The Factual Relationship Between the Bosnian Serb Army and the Army of the FRY

146. The Appeals Chamb er has concluded that in general international law, three tests may be applied for determining whether an individual is acting as a de facto State organ. In the case of individuals forming part of armed forces or military units, as in the case of any other hierarchically organised group, the test is that of overall control by the State.

147. It now falls to the Appeals Chamber to establish whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Yugoslav Army exercised in 1992 the requisite measure of control over the Bosnian Serb Army. The answer must be in the affirmative.

148. The Appeals Chamber does not see any ground for overturning the factual findings made in this case by the Trial Chamber and relies on the facts as stated in the Judgement. The majority and Judge McDonald do not appear to disagree on the facts, which Judge McDonald also takes as stated in the Judgement, 176 but only on the legal interpretation to be given to those facts. 149. Since, however, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the legal consequences of the relationship between the FRY and Bosnian Serb forces, the Appeals Chamber must now apply its foregoing analysis to the facts and draw the necessary legal conclusions therefrom.

150. The Trial Chamber clearly found that even after 19 May 1992, the command structure of the JNA did not change after it was renamed and redesignated as the VJ. Furthermore, and more importantly, it is apparent from the decision of the Trial Chamber and more particularly from the evidence as evaluated by Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting Opinion, that even after that date the VJ continued to control the Bosnian Serb Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is the VRS. The VJ controlled the political and military objectives, as well as the military operations, of the VRS. Two “factors” emphasised in the Judgement need to be recalled: first, “the transfer to the 1st Krajina Corps, as with other units of the VRS, of former JNA Officers who were not of Bosnian Serb extraction from their equivalent postings in the relevant VRS unit’s JNA predecessor” 177 and second, with respect to the VRS, “the continuing payment of salaries, to Bosnian Serb and non-Bosnian Serb officers alike, by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. 178 According to the Trial Chamber, these two factors did not amount to, or were not indicative of, effective control by Belgrade over the Bosnian Serb forces. 179 The Appeals Chamber shares instead the views set out by Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting Opinion, whereby these two factors, in addition to others shown by the Prosecution, did indicate control. 180

151. What emerges from the facts which are both unc ontested by the Trial Chamber and mentioned by Judge McDonald (concerning the command and control structure that persisted after the redesignation of the VRS and the continuous payment of salaries to officers of the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY) is that the VRS and VJ did not, after May 1992, comprise two separate armies in any genuine sense. This is further evidenced by the following factors:

(i) The re-organization of the JNA and the change of name did not point to an alteration of military objectives and strategies. The command structure of the JNA and the re-designation of a part of the JNA as the VRS, while undertaken to create the appearance of compliance with international demands, was in fact designed to ensure that a large number of ethnic Serb armed forces were retained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 181

(ii) Over and above the extensive financial, logistical and other assistance and support which were acknowledged to have been provided by the VJ to the VRS, it was also uncontested by the Trial Chamber that as a creation of the FRY/VJ, the structures and ranks of the VJ and VRS were identical, and also that the FRY/VJ directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS. 182 As a result, the VRS reflected the strategies and tactics devised by the FRY/JNA/VJ.

(iii) Elements of the FRY/VJ continued to directly intervene in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 19 May 1992, and were fighting with the VRS and providing critical combat support to the VRS. While an armed conflict of an international character was held to have existed only up until 19 May 1992, the Trial Chamber did nevertheless accept that thereafter “active elements” of the FRY’s armed forces, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), continued to be involved in an armed conflict with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 183 Much de facto continuity, in terms of the ongoing hostilities, 184 was therefore observable and there seems to have been little factual basis for the Trial Chamber’s finding that by 19 May 1992, the FRY/VJ had lost control over the VRS. 185

(iv) JNA military operations under the command of Belgrade that had already commenced by 19 May 1992 did not cease immediately and, from a purely practical point of view, it is highly unlikely that they would have been able to cease overnight in any event. 186 The creation of the VRS by the FRY/VJ, therefore, did not indicate an intention by Belgrade to relinquish the control held by the FRY/VJ over the Bosnian Serb army. To the contrary, in fact, the establishment of the VRS was undertaken to continue the pursuit of the FRY’s own political and military objectives, and the evidence demonstrates that these objectives were implemented by military and political operations that were controlled by Belgrade and the JNA/VJ. There is no evidence to suggest that these objectives changed on 19 May 1992. 187

152. Taken together, these factors suggest that the relationship between the VJ and VRS cannot be characterised as one of merely coordinating political and military activities. Even if less explicit forms of command over military operations were practised and adopted in response to increased international scrutiny, the link between the VJ and VRS clearly went far beyond mere coordination or cooperation between allies and in effect, the renamed Bosnian Serb army still comprised one army under the command of the General Staff of the VJ in Belgrade. 188 It was apparent that even after 19 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb army continued to act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade. In this regard, clear evidence of a chain of military command between Belgrade and Pale was presented to the Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber accepted that the VRS Main Staff had links and regular communications with Belgrade. 189 In spite of this, and although the Trial Chamber acknowledged the possibility that certain members of the VRS may have been specifically charged by the FRY authorities to commit particular acts or to carry out particular tasks of some kind, it concluded that “without evidence of orders having been received from Belgrade which circumvented or overrode the authority of the Corps Commander, those acts cannot be said to have been carried out ‘ on behalf of’ the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” 190

153. The Appeals Chamber holds that to have required proof of specific orders circumventing or overriding superior orders not only applies the wrong test but is also questionable in this context. A distinguishing feature of the VJ and the VRS was that they possessed shared military objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from Belgrade circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps commanders would have ever been necessary as these forces were of the same mind; a point that appears to have been virtually conceded by the Trial Chamber. 191

154. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber, noting that the pay of all 1 st Krajina Corps officers and presumably of all senior VRS Commanders as former JNA officers continued to be received from Belgrade after 19 May 1992, acknowledged that a possible conclusion with regard to individuals, is that payment could well “be equated with control”. 192 The Trial Chamber nevertheless dismissed such continuity of command structures, logistical organization, strategy and tactics as being “as much matters of convenience as military necessity” and noted that such evidence “establishes nothing more than the potential for control inherent in the relationship of dependency which such financing produced.” 193 In the Appeals Chamber’s view, however, and while the evidence may not have disclosed the exact details of how the VRS related to the main command in Belgrade, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that a clear intention existed to mask the commanding role of the FRY; a point which was amply demonstrated by the Prosecution. 194 In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the finding of the Trial Chamber that the relationship between the FRY/VJ and VRS amounted to cooperation and coordination rather than overall control suffered from having taken largely at face value those features which had been put in place intentionally by Belgrade to make it seem as if their links with Pale were as partners acting only in cooperation with each other. Such an approach is not only flawed in the specific circumstances of this case, but also potentially harmful in the generality of cases. Undue emphasis upon the ostensible structures and overt declarations of the belligerents, as opposed to a nuanced analysis of the reality of their relationship, may tacitly suggest to groups who are in de facto control of military forces that responsibility for the acts of such forces can be evaded merely by resort to a superficial restructuring of such forces or by a facile declaration that the reconstituted forces are henceforth independent of their erstwhile sponsors.

155. Finally, it must be noted that the Trial Chamber found the various forms of assistance provided to the armed forces of the Republika Srpska by the Government of the FRY to have been “crucial” to the pursuit of their activities and that “those forces were almost completely dependent on the supplies of the VJ to carry out offensive operations.” 195 Despite this finding, the Trial Chamber declined to make a finding of overall control. Much was made of the lack of concrete evidence of specific instructions. Proof of “effective” control was also held to be insufficient, 196 on the grounds, once again, that the Trial Chamber lacked explicit evidence of direct instructions having been issued from Belgrade. 197 However, this finding was based upon the Trial Chamber having applied the wrong test.

156. As the Appeals Chamber has already pointed out, international law does not require that the particular acts in question should be the subject of specific instructions or directives by a foreign State to certain armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to be acting as de facto organs of that State. It follows that in the circumstances of the case it was not necessary to show that those specific operations carried out by the Bosnian Serb forces which were the object of the trial (the attacks on Kozarac and more generally within opština Prijedor) had been specifically ordered or planned by the Yugoslav Army. It is sufficient to show that this Army exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. This showing has been made by the Prosecution before the Trial Chamber. Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria required by international law.

157. An ex post facto confirmation of the fact that over the years (and in any event between 1992 and 1995) the FRY wielded general control over the Republika Srpska in the political and military spheres can be found in the process of negotiation and conclusion of the Dayton-Paris Accord of 1995. Of course, the conclusion of the Dayton-Paris Accord in 1995 cannot constitute direct proof of the nature of the link that existed between the Bosnian Serb and FRY armies after May 1992 and hence it is by no means decisive as to the issue of control in this period. Nevertheless, the Dayton-Paris Accord may be seen as the culmination of a long process. This process necessitated a dialogue with all political and military forces wielding actual power on the ground (whether de facto or de iure ) and a continuous response to the shifting military and political fortunes of these forces. The political process leading up to Dayton commenced soon after the outbreak of hostilities and was ongoing during the key period under examination. To the extent that its contours were shaped by, and thus reflect, the actual power structures which persisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the course of the conflict, the Dayton-Paris Accord provides a particular insight into the political, strategic and military realities which prevailed in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 1995, and including May 1992. The fact that from 4 August 1994 the FRY appeared to cut off its support to the Republika Srpska because the leadership of the former had misgivings about the authorities in the latter is not insignificant. 198 Indeed, this “delinking” served to emphasise the high degree of overall control exercised over the Republika Srpska by the FRY, for, soon after this cessation of support from the FRY, the Republika Srpska realised that it had little choice but to succumb to the authority of the FRY. 199 Thus, the Dayton-Paris Accord may indirectly shed light upon the realities of the command and control structure that existed over the Bosnian Serb army at the time the VRS and the VJ were ostensibly delinked, and may also assist the evaluation of whether or not control continued to be exercised over the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY army thereafter.

158. The Appeals Chamber will now turn to examine the specific fe atures of the Dayton Accord that are of relevance to this inquiry.

159. By an agreement concluded on 29 August 1995 between the FRY and the Republika Srpska and referred to in the preamble of the Dayton-Paris Accord, it was provided that a unified delegation would negotiate at Dayton. This delegation would consist of six persons, three from the FRY and three from the Republika Srpska. The Delegation was to be chaired by President Milo{evi}, who would have a casting vote in case of divided votes. 200 Later on, when it came to the signing of the various agreements made at Dayton, it emerged again that it was the FRY that in many respects acted as the international subject wielding authority over the Republika Srpska. The General Framework Agreement, by which Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY endorsed the various annexed Agreements and undertook to respect and promote the fulfilment of their provisions, was signed by President Milo{evi}. This signature had the effect of guaranteeing respect for these commitments by the Republika Srpska. Furthermore, by a letter of 21 November 1995 addressed to various States (the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom), the FRY pledged to take “all necessary steps, consistent with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the Republika Srpska fully respects and complies with the provisions” of the Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement (Annex 1A to the Dayton-Paris Accord). 201 In addition, the letter by which the Republika Srpska undertook to comply with the aforementioned Agreement was signed on 21 November 1995 by the Foreign Minister of the FRY, Mr. Milutinovi}, for the Republika Srpska . 202

160. All t his would seem to bear out the proposition that in actual fact, at least between 1992 and 1995, overall political and military authority over the Republika Srpska was held by the FRY (control in this context included participation in the planning and supervision of ongoing military operations). Indeed, the fact that it was the FRY that had the final say regarding the undertaking of international commitments by the Republika Srpska, and in addition pledged, at the end of the conflict, to ensure respect for those international commitments by the Republika Srpska, confirms that (i) during the armed conflict the FRY exercised control over that entity, and (ii) such control persisted until the end of the conflict.

161. This would therefore constitute yet another (albeit indirect) indication of the subordinate role played vis-à-vis the FRY by the Republika Srpska and its officials in the aforementioned period, including 1992.

162. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that, for the period material to this case (1992), the armed forces of the Republika Srpska were to be regarded as acting under the overall control of and on behalf of the FRY. Hence, even after 19 May 1992 the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be classified as an international armed conflict.



References:

1. See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 1: “I completely agree with and share in the Opinion and Judgment with the exception of the determination that Article 2 of the Statute is inapplicable to the charges against the accused. [176]
2. Judgement, para. 601. [177]
3. Ibid . [178]
4. Ibid ., paras. 601-602. [179]
5. As Judge McDonald noted: “ [ t ] he creation of the VRS [ after 19 May 1992 ] was a legal fiction. The only changes made after the 15 May 1992 Security Council resolution were the transfer of troops, the establishment of a Main Staff of the VRS, a change in the name of the military organisation and individual units, and a change in the insignia. There remained the same weapons, the same equipment, the same officers, the same commanders, largely the same troops, the same logistics centres, the same suppliers, the same infrastructure, the same source of payments, the same goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same operations. Importantly, the objective remained the same [ ... ] The VRS clearly continued to operate as an integrated and instrumental part of the Serbian war effort. [ ... ] The VRS Main Staff, the members of which had all been generals in the JNA and many of whom were appointed to their positions by the JNA General Staff, maintained direct communications with the VJ General Staff via a communications link from Belgrade. [ ... ] Moreover, the VRS continued to receive supplies from the same suppliers in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) who had contracted with the JNA, although the requests after 19 May 1992 went through the Chief of Staff of the VRS who then sent them onto Belgrade.” (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, paras. 7-8). [180]
6. In the light of the demand of the Security Council on 15 May 1992 that all interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately, the Trial Chamber characterised the dilemma posed for the JNA by increasing international scrutiny from 1991 onwards in terms of the way in which the JNA could: “ be converted into an army of what remained of Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, yet continue to retain in Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina while appearing to comply with international demands that the JNA quit Bosnia and Herzegovina. [ ... ] The solution as far as Serbia was concerned was found by transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units elsewhere while sending all non-Bosnian soldiers out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ensured seeming compliance with international demands while effectively retaining large ethnic Serb armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (Judgement, paras. 113-114). Additionally, the U.N. Secretary-General, in commenting on its purported withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded in his report of 3 December 1992 that “ [ t ] hough JNA has withdrawn completely from Bosnia and Herzegovina, former members of Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their equipment and constitute the Army of the ‘ Serb Republic’” (Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina , U.N. Doc. A/47/747, para. 10). [181]
7. Judgement, para. 115: “ ?T ghe VRS was in effect a product of the dissolution of the old JNA and the withdrawal of its non- Bosnian elements into Serbia. However, most, if not all, of the commanding officers of units of the old JNA who found themselves stationed with their units in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 May 1992, nearly all Serbs, remained in command of those units throughout 1992 and 1993 [ ... ] ”. See further ibid ., para. 590: “The attack on Kozarac was carried out by elements of an army Corps based in Banja Luka. This Corps, previously a Corps of the old JNA, became part of the VRS and was renamed the ‘ Banja Luka ’ or ‘ 1st Krajina ’ Corps after 19 May 1992 but retained the same commander.” See also ibid . , paras. 114-116, 118-121, 594. [182]
8. Ibid ., para. 118 (“Despite the announced JNA withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1992, active elements of what had been the JNA, now rechristened as the VJ [ ... ] remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the May withdrawal and worked with the VRS throughout 1992 and 1993”) and para. 569 (“ [ ... ] the forces of the VJ continued to be involved in the armed conflict after that date”). [183]
9. See in particular ibid ., para. 566: “The ongoing conflicts before, during and after the time of the attack on Kozarac on 24 May 1992 were taking place and continued to take place throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Bosnian Serb forces, elements of the VJ operating from time to time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and various paramilitary groups, all of which occupied or were proceeding to occupy a significant portion of the territory of that State.” See also para. 579: “ ?T ghe take-over of opština Prijedor began before the JNA withdrawal on 19 May 1992 and was not completed until after that date”. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald who noted “ ?t ghe continuity between the JNA and the VRS particularly as it relates to the military operations in the Opština Prijedor area [ ... ] .” (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 15). [184]
10. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that while concluding that by 19 May 1992 effective control over the VRS had been lost by the JNA/VJ, the Trial Chamber simultaneously observed that such control nevertheless did not appear to have been regained by the Bosnian authorities. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that the “Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina [ ... ] faced [ ... ] major problems [ ... ] of defence , involving control over the mobilization and operations of the armed forces ” (Judgement, para. 124, emphasis added). [185]
11. In and of itself, the logistical difficulties of disengaging from the conflict and withdrawing such a large force would have been considerable. With regard to the extent and depth of the involvement of the large number of JNA forces engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ongoing nature of their activities beyond 19 May 1992, see ibid . , paras. 124-125: “By early 1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 700 tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, much heavy weaponry, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. [ ... ] On 19 May 1992 the withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced but the attacks were continued by the VRS.” [186]
12. See in particular ibid ., para. 116 (citing the 1993 publication of the former Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Defence, General Veljko Kadijevi}, entitled My view of the Break-up: an Army without a State ( Prosecution Exhibit 30)): “ ?T ghe units and headquarters of the JNA formed the backbone of the army of the Serb Republic (Republic of Srpska) complete with weaponry and equipment [ ... ] ?F girst the JNA and later the army of the Republic of Srpska, which the JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate Serb territory, protect the Serb nation and create the favourable military preconditions for achieving the interests and rights of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina... ”. See also para. 590: “The occupation of Kozarac and of the surrounding villages was part of a military and political operation, begun before 19 May 1992 with the take-over of the town of Prijedor of 29 April 1992, aimed at establishing control over the opština which formed part of the land corridor of Bosnian territory linking the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia.” [
187]
13. While the relationship between the JNA and VRS may have included coordination and cooperation, it cannot be seen as limited to this. As the Trial Chamber itself noted: “In 1991 and on into 1992 the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces cooperated with and acted under the command and within the framework of the JNA .”( ibid ., para. 593; emphasis added). [188]
14. Ibid ., para. 598: “The Trial Chamber has already considered the overwhelming importance of the logistical support provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the VRS. [ ... ] [ I ] n addition to routing all high-level VRS communications through secure links in Belgrade, a communications link for everyday use was established and maintained between VRS Main Staff Headquarters and the VJ Main Staff in Belgrade [ ... ] .” [189]
15. Ibid ., para. 601. [190]
16. The Trial Chamber noted that: “ ? igt is clear from the evidence that the military and political objectives of the Republika Srpska and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were largely complementary. [ ...g The [ ... ] political leadership of the Republika Srpska and their senior military commanders no doubt considered the success of the overall Serbian war effort as a prerequisite to their stated political aim of joining with Serbia and Montenegro as part of a Greater Serbia. [ ... ] In that sense, there was little need for the VJ and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to attempt to exercise any real degree of control over, as distinct from coordination with, the VRS. So long as the Republika Srpska and the VRS remained committed to the shared strategic objectives of the war, and the Main Staffs of the two armies could coordinate their activities at the highest levels, it was sufficient for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ to provide the VRS with logistical supplies and, where necessary, to supplement the Bosnian elements of the VRS officer corps with non-Bosnian VJ or former JNA officers, to ensure that this process was continued” ( ibid ., paras. 603-604). [191]
17. Ibid ., para. 602. On this point, the Trial Chamber noted, further, that: “ given that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had taken responsibility for the financing of the VRS, most of which consisted of former JNA soldiers and officers, it is a fact not to be wondered at that such financing would not only include payments to soldiers and officers but that existing administrative mechanisms for financing those soldiers and their operations would be relied on after 19 May 1992 [ ... ] .” ( ibid. ). [192]
18. Ibid. [193]
19. See in this regard the testimony of the expert witness Dr. James Gow, transcript of hearing in The Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi} , Case No.: IT-94-1-T, 10 May 1996, pp. 308-309; ibid ., 13 May 1996, pp. 330-338. [194]
20. Judgement , para. 605. 196 It was deemed insufficient by the Trial Chamber that the VJ “ ‘ made use of the potential for control inherent in that dependence ’ , or was otherwise given effective control over those forces [ ... ] ” ( ibid .; emphasis added). [195]
21. The Trial Chamber noted that: “ the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), through the dependence of the VRS on the supply of matériel by the VJ, had the capability to exercise great influence and perhaps even control over the VRS [ ... ] ?However g there is no evidence on which this Trial Chamber can conclude that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ ever directed or, for that matter, ever felt the need to attempt to direct, the actual military operations of the VRS [ ... ] ” ( ibid. ). [197]
22. See Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of operations of an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) , S/1994/1074, 19 S eptember 1996, p. 3, where it is noted that as of 4 August 1994, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ordered, inter alia , the breaking off of political and economic relations with the Republika Srpska and the closure of the border between the Republika Srpska and the FRY to all transport towards the Republika Srpska , except food, clothing and medicine. International observers were deployed to monitor compliance with these measures, and it was reported by the Co-Chairmen that the Government of the FRY appeared to be “meeting its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces.” ( Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) , S/1994/1124, 3 October 1994, pp. 2-3). [198]
23. As outlined below, this process culminated in the agreement of the Republika Srpska to be represented at the Dayton conference by the FRY (below, at paragraph 159) . This appears to have been in spite of intense opposition, within the Republika Srpska , to the peace settlements proposed by the international community, as is evidenced by the overwhelming rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the international community’s peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in a referendum which took place in Bosnian Serb-held territory on 27 – 28 August 1994 ( See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization , UNGAOR, 49 th sess., supp. no. 1 (A/49/1), 2 September 1994, p. 95). [199]
24. This agreement stipulated th at the delegation of the Republika Srpska was to be “headed by the President of the Republic of Serbia Mr. Slobodan Miloševic” (Article 2). Pursuant to this agreement, the leadership of the Republika Srpska agreed “to adopt the binding decisions of the delegation, regarding the Peace Plan, in plenary sessions, by simple majority. In the case of divided votes, the vote of the President, Mr. Slobodan Miloševic, shall be decisive” (Article 3). That Mr. Miloševic was head of the joint delegation was confirmed by Mr. Miloševic himself in his letter of 21 November 1995 to President Izetbegovi} concerning Annex 9 to the Dayton-Paris Accord. (Agreement on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). [200]
25. This letter had been signed by Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the FRY, following a request of 20 November 1995 of the three members of the “Delegation of Republika Srpska ” to Mr. Miloševic. [201]
26. See the texts of the Dayton-Paris Accord (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled by the parties on 21 November 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/790, S/1995/999, 30 November 1995). [202]