kadric, the aforementioned work, p. 27).
121. ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 639.
122. Oslobodjenje, July 20, 1993, p. 4.
123. Posebno izdanje, no. 2, April 28, 1992.
124. Ibid. Numerous documents of military origin confirm this without dilemma. Thus, for an illustration, in the Conclusions from the assessment of the situation on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Military District, sent by general Kukanjac to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY on March 20, 1992, he, among other things, indicates of how “reliable sources” as well as “speeches of the Ministry of Interior officials on the television” confirm the fact that “the peoples of this Republic have armed well on the party basis”, presenting on this occasion the data that “the Muslims have armed some 60,000, Croats some 35,000, and Serbs some 20,000 people” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, 2-169, and 772). The document of the Command of the 2nd Military District entitled “Security Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, addresses the paramilitary formations and their composition and relation towards the JNA. Starting at this from the false assessment that “the leadership of BiH, parallel with negotiations under the EC auspices, for a peaceful resolution of the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has also intensively worked on military organization of party armies (SDA and HDZ)”, general Kukanjac points out that “this process has been finalized, which is corroborated by the numerous armed actions by these forces against the JNA and the Serb population”. Of the basic objectives and the “activities of the paramilitary formations on the territory of BiH”, which were stated, among others, by general Kukanjac, on this occasion we are pointing out the following ones: 1. “Attacking on the facilities and members of the JNA inflict losses on it and challenge it to make an intervention so that after that it would be condemned for attacking democratic forces and for wishing to preserve the Communist system in the country”, and 2. “By committing genocide against the Serb population, make pressure for a more massive moving out into Serbia, and thus create as large as possible ethnically pure space to be placed under their control (by the forces of the SDA and HDZ), thus creating favourable conditions in the case of setting up of territorial borders” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-771). According to general Kukanjac, “on the territory of BiH there are organized, armed and active respective paramilitary formations on the party and ethnic basis (SDA, HDZ, and HOS)” for realization of the aforementioned goals, which, in the JNA assessment, had some 100,000 manpower (SDA some 50,000, HDZ some 35,000, and HOS some 15,000). However, this document, in addition to not documenting the aforementioned figures, general Kukanjac does not employ a single word to refer to formation of the Serb armed formations. It is interesting to point out the assessment by general Kukanjac about the place, role and position of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the general states that the JNA “is the stabilizer of peace” on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that until recognition of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (by the EC and USA), “as the factor of peace, with its direct presence in the crisis areas of Bosanski Brod, Kupres, Mostar, Sarajevo, Bijeljina, it prevented expansion of interethnic armed conflicts”. However, the role of the JNA on the alleged prevention of “interethnic armed conflicts and the genocide against the Serb population of BiH”, according to the assessment of the Command of the 2nd Military District, “does not fit into the policies of extremist forces of the SDA and HDZ for dominance over the Serb people”. In relation to this, it is stated that “the paramilitary formations of the SDA and HDZ”, in addition to “the armed attacks on the JNA members and the Serb population”, also participate in armed attacks on the JNA facilities and units, “that are employed in prevention of the interethnic conflicts and the genocide against the Serb people (Bosanski Brod, Kupres, Mostar)”. In this context, it is further stated that “a massacre has been committed against the Serb population in the surroundings of Bosanski Brod and Kupres”. At the end, this document makes the assessment that the recognition of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EC and the USA “has directly contributed to creation of a general chaos, interethnic conflicts, and expansion of armed combat on this territory”, and that thus the JNA has allegedly been “brought into an unfavourable position”. It is also stated that “the top leadership of BiH (SDA and HDZ), headed by Alija Izetbegovic, with its actions and open invitations to mobilization, by tricking the public, expansion of falsities and panic, has directly contributed to the current situation in the Republic” (Ibid.). Obviously, the Command of the 2nd Military District and the other commands and units of the JNA, as well as the top military leadership of the SFRY were persistently disseminating disinformation on the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the role and place of the JNA in this republic, and particularly on the role of the highest ranking representatives of power from among the Bosniak and Croat peoples, Alija Izetbegovic in particular. The truth is quite different from the one placed through the JNA, and numerous documents testify to this.
125. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-1174, Information by Velibor Ostojic - to Radovan Karadzic (“confidential”), March 1992; ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraph 791.
126. D. Gajic-Glisic, SRPSKA VOJSKA, Belgrade 1992, pp. 260-264; M. Bojic, OSVRT NA POLOZAJ MUSLIMANA - BOSNJAKA U JUGOSLAVIJI, in: STVARANJE I RAZARANJE JUGOSLAVIJE, Compilation of works from the Round Table on Creation and Destruction of the AVNOJ Yugoslavia, held in Belgrade, on December 5-7, 1995, Belgrade 1996, p. 274.
127. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 1, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY (“attn. NGS”); Ibid., inv. No. 2-76, The Government of the SAO Romanija, strictly confidential no. 10-9/92, February 10, 1992 - to the assistant federal secretary for national defence for background activity, and the others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-77, The Government of the SAO Romanija, strictly confidential no. 10-8/92, February 10, 1992 - to the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic). JNA officer Predrag Bukurica (from Ilijas), served until 1991 in Zadar, and then was redeployed to Sarajevo. In mid-May 1991, he went to Belgrade, from where for the needs of the SSNO he maintained connections and contacts with the SDS leadership in the areas of Pale and Ilijas, due to which he visited Pale and Ilijas on a number of occasions (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-541).
128. AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 1023/11, President of the Serb municipality of Kalesija, March 23, 1992 - to Minister Velibor Ostojic.
129. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2809, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the 216th Mountain Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel of the JNA, Asim Dzambasovic.
130. Oslobodjenje, February 25, 1993.
131. Ibid.
132. Oslobodjenje, October 1, 1993.
133. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-76, The Government of the SAO Romanija, strictly confidential no. 10-9/92, February 10, 1992 - to the assistant federal secretary for national defence, and others; Ibid., inv. No. 2-77, The Government of the SAO Romanija, strictly confidential no. 10-8/92, February 10, 1992 - to the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (Attn. Dr. Radoman Bozovic).
134. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-75, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 908-1, March 20, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - (attn. NGS, in person).
135. Ibid. “The reliable” pensioned JNA officers were maximally involved in military planning, preparation and conducting of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are a lot of data about this. For illustration, we indicate the fact that Slobodan Krivokapic, a pensioned JNA officer, owner of the Konoba inn at Marka Marulica St., (permanently residing at 2, Marjana Baruna) in Sarajevo, before the outbreak of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possessed the plans for occupation of Kupres and Livno, and their integration with the SAO Krajina. Krivokapic also knew about a certain “deed book file”, a document found at the Command of the 2nd Military District, pertaining to the “return of 70% of the territory of R BiH to Serbia” (Dnevni izvjestaj, nos. 114/115, August 17, 1992). In the order dated April 4, 1992, among other things, general Milutin Kukanjac order recruitment of the pensioned military personnel and civilians for “preparedness in the defence of residential buildings” (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2804, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 09/80-23, April 4, 1992 - to the Command of the Military Engineering Directorate). This order, among other things, raised the combat preparedness of the commands, units and institutions of the 2nd Military District “up to the highest level”. It was of special importance and “very relevant” that by eight PM of the same date (that is, on April 4), the full combat preparedness is also ensured “of separate facilities as well as their protection” (Ibid.).
136.RATNI ZLOCINI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, Reports by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, Antiwar Campaign of Croatia, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights Zagreb, Library Dokumenti, no. 2, Zagreb, 1993, p. 107.
137. Ibid.
138. Prva Linija, no. 6, May 23, 1993, p. 13.
139. M. Kreso, CINJENICE KOJE UKAZUJU NA AGRESIJU NA REPUBLIKU BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU OD STRANE SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE I NJENIH POMAGACA (manuscript), Sarajevo, 1993, p. 6.
140. Agresija …, p. 19; AIIZ, inv. No. 2-88, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1940, April 2, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-118, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-1986, April 4, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Background Sector; Ibid., inv. No. 2-85, Command of the 2nd Military District, Operational Duty Team, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2000, April 5, 1992 - to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - Operational Centre; Ibid., inv. No. 2-124, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 10/36-2126, April 10, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - for background activity Sector. On April 6, 1992, the leadership of the Municipal Assembly of Bihac brought the decision that within ten days the JNA should return the arms to the units and the headquarters of the territorial defence. However, the JNA refused this. On April 9, the Party of Democratic Action sent a request to issue the arms for the TO units from the Ustikolina warehouse, and this request was refused (Ibid.).
141. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2821, Technical Administration of the SSNO, confidential no. 2268-1, December 30, 1991 - to the Command of the 5th Military District. This order was served on “all of the commands - headquarters of the TO and JNA, up to the brigade level” (Ibid.).
141a. Ibid. It is interesting to point out how general Blagoje Adzic, in the explanation for bringing of this order, indicates upon compliance with regulations and prevention of any misuse (“…in order to continue honoring the regulations thus preventing any misuse”; “…exclusively in compliance with the applicable regulations”). He had obviously “forgotten” that it was exactly his order and other related activities were of criminal character, rather than, as he claims, compliant with the regulations and preventive against any misuse.
142. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2815, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no. 31/103-6-1, January 9, 1992 - Attn. Commander. Just like his supervisor (general Blagoje Adzic), general Milutin Kukanjac also speaks about “compliance” with regulations and “prevention” of any misuse. He was obviously copying his commander in the criminal intentions and actions.
143. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-195, 196, 198, and others.
144. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-175, Municipal Headquarters of Territorial Defence of Bosanski Petrovac, strictly confidential no. 06/190-1, December 13, 1991 - to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-176, Command of the 530 Background Base, strictly confidential no. 25-1, January 3, 1992 - to the Command of the 5th Military District. On this occasion, the following material and technical resources were requested:
1. pistol 7.62 mm 40 pcs
2. automatic pistol 7.65 mm 15 pcs
3. automatic gun 7.62 mm 130 pcs
4. submachine gun 7.62 mm (7.9 mm) 60 pcs
5. mortar 60 mm 12 pcs
6. mortar 82 mm 10 pcs
7. mortar 120 mm 3 pcs
8. recoilless cannon 82 mm 6 pcs
9. hand rocket launcher 90 mm 20 pcs
10. hand launcher M-57 40 pcs
11. hand rocket launcher (“zolja”) 200 pcs
12. hand defensive grenade 400 pcs
13. light compass 3 pcs
14. combat ammunition sets for infantry armament 2 pcs
15. set of clothes for soldiers 1,200 pcs (Ibid.).
145. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-176, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 25-1, January 3, 1992 - to the Command of the 5th Military District.
146. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-177, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.32/198-5, January 8, 1992 - to the Command of the 530th Background Base and the OpSTO of Bosanski Petrovac.
147. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-222, Command of hte 5th Military District, Confidential no. 32/205-3, January 2, 1992 - to the Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO and to Others. In the assessment of Colonel Gradimir Petrovic, representative of the Chief of Staff of the Technical Services of the Command of the 5th Military District, the aforementioned resources were to be “delivered” to the 530th Background Base, “for distribution to the end recipients”.
148. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2820, Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most - to the JNA Command in Belgrade, Specification List of the Needs in Armament, Equipment and Other Military Materials for Organization of the Serb People on the Territory of the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most. This request was substantiated in the following manner: “B ecause we are not able to do anythign through the Commander of the TO in Sanski Most, who is of Muslim ethnicity, and has been appointed to this post by the SDA in Sanski Most, and their joint efforts over the past year pertained to destruction of the JNA and Yugoslavia as the joint state of equal nations and ethnicities,. We wish to organize and equip ourselves for the defence of Sanski Most and the people who wish to remain in Yugoslavia. In this, we are placing ourselves directly under the JNA command. We hope that in this difficult moment youl will offer us the necessary help and that we will jointly defend our homeland“ (Ibid.).
149. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2822, Command of the 530th Background Base, confidential no. 188-2, January 28, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District.
150. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2822, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 31/103-6/2, February 10, 1992 - to the SSNO Technical Administration.
151. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-224, Military Post 4509 Belgrade, confidential no. 11-9, January 7, 1992 - to the Military Post 9808 Pancevo. The aforementioned resources were to be taken from the 2nd Military District.
152. AIIZ, inv. Nos. 2-225, and 2-227, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/198-60, February 22, 1992 - to the Commands of the 993th, 530th, and 405th Background Base, and to the Command of the 5th Corps.
153. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-234, Minitry of Interior, Security Services Centre Bihac, Serb Police Precinct Bosanski Petrovac, strictly confidential no. 01-06/92, February 6, 1992 - to the Military Post 1754 Bosanski Petrovac. Ibid., inv. No. 2-223, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 267-2, February 17, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District.
154. Ibid.
155. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-232, /Serb/ District Headquarters of the TO of Bihac, strictly confidential no. 06/1-1/92, February 18, 1992 - to the Command of hte 405th Background Base. The command of the 405th Background Base forwarded the aforementioned request “by this headquarters of the Bihac TO“ to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the attention of general major Ratko Milicevic, because this unit “is competent for resolving of the request“, with the appeal that this request be reviewed in the spirit of the order by the Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY no. 2268-1, dated December 30, 1991, and the order of the Command of the 2nd Military District no. 31/103-6-1, dated january 9, 1992 (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-231, Command of the 405th Background Base, strictly confidential no. 200-2, February 18, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District).
156. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-230, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.32/205-16, March 3, 1992, - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence - Technical Administration.
157. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-236, Military Post 4022, confidential no. 18/4-35, March 26, 1992, Banjaluka - to Military Post 5027 Sarajevo; Ibid., inv. No. 2-235, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential no. 32/205-24, March 30, 1992 - to Military Posts 5290 and 4022 Banjaluka.
158. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-127, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2201, April 13, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - for background activity Sector (background report - OP 54); Ibid., inv. No. 2-134, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2383, April 20, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - for background activity Sector (background report - OP 61).
159. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-183, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/101-230, April 7, 1992 - to the Command of the 9th Corps.
160. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-239, Serb Autonomous Area of Krajina, Headquarters of the TO of the III Operational Zone of Banija and Kordun, No. 405-1, March 23, 1992, Vojnic - to the 530th Background Base of Bosanski Petrovac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-237, Command of the 530th Background Base, strictly confidential, no. 863-3, March 31, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District.
161. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-178, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.14/20-38, April 1, 1992 - to the Chief of Staff of the Background Service of the 2nd Military District.
162. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-184, Military Post 9808, confidential no. 11-200/1, April 7, 1992, Sarajevo - to the Command of the 2nd Military District.
163. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-186, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential, no.32/205-28, April 10, 1992 - to the Command of the 5th Corps.
164. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-181, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential, no. 20/40-2009, April 6, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District (Technical Service).
165. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-182.
166. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-189, Military Post 5027 Sarajevo, confidential, no. 32/205-28, April 8, 1992 - to Military Post 8248 Knin, and Military Post 4022 Banjaluka.
167. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-192, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/206-28, April 13, 1992 - to the Command of the 5th Corps, and to the Command of the 744th Background Base.
168. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-195, Command of the 10th Corps, strictly confidential no. 19/31-442, April 23, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District. Ibid., inv. No. 2-196, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/103-40- 1, April 24, 1992 - to the Command of the 10th Corps and the Command of the 530th Background Base (attn. Commander).
169. A significant place in preparation of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Counterintelligence Service of the JNA (“KOS”) and the Federal Secretariat for Interior Affairs (SSUP). At this, it is necessary to have in mind the relations of the KOS and SSUP towards the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, as the key lever of the KOS, immediately upon formation, the Serb Democratic Party continuously monitored the situation at the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting from police precincts at municipalities and all the way up to the leadership of the State Security Service and the Board of Ministers. In this context, we need to point out that all the relevant information on the situation in all the organizational units of the Ministry of Interior, were regularly forwarded to the cabinet of the president of the SDS and the minister of the SSUP. Also, a number of the personnel employed at the Ministry of Interior and the centres of security services regularly attended the sessions of the top bodies of the SDS, and kept permanent contacts with the members of the Main Boards of the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By insisting on certain staffing solutions (at the centres for security services in Banjaluka, Bihac, Doboj, and Tuzla, “ensure that the chiefs of staff of such centres be Serbs loyal to the SDS, and that in other centres Serbs take the positions of the chiefs of staff of the Public Security Sectors”), the SDS anticipated even the zones of war activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina - northern Bosnia (main corridor for link between the western borders of the imaginary “Greater Serbia” and Yugoslavia). According to the instructions from the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, in the period from October 1991 until January 1992, in order to conquer the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina or neutralize it as a significant defence factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an “expert group” of the SSUP visited the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (composed if the inspectors of the State and Public Security Services of the SSUP). The role of the members of this group was mainly of intelligence character. Their basic task was to gather the data on the operations, staffing and material levels and capacities of the State Security Service of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then those data pertaining to the police precincts throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing in this a particular interest for the reserve and active composition of the police, their staffing, equipment, supplies, and the like. The fact should be particularly noted that the aforementioned “expert group” had arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the invitation of the then minister of interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Delimustafic. He, as well as his deputy Vitomir Zepinic, and a number of senior personnel at the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its organizational units, as well as a significant number of the senior personnel of the Serb ethnicity within the police, was an active associate of the KOS (AIIZ, inv. No. 2-551).
170. AIIZ, SDS Fund, inv. No. 490/1-16.
171. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-197, “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Ministry of Interior Sarajevo - Security Services Centre Banjaluka”, strictly confidential no. 11, April 23, 1993 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District (attn. Commander).
172. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-198, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 31/103-41, April 24, 1992 - to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence - Technical Administration. 173. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-139, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 10/36-2500, April 26, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - for background activity Sector (the background report - OP 66). The aforementioned material and technical resources were supplied, which is confirmed by teh statement of Stojan Zupljanin in Glas Srpski , of April 29, 1992, that “the Security Services Centre now has the arms and equipment, starting from automatic guns, armored combat vehicles, even anti-aircraft weapons and helicopters“ (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 593-598). The Serb Ministry of Interior of BiH received equipment, armament and other material and technical resources also from the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Secretariat for Interior Affairs (ICTY, Case: No. IT-02-54-T, paragraphs 262 and 270).
174. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-2584, Command of the 30th Partisan Division, strictly confidential no. 151-1, January 28, 1992.
175. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-199, Command of the 5th Corps, confidential, no. 16/4-32/1, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District, Command of the 5th Corps - cc, and also to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division - cc; Ibid., inv. No.2-200, Command of the 993rd Background Base, confidential no. 1676-2/1, April 25, 1992 -to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division - cc; Ibid., inv. No. 2-201, Command of the 993rd Background Base, confidential no. 1676-1/1, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District, to the Command of the 30th Partisan Division - cc.
176. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-203, Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 1472-11, April 23, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District and to the Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Ministry of Interior of Benkovac, cc’d; Ibid., inv. No. 2-202, Command of the 608th Technical Supply Base of the SSNO, strictly confidential, no. 1472-9, April 23, 1992 - to the Command of the 2nd Military District and to the Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Ministry of Interior of Vojnic; Ibid., inv. No. 2-208, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.32/198-134, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 405th Background Base, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Police Precinct of Korenica; Ibid., inv. No. 2-206, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no.32/198-138, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 405th Backgroupd Base, the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Police Precinct of Benkovac; Ibid., inv. No. 2-136, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no.10/36-2441, April 23, 1992 - to the Operational Centre of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the SFRY - for background activity Sector (background report OP 64).
177. Ibid.
178. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-205, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.32/198-138/1, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 405th and 530th Background Base.
179. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-209, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 32/198-137, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 530th Background Base, to the Ministry of Interior of Republic of Serb Krajina and the police precinct in Okucani.
180. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-211, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/198-135, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 530th Background Base, to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the police precinct of Petrinja.
181. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-213, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential no. 32/198-133, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 405th Background Base, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and the police precinct in Knin.
182. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-215, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/1, April 26, 1992 - to the Command of the 9th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-216, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/3, April 26, 1992 - to the Command of the 5th Corps; Ibid., inv. No. 2-217, Command of the 2nd Military District, strictly confidential, no. 32/205-30/2, April 26, 1992 - to the Command of the 10th Corps.
183. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-219, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no.32/198-100/1, April 26, 1992 - to the Command of the 530th Background Base and the Command of the 10th Corps.
184. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-221, the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina, Zonal Headquarters of the TO of Kordun, Confidential no. 256, April 25, 1992 - to the Command of the 10th Corps, to the Command of the 2nd Military District, and to the Command of the 993rd Background Base of Banjaluka.
185. AIIZ, inv. No. 2-235, Military Post 5027, Sarajevo, Confidential no. 32/205-24, March 30, 1992 - to the Military Posts 5290 and 4022 Banjaluka; Ibid., inv. No. 2-220, Command of the 2nd Military District, confidential no. 32/205-28/1, April 27, 1992, to the Command of the 5th Corps.
186. AIIZ, inv. No. 3-2828.

Tags: Serbian agression, JNA, Illegal arming, Serbian terrorists

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